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Introduction
Mephistopheles
Wo fehlt’s nicht irgendwo auf dieser Welt?
Dem dies, dem das, hier aber fehlt das Geld.
Vom Estrich zwar ist es nicht aufzuraffen;
Doch Weisheit weiß das Tiefste herzuschaffen.
In Bergesadern, Mauergründen,
Ist Gold gemünzt und ungemünzt zu finden,
Und fragt ihr mich, wer es zutage schafft:
Begabten Manns Natur- und Geisteskraft...
Ein solch Papier, an Gold und Perlen Statt,
Ist so bequem, man weiß doch was man hat,
Man braucht nicht erst zu markten noch zu tauschen,
Kann sich nach Lust in Lieb’ und Wein berauschen.
Will man Metall, ein Wechsler ist bereit,
Und fehlt es da, so gräbt man eine Zeit.
Pokal und Kette wird verauktioniert,
Und das Papier, sogleich amortisiert,...
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe,
Faust. Der Tragödie zweiter Teil
"Die Entstehung des Papiergelds - Lustgarten", part of a series of paintings by Siegfried Rischar
(1987) for Deutsche Bundesbank Regional Office in Hesse, illustrates the role of money in
Goethe’s epic Faust II. The throne room scene, in parts quoted above, tells us a lot about the two
unifying themes of this dissertation - the role of interest rates and debt for the economy. Interest
rates and debt are key policy instruments of monetary and fiscal policy and relevant not only
for individual decision making but also for the economy as a whole. In Goethe’s Faust II, the
emperor is in grave need of money to finance current expenditures and service the Reich’s out-
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Figure 1. Die Entstehung des Papiergeldes (Detail) – Siegfried Rischar, 1987.
©Deutsche Bundesbank, Foto: Waltraud Krase
standing debt. Mephisto, his fool, elaborates on that the emperor could pay all his obligations
using prospective future revenues from yet unmined natural resources. An endless stream of
noninterest-bearing debt obligations, or paper money, no longer backed by solid metal, seems
to be the sweet promise that solves all financial worries. Nevertheless, as the painting illustrates
likewise, bankruptcy looms in the distance as creditors want to get repaid at some point in time.
In modern societies, central banks have the Mephisto-esque power to create money from noth-
ing. However, for the story to end differently than in Goethe’s epic drama, they depend on the
treasury to honour outstanding obligations and the central bank to keep prices stable. Hence,
successful macroeconomic policy must walk the tightrope between minimizing welfare losses
by stabilizing shocks and ensuring that debt remains sustainable in the long run.
The present thesis takes a glance at both these aims. The first chapter contributes to
the literature on the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzle that discuss and analyze why
consumption behavior (at the macro level) is so much at odds with model predictions. Its main
result is that discrepancies between model predictions and empirical observations can be ex-
plained by monetary policy surprises, and the way the central bank conducts its policy.
The second chapter analyzes the transmission of monetary policy in an incomplete mar-
kets Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) Model with heterogeneous agents and a
life-cycle motive in the form of stochastic aging. Its main result is that implications from demo-
graphic change matter for the conduct of monetary policy - not only in the far future but already
today in understanding competing saving motives of young and old households. The chapter is
joint work with Christian Bayer and Ralph Lütticke.
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The third chapter contributes to the literature on fiscal policy in the Euro Area in light of
debates on fiscal rules, sustainable public finances and European economic integration lasting
for years. Using a Kalman-Filter approach it assesses the fiscal policy stance of European gov-
ernments before and after the European Debt Crisis. The following paragraphs summarize the
chapters in more detail.
Chapter 1: Empirical evidence on the movement of US consumption growth rates and real
interest rates does not square with predictions from theoretical models. In these models, the real
Federal Funds works as main transmission device of monetary policy. Following recessions or an
intervention by the central bank, the ex-post observed Federal Funds Rate and a model-implied
Euler equation rate move into opposite directions. In theory however, they should correlate
perfectly.
In the work Data, Model-implied Policy Rates and Consumption Euler Equations, I extend re-
search by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) who were the first to document this result. I
provide new evidence and find a possible way to resolve this problem. In a first step, I consider
the importance of the choice of the sample period. The original paper regards predictions from
quarterly Data from 1966 to 2005 which I update until 2017Q1. The first result is that the sign
of the correlation is not stable over a long time horizon. From the 1960’s to the early 1980’s
this chapter confirms the results of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), however this relation
breaks down during the so-called Great Moderation, from the 1980’s onwards. Moreover, var-
ious specifications of the consumption function adequately capture the long-term decrease in
real interest rates and consumption growth. From that time on the Federal Funds Rate and the
model-implied Euler rate correlate positively, as theory predicts. In a second step, I test whether
the Federal Funds rate and the Euler rate still move into opposite directions following a reces-
sion or a monetary policy intervention. Chapter 1 finds that regardless of the time period, both
rates move into opposite directions following a change in the Federal Funds rate, i.e. the Euler
rate systematically reacts to monetary policy. In a last step, I investigate what could be a po-
tential driver of this reaction. Macroeconomic theory under rational expectations tells us that
the variables of a model should not react to anticipated shocks. Here, this includes everything
that is in the information set of the central bank. Romer and Romer (2004) provided us event
study-based evidence on monetary policy surprises outside the scope of the central bank, called
narrative monetary policy shocks. I use them to cleanse the Federal Funds rate from its unex-
pected component. Using only the anticipated component of the Federal Funds rate, there is no
longer a significant reaction of the Euler rate to the stance of monetary policy.
Chapter 2: Consumption decisions of households have been reformulated as problems of
intertemporal choice since the days of Fisher (1930). However, they also depend on the current
stage of the household’s life-cycle as Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) show. Moreover, adding
income and wealth heterogeneity as described by models in the tradition of Hansen and Imro-
horoglu (1992), Huggett (1993), or Aiyagari (1994), allows to discuss inter- and intratemporal
effects of monetary or fiscal policy on consumption decisions. In the work Monetary Policy in a
Heterogeneous Agent Model with Aging we extend variants of the models in Bayer et al. (2015)
and Lütticke (2017) using a stochastic aging framework. The chapter builds on the premise
discussed e.g. in Miles (2002) who argues that the transmission of monetary policy might be
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different in a greyer world. In the presence of nominal rigidities and a life-cycle motive of con-
sumption, effects of monetary policy work among other things through intertemporal substitu-
tion, wealth effects and the individual (in)ability to borrow against expected lifetime income.
Changes in the age composition of the economy - or demographic change - may alter the rela-
tive importance of each channel for the respective household. Obviously, young households will
react differently to shocks to the policy rate as old households, given the fact that intertemporal
substitution plays a greater role for them, still. On the contrary, both young and old households
face wealth effects of monetary policy. Asset-rich, old households tend to benefit from posi-
tive rate hikes whereas young households find themselves faster close to their borrowing limit.
Nevertheless, as the amount of asset-rich households is generally small, an increase of the cen-
tral bank’s policy rate still depresses aggregate demand. Thus, monetary policy that considers
overall welfare, should take possible effects on inter-age group inequality into account, as well.
This chapter builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with heterogeneous
agents and stochastic aging. First-order perturbations around the stationary steady-steady are
used to answer the questions formulated above. From amethodological point of view this allows
to model a parsimonious life-cycle structure without having to track every single generation as
in the literature on overlapping generation (OLG) models. This enables us to study the general
equilibrium effects of monetary policy both between age groups and between different steady-
states, i.e. comparing very young and very old economies. Furthermore, including agents that
differ ex-post through different realizations of idiosyncratic labor productivity creates hetero-
geneity in the accumulation of assets. Using our model we are able to confirm results found
in the literature. Along the transition to an older society, the real return to capital will fall by
approximately 0.5 percentage points. Moreover, the consumption response to a monetary pol-
icy shock is different relative to the response of an incomplete markets economy without age
structure. Furthermore, this response differs significantly depending on the age composition of
the economy. Finally, including an age-structure into the HANK framework further reduces the
effect of forward guidance shocks, here measured as the difference between a persistent and a
transitory monetary policy innovation.
Chapter 3: The Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its successor,
the Fiscal Compact have been praised as the cornerstones of successful European economic
integration. Nevertheless, the last 20-25 years have seen endless discussions, failures to reform
and to commit credibly, and finally, the European debt crisis from 2010 onwards. The popular
debate in Germany favors the hypothesis of profligate southern Europeans bailed out using
German tax payers money. However, others correctly point out that the 2003 violation without
consequences of Germany and France has been the original Fall of Man. During times of distress
- as it is the case in every family - the discussion circles around arguments of solidarity versus
responsibility. It seems that abiding by European rules in fiscal policy (and other areas) has
not worked too well over the last 25 years. This includes Germany who usually takes a moral
high ground on that issue. For some countries even, the SGP has never been complied with
seriously, once they had been admitted to joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) in
1999. Especially, questions of enforcement remain a pending issue. Nevertheless, rule-based
fiscal policy evaluation is still seen by many as a necessary condition for the well-working of the
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European Monetary Union. Among other indicators, this evaluation is based on the structural
deficit, i.e. the discretionary part of the budget balance that does not fluctuate over the business
cycle. This figure or its components are unobservable and need to be estimated. Moreover, data
on variables relevant for fiscal policy as e.g. tax revenue statistics are usually only available at
an annual frequency. Thus, causal implications from fiscal policy measures, as can be derived
from DSGE models calibrated to a quarterly frequency, are difficult to reconcile with the data.
In the work Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: A 20 Years Empirical Perspective, I esti-
mate quarterly structural deficit series of 31 European countries on the basis of an Unobserved
Components Model (UCM) and the Kalman Filter. This enables an empirical assessment of Euro-
pean fiscal policy in the light of the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact and their
successor treaties. In comparison to related approaches to the question at hand, the chosen
econometric approach employs a direct, one-step estimation technique. This allows to evaluate
the fiscal policy stance within clearly defined statistical boundaries. The chapter documents
that the fiscal policy stance is countercyclical in most countries and that fiscal policy is active in
the sense of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. From a policy perspective, Chapter 3 finds that
after admittance to the monetary union in the late 1990’s, the Maastricht criteria, especially the
3% deficit ceiling were no longer taken seriously. Using safety-margins, i.e. values the structural
deficit can assume to stay within the 3% boundary, reveals that discretionary and not business
cycle-driven spending has been the driver of deficits in many European countries.
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1.1 Introduction
There exists a consensus in macroeconomic literature towards the modeling of conventional
monetary policy within Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The monetary
authority is assumed to set its operating instrument1 following a feedback rule towards policy
goals such as an inflation target or a certain level of unemployment. Additionally, the policy
instrument responds to exogenous, monetary disturbances which are not in the information set
of the central bank and affect policy goals only with a time lag - the monetary policy shock.
In monetary models with price rigidities, the transmission of a monetary policy shock to the
real economy is engineered via the Consumption Euler equation. In DSGE models, variants of
this equation represent the demand side of the economy and are at the core of the linearized
dynamic system that constitutes a rational expectations equilibrium, as e.g. the 3-equation basic
New Keynesian Model in Galí (2008). In contrast to the old Keynesian consumption function
that related consumption to disposable, aggregate income, the Consumption Euler equation
describes optimal decisions of an individual, representative household over the current and
future level of his consumption.2 A variant of it, linearized around the non-stochastic steady-
state, describes the relation between expected consumption growth and the real interest rate.
Modern consumption theory suggests that both should be perfectly and positively correlated.
Additionally, differences in each series’ volatility only stem from the degree of risk aversion as
1 As operating or policy instrument central banks usually use an overnight interest rate charged on reserves
borrowed from the central bank or use the reserve requirement ratio, i.e. the ratio of bank reserves to bank deposit
liabilities.
2 The gain in utility from consuming one unit less of the consumption good today, has to equal the discounted
gain in utility from consuming one more unit tomorrow times the return received on the previous’ period saving.
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captured by the household’s preferences. Thus, models that analyze monetary policy typically
view the Euler equation-implied interest rate as a market rate - the rate that clears the capital
market - and equate it to the policy instrument of the central bank.
Empirically however, tests based on predictions made by Consumption Euler equation mod-
els perform poorly. Following the famous rejection of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing
model (CCPAM) by Hansen and Singleton (1983), Hall (1988) or Campbell and Mankiw (1989)
among others, there exists repeatedly documented evidence that data on returns and consump-
tion expenditures are not consistent with model implications. A at that time standard model3
has not been capable of generating plausible real interest rate behavior in comparison to what
can be observed in the data. This failure has generated a lot of effort to improving the standard
model such that it matches empirical evidence from structural Vector Autoregressive Models
(VAR) as e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
Fuhrer (2000) documents that preferences that include habit formation are key to gener-
ate a more realistic, humped-shaped response of e.g. consumption or inflation to a monetary
policy shock. Moreover, Carroll (1992), Kimball (1990) or Aiyagari (1994) have documented
the importance of precautionary savings motives in an adequate description of consumption
behavior. However, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) among others, challenge the modeling
practice that equates the nominal interest rate targeted by the central bank with an interest
rate implied out of the Consumption Euler equation. For a variety of preference specifications -
including habits - they find that interest rates calculated out of a Consumption Euler equation
cannot be reconciled with observed market rates. Furthermore, the two rates are uncorrelated
or even negatively correlated. Their approach follows Fuhrer (2000) and estimates a reduced-
form VAR of consumption and inflation. They make use of the VAR’s dynamics and the first and
second conditional moments to derive the implied paths of the nominal or real interest rate.
These rates are then compared with ex-post observed rates. Additionally, the authors show that
the spread between both rates reacts systematically to the stance of monetary policy. In this
case, the model-implied interest rate responds negatively to contractionary monetary policy.
Ahmad (2005) extends this analysis towards six of the G7 countries and finds similar results -
an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decline in the implied model rate. He confirms
this result by comparing the responses of consumption and output following a money market
interest rate shock. Using the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) approach to VAR-
identification, he shows that the response of the model-implied interest rate to an increase
of the money market interest rate is negative. Both Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) and
Ahmad (2005) conclude that movements in implied interest rates can not be reconciled with
the theoretical foundation of the Consumption Euler equation. More recent work on that topic
by Collard and Dellas (2012) argues that the non-separability of consumption and leisure helps
to bring the data closer to theoretical predictions. In their paper, the model-implied interest
rate is positively correlated with the data and the average discrepancy between model and data
is lower. Additionally, the response of the model-rate towards an increase in the federal funds
3 The term standard refers to investors with logarithmic, or constant-relative risk aversion (CRRA), time-separable
preferences and the absence of habits, borrowing constraints or other financial frictions.
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rate is now slightly positive nevertheless, insignificant. Furthermore, Gareis and Mayer (2013)
argue that the negative correlation can be explained by risk premium disturbances. Finally,
Florio (2013) shows that accounting for financial frictions within the Euler equation helps to
bring the model closer to the data.
Using US data from 1960 to 2017, this chapter applies themethodology of Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2007) and highlights that the qualitative statement and the quantitative magnitude
of their results is highly conditional on the regarded time period. The correlation betweenmodel
and data is neither negative nor negligible for all subsamples. Two time periods are outstanding:
From the 1960’s to the early 1980’s there exists a strong negative correlation betweenmodel and
data and the spread between both rates reacts severely and highly significantly to an increase in
the federal funds rate. On the contrary, over the entire sample or a second subsample from the
1980’s until today, model and data correlate strongly positive. A partition of data and model-
implied rates into a trend and a cyclical component shows that the correlation is biased towards
negative values by the cyclical components. In contrast to that, the model is able to adequately
capture the trend behavior of consumption and interest rates over the sample. The reaction of
the spread to the stance of monetary policy is four to five times smaller in the later subsample
but still highly significant. Using narrative Romer and Romer (2004) shocks as instruments, this
chapter documents that the significant reaction to monetary policy has been due to surprise
actions by the monetary authority. Accounting for them, the reaction of the spread between
model and data to a change in the Federal Funds rate becomes insignificant in both economic
and statistic terms.
The remaining sections of the chapter proceed as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the proper-
ties of the dataset and section 1.3 discusses the model, inherent assumptions and states first
estimation results. Section 1.4 analyzes the influence of the sample horizon and section 1.5
explains how to reconcile these findings with the model’s predictions. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
I use quarterly data from 1960 - 2017 constructed using the Federal Reserve St. Luis database.
Variables are: Real per capita consumption expenditures of nondurable goods and services, real
per capita disposable income, a gross measure of inflation using nominal and real consumption
expenditures, the Federal Funds rate, producer prices, a measure of real GDP per capita without
consumption and the monetary aggregate M1. To account for the effects of unconventional
monetary policy, a Federal Funds shadow rate following Wu and Xia (2016) is used instead
of the Federal Funds rate from the years 2009 onwards. For the most recent years, both rates
coincide again. All data except the Federal Funds rate are in logs and the VAR is estimated with
four lags, the lag order suggested by both BIC and Hannan-Quinn information criterion. The
dataset corresponds to the specification of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007). However, the
sample length and the price index used for producer prices, differ.4 Figure 1.1 visualizes the
4 Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) use the Journal of Commerce industrial materials commodity. My robustness
checks contain the Thomson Reuters/CoreCommodity CRB Index (TR/CC CRB) obtained from Thomson/Reuters
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Figure 1.1. Key U.S. Macroeconomic Variables, 1960-2017, Annualized at Quarterly Frequency
Notes: The gure shows annual growth rates (log-dierences) at quarterly frequency for all variables except the Fed-
eral Funds rate. The subplot for the Federal Funds rate contains the ination-adjusted real rate (dashed), as well. From
the year 2009 onwards, the Federal Funds shadow rate provided by Wu and Xia (2016) substitutes the eective Federal
Funds rate.
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of Model Variables Over Dierent Samples
∆ Real Per Capita Ination ∆ Industrial Materials ∆ Real Disposable Federal Funds ∆ Real GDP ∆ M1
Consumption: ND+S Price Index Income Per Capita (Shadow) Rate per Capita
Sample Period: 1960-2017
Mean 0.0198 0.0365 0.035 0.0183 0.05 0.0148 0.0586
St. deviation 0.018 0.0263 0.0766 0.0364 0.0394 0.0528 0.0544
Min -0.0444 -0.0599 -0.416 -0.169 -0.0292 -0.149 -0.0708
Max 0.0828 0.132 0.369 0.173 0.178 0.226 0.325
Sample Period: 1969-1982
Mean 0.0193 0.0699 0.0881 0.0122 0.0853 -0.00219 0.0631
St. deviation 0.0208 0.0262 0.0739 0.0461 0.0381 0.0757 0.0298
Min -0.0444 0.03 0 -0.0842 0.0354 -0.14 -0.0225
Max 0.0631 0.132 0.369 0.173 0.178 0.226 0.144
Sample Period: 1983-2017
Mean 0.0169 0.0272 0.0215 0.0174 0.0378 0.017 0.06
St. deviation 0.0158 0.0162 0.0786 0.0342 0.0349 0.0396 0.065
Min -0.0315 -0.0599 -0.416 -0.169 -0.0292 -0.149 -0.0708
Max 0.053 0.0625 0.306 0.0971 0.114 0.118 0.325
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growth rates of the sample’s variables and Table 1.1 depicts summary statistics over the full
sample and subsamples which become important in later parts of the chapter. Appendix A.1
provides details and the exact sources of the employed data.
1.3 Economic Model and Preference Specications
The following section considers the household part of a very stylized general equilibrium model
in which a representative consumer maximizes his life-time utility subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. The resulting Consumption Euler equation builds - under different preference
specifications - the basis for the calculation of interest rates implied by the first and second
moments of a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR).
1.3.1 The Model
The model assumes complete markets, no borrowing constraints and decisions under full infor-
mation rational expectations. This is important to stress e.g. given the fact that precautionary
savings motives and imperfect or limited information could be an alternative explanation for
the spread between empirically-observed and theoretically-implied interest rates, as argued in
Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018).
The specification of the utility function considers the cases of constant, relative risk-aversion
(CRRA), internal habit formation in the tradition of Fuhrer (2000) and external habit formation
as in Abel (1990) or Abel (1999). The later two are described in the following subsection. Every
period, the representative agent divides his interest income from existing financial wealth bt–1
between consumption expenditures and the holding of two riskless one-period bonds. The first
one pays one unit of the consumption good in the next period and the second one pays one dollar.
The life-time utility maximization problem of the representative agent takes the following form:
Ut =
∞∑
j=0
β tEtu(Ct+ j , Zt+ j) (1.1)
subject to the following period budget constraint:
PtCt + Bt = (1 + it–1)Bt–1, (1.2)
where β is the consumer’s discount factor and Zt+ j the reference or habit level of consumption
evolving as:
Zt = ρZt–1 + (1 – ρ)Ct–1. (1.3)
Datastream. How the variable selection influences the replication of the original results in Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2007) is discussed in A.2.2.
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Pricing both bonds, using a stochastic discount factor looks as follows:
1
1 + rt
= βEt

U ′c(Ct+1, Zt+1)
U ′c(Ct , Zt)

1
1 + it
= βEt

U ′c(Ct+1, Zt+1)
U ′c(Ct , Zt)
1
1 + pit+1

,
where rt is the real and it is the nominal interest rate. Pt is the price of one unit of the con-
sumption good such that Pt+1Pt = (1+pit+1), the gross inflation rate. The ex-post real interest
rate rt is defined as (1+ it)/(1+pit+1). The different preference specifications discussed be-
low thus, affect the respective interest rate via different marginal rates of substitution. Out of
convenience I abstract from a consumption-leisure trade-off, which is unproblematic as long
as preferences are additively-separable.5 The generality of the model makes such extensions
however, straightforward.
1.3.2 CRRA Preferences
If the representative agent has preferences under constant, relative risk-aversion (CRRA), his
period utility is described by the following function:
u(Ct) =
C1–σt
1 – σ
,
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. This is nested in equation (1.1) and
(1.3) for ρ = 0, i.e. there exist no habits in consumption. For σ→ 1 this specification converges
towards log-utility preferences. The associated Euler equation looks as follows:
1
1 + it
= βEt

Ct+1
Ct
–σ 1
1 + pit+1

. (1.4)
The corresponding expression for the real return looks identical except for the terms correspond-
ing to the inflation rate in the denominator. Under the additional assumption that variables are
conditionally lognormal distributed this implies for the Euler equation under CRRA preferences
that:
1
1 + it
= β exp

–σ(Et ct+1 – ct) – Etpit+1 +
σ2
2
Vt ct+1 +
1
2
Vtpit+1 + σcovt(ct+1,pit+1)

.
(1.5)
Conditional lognormality is a strong assumption and Carroll (1997) points out the weaknesses of
Euler equation approximations. However, as DSGEmodels are often cast into a linearized form it
5 For the consequences of non-separability compare the already mentioned paper by Collard and Dellas (2012).
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is a comprehensive way to test their performance. Assuming that the dynamics of consumption
and inflation can be represented by a VAR model in companion form:
Yt = A0 + A1Yt–1 + et , et
iid∼ N(0,Σ) (1.6)
where Yt = [ct ,Πt , ppit , y
disp
t ,Rt , yt ,mt]. Variables denote the log of real consumption expen-
ditures and services per capita, the log of gross inflation. Additional control variables are the log
of a producer price index, the log of real disposable income per capita, the federal funds rate,
nonconsumption real GDP per capita and the log of the monetary aggregate M1. If necessary,
data has been seasonally adjusted.6 Conditional on the observed data the VAR specification
allows to form expectations one- or t-steps ahead. The VAR thus works as a predictor function
of the representative agent’s expectations. Using his expectations about consumption and infla-
tion, it is possible to derive implied nominal and real interest rates out of the Euler equation
specification derived above.
In the CRRA preferences case, I set σ = 2 and β = 0.9967 which corresponds to the average
real interest rate over the whole sample. I obtain first and second moments of the model by
using the following specification:
EtYt+1 = A0 + A1Yt (1.7)
EtYt+2 = A0 + A1EtYt+1 (1.8)
Vt(Yt+1) = Σ (1.9)
Vt(Yt+2) = A1ΣA
′
1 + Σ (1.10)
Covt(Yt+1,Yt+2) = ΣA
′
1, (1.11)
where it is important to note that in this case, the conditional second moments are time con-
stant. In contrast to Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), I do not use a linear-segmented trend.
Their proposition of a trend break around 1974 seems arbitrary with respect to other potential
breaks we can observe in the data, especially in the 1980’s. The following paragraph compares
implied nominal and real rates with the ex-post observed rates from the data. Alternative pref-
erence specifications used to obtain the remaining results are described further below. Table 1.2
illustrates estimation results and Figure 1.2 plots ex-post observed real market and real implied
model rates for the CRRA preference specification. In addition, it shows the respective spread
between model and data.
In contrast to the results of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)7, the estimation results
depicted in Table 1.2 suggest that the respective model matches the data better on average.
6 For further details on the data used in the estimation of the VAR see the appendix.
7 For results of the original paper, the interested reader is referred to Table 1 on p. 1867 in Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2007). Appendix A.2 has a paragraph on estimation results for the original time period and comparability
issues.
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Figure 1.2. Model-Implied Rates vs. Ex-Post Observed Rates (annualized)
Notes: The gure’s rst column shows the development of ex-post observed real interest rates (dashed) compared to
rates predicted from the VAR and the DSGE model (solid) for the CRRA preference specication. The second column
calculates the spread, i.e. the dierence between model rate and the data and sets and highlights period when the
US has been in a recession as classied by the NBER.
Table 1.2. Ex-post Observed and Model-Implied Nominal Interest Rates, 1960-2017
Time period: 1960-07-01 to 2017-01-01
Rates computed from models
Data CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
Mean 0.013 0.0095 0.0032 0.0014
St. deviation 0.029 0.024 0.026 0.022
Min -0.053 -0.07 -0.13 -0.071
Max 0.11 0.064 0.087 0.045
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.15 0.032 0.15
Nominal Rates
Mean 0.051 0.046 0.04 0.038
St. deviation 0.04 0.031 0.033 0.03
Min -0.029 -0.072 -0.05 -0.073
Max 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.11
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.51 0.44 0.54
The estimated model fits the mean interest rate quite well. Furthermore, the standard deviation
as well as the extrema come relatively close to the sample counterparts. Overall, observed and
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model-implied rates seem to follow a similar long term or trend pattern: Higher rates in the
early phase of the sample and lower rates for the most recent years. This is also the case for
nominal rates which are not plotted here. Surprisingly, the correlation coefficient describes a
strong, positive relationship between data and model for nominal interest rates. In addition,
implied real and observed real rates are weakly positively correlated. Figure 1.2 shows that the
model is able to replicate the trend found in interest rates but fails with respect to the cyclical
component. Cochrane (2017) argues that risk premiums have a clear business-cycle correlation
such that the above observation could be an indication of preference or risk premium shocks
driving model and data apart. Nevertheless, key findings of the work of Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2007) and Ahmad (2005) remains visible - it is not possible to reconcile the divergence of
data and model-implied rates following monetary policy (MP) interventions of the central bank.
With respect to the modeling of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in DSGEmodels
described above this constitutes a severe problem. Figure 1.2 and Table 1.3, show five periods of
Table 1.3. Implied- vs. Observed Interest Rates During Recessions or MP Interventions
Rates computed from models
Data CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
1967Q3 - 1968Q2 0.022 0.025 0.0098 0.015
1973Q4 - 1974Q3 -0.0064 0.026 0.029 0.018
1978Q3 - 1979Q2 0.021 -0.027 -0.012 -0.031
1979Q4 - 1980Q3 0.082 -0.03 -0.048 -0.036
2007Q4 - 2009Q2 -0.0037 -0.031 -0.021 -0.035
the Federal Reserves’ reaction to a monetary policy shock as identified in Ahmad (2005) plus the
Great Recession. The first period is 1967Q3 - 1968Q2 has rates moving in opposite directions,
the second 1973Q4 - 1974Q3 as well has model-implied rates which are high whereas market
rates are low, followed by 1978Q3-1979Q2 and 1979Q4 - 1980Q3 where model-implied rates
are low and market rates high.
Interest rates moving into opposite directions imply that the spread between model and data
widens. Using grey-shaded NBER recession dates in the right panel of Figure 1.2, this suggests
that model and data are more at odds in times of recessions or presumably, times of monetary
policy intervention. Finally, the model predicts strongly negative real interest rates following the
onset of the recent financial crisis, whereas as the observed nominal interest rate is of course
subject to the zero-lower bound (ZLB). A way to combine the shortcomings of the ZLB and the
negative model-implied rates is the use of a Federal Funds shadow rate as e.g. recently proposed
in Wu and Xia (2016). The shadow rate accounts for the effects of unconventional monetary
policy and thus the overall stance of monetary policy at the ZLB which is otherwise not present
in the effective Federal Funds rate. The results suggest that both the selection of the sample
horizon and monetary policy surprises seem to drive results apart.
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1.3.3 Preference Shocks
The significant difference in the behavior of the two interest rate series depicted in Figure 1.2
may stem from shocks to consumer’s preferences. A positive preference shock, incorporated in
an otherwise standard CRRA utility function looks as follows:
u(Ct) =
 Ct∆t 1–σ
1 – σ
 , (1.12)
where a preference shock is a (positive) innovation to Et(∆t+1 –∆t). Incorporated into equa-
tions (1.4) and (1.5) this implies
1
1 + it
=
βEt

∆t
∆t+1
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β˜t
 Et

Ct+1
Ct
–σ 1
1 + pit+1

, (1.13)
such that we can think of the preference- or taste shock as a time-varying component of the
discount factor. The conditional log-normal approximation is then given by:
1
1 + it
= β exp{–σ(Et ct+1 – ct)) + σ(Et(log(∆t+1) – log(∆t)) – Etpit+1
+
σ2
2
Vt ct+1 +
1
2
Vtpit+1 + σcovt(ct+1,pit+1)}. (1.14)
Other things equal, the positive preference shock pushes down the interest rate and agents
become less patient to clear the market. Suppose now that the model-implied rate is equalized
with the observed Federal Funds rate - however, the model does not account for movements
in the data due to innovations in preferences. Then the model-implied rate as shown in Figure
1.2 is too high compared to the data as the influence of the preference shock which depresses
the interest rate is falsely neglected. As already mentioned above, monetary policy uncertainty
until the Volcker disinflation regime switch plays a huge role. Incorporating the influence of
taste shocks in specifications that include habit formation as those described below yields the
same qualitative result. Before further investigating these findings for subsample periods, the
following section outlines and applies preferences with habit formation to the model.
1.3.4 Habit Formation
Preferences that incorporate habits are important for an adequate description of a consumer’s
consumption-saving problem. This paragraph provides a brief introduction to the problem at
hand. For a more thorough discussion the interested reader is referred to Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2008).
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The literature on empirical asset pricing identifies the fact that agents develop consumption
habits over time as one approach to explain the equity premium puzzle, as first identified in
the work of Mehra and Prescott (1985). The equity premium puzzle states that observed ex-
cess returns of shares over less risky assets are too high in order to be consistent with observed
consumption behavior unless risk aversion is tremendously high. Empirically, fluctuations in con-
sumption growth are small (around 1.8 percentage points in the chapter’s sample from 1960 to
2017, compare Table 1.1), which implies that high returns on risky assets can only be explained
if already small fluctuations in consumption have a strong negative impact on consumer’s util-
ity. A model, where consumers have CRRA or even log-preferences and do not form any habits,
as discussed, is not able to generate volatile enough consumption growth. In contrast to that,
habit formation specifies the period utility function in dependence of current consumption and
a reference level of consumption. As the term habit suggests, consuming more today makes con-
sumers want to consume at least as much or even more tomorrow. In other words, habits break
up the separability of preferences over time. If the stock of habits is of autoregressive nature as
depicted in (1.3), the parameter ρ captures persistence and sensitivity towards past consump-
tion levels. Under habits, consumers care more about variations of consumption relative to their
habit level, rather than variations in the level of consumption itself. The following paragraphs
describe two distinct variants of habit formation and apply them to the model.
Fuhrer et al. (2000)
For preferences incorporating the results on habit formation as in Fuhrer (2000), the represen-
tative agent has the following utility function:
u(Ct , Zt) =
1
1 – σ

Ct
Ct–1
C1–γt–1
1–σ
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (1.15)
Fuhrer (2000) estimated the autoregressive parameter of the habit formation process as in-
significant and close to zero, such that equation 1.3 reduces to Zt = Ct–1. Unlike under CRRA
preferences, period utility is no longer additively-separable over time. The current level of pe-
riod utility depends on today’s and yesterday’s choice of consumption. As a consequence, the
Consumption Euler equation including habits looks as follows:
1
β(1 + it)
= Et
 C–γ(1–σ)t–1 C–σt – βγC1–σt+1 C–γ(1–σ)–1t 
C–γ(1–σ)t C
–σ
t+1 – βγC
1–σ
t+2 C
–γ(1–σ)–1
t+1

(Pt/Pt+1)

, (1.16)
which nests the standard CRRA case for γ= 0. In contrast to the standard case, the represen-
tative agent wants to smooth both - consumption and its growth rate over time. Using the
assumption of conditional log-normality again, the approximation of (1.16) becomes:
[β(1 + it)]
–1 =
exp(dt) – βγexp(et)
exp(at) – βγexp(bt)
, (1.17)
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where coefficients are given by:
at = –γ(1 – σ)ct–1 – σct (1.18)
bt = (–γ(1 – σ) – 1)ct + (1 – σ)Et ct+1 +
(1 – σ)2
2
Vt ct+1 (1.19)
dt = –γ(1 – σ)ct – σEt ct+1 – Etpit+1 +
σ2
2
Vt ct+1 +
1
2
Vtpit+1 + σcovt(ct+1,pit+1)
(1.20)
et = (–γ(1 – σ) – 1)Et ct+1 + (1 – σ)Et ct+2 – Etpit+1 +
(γ(σ – 1) – 1)2
2
Vt ct+1
+
(1 – σ)2
2
Vt ct+2 +
1
2
Vtpit+1 + (1 – σ)(γ(σ – 1) – 1)covt(ct+1, ct+2)
– (1 – σ)(covt(pit+1, ct+2) – (γ(σ – 1) – 1)covt(pit+1, ct+1)). (1.21)
Again, a reduced-form VAR gives the first and second moments which are then used to calcu-
late the implied nominal and real rates out of the model. Following Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2007), I set the discount factor β = 0.986, risk aversion σ = 2 and the degree of habit persis-
tence γ= 0.6. Results are again shown in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2. Similar to the case of CRRA
preferences, the correlation between model-implied and ex-post observed rates is moderately
positive for nominal rates and close to zero for real rates. Additionally, all summary statistics
come very close to the data - the Fuhrer (2000) specification even outperforms the CRRA case
for a few summary statistics. Nevertheless, as for the CRRA case, both rates diverge during the
identified periods of monetary policy action.
Abel (1990, 1999)
In the specification of Abel (1990, 1999), period utility depends on the ratio of current consump-
tion to a reference level, as specified in (1.1). In contrast to Fuhrer (2000) however, habits are
external and not internal. Here, the habit level is a function of the lagged aggregate instead
of the lagged individual level of consumption. This assumption simplifies the first-order condi-
tion of the household and is feasible as long as in equilibrium, aggregate and individual growth
rates of consumption will be the same. Parameter values of the log-linear approximated Con-
sumption Euler equation are picked following an algorithm that matches unconditional first
and second moments of the model with respective sample moments. In Abel (1999)’s model,
the representative agent i maximizes the following utility function:
Ut(i) = Et
(∞∑
j=0
β j

1
1 – σ

Ct(i)
Zt
1–σ)
, (1.22)
where σ is the degree of risk aversion, β the discount factor and Ct(i) the individual level
of consumption. The habit level of consumption is given by Zt = C
γ0
t C
γ1
t–1G
γ2 . It refers to the
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current and past aggregate level of consumption and its average trend growth rate, G. Using
that in equilibrium both growth rates coincide, the implied nominal interest rate out of the
Consumption Euler equation looks as follows:
1
1 + it
= β˜Et

Ct
Ct–1
γ1(σ–1)Ct+1
Ct
–σ Pt
Pt+1

, (1.23)
where β˜ = βGγ2(σ–1). The equation results from imposing three restrictions that guarantee
unique parameter values: γ0 = 0, 0≤ γi ≤ 1, and G = 1+µ, where µ refers to the mean growth
rate of aggregate consumption. As above, the implied real rate is the same except for the terms
involving the price level. Under the restrictions imposed above, Abel (1999)’s methodology only
applies to the case where consumption growth is iid. lognormal. However, following the results
of Fuhrer (2000), the dynamics of consumption and inflation are well represented using a Vector
Autoregressive Model (VAR), where variables are jointly lognormal. Abel (1999)’s calibration
method leads to biased parameters estimates. Nevertheless, as Ahmad (2005) argues, Abel’s
methodology is a good reference point even under a joint lognormal distribution in order to
generate a series whose mean and variance are close to the observed ones in the sample. Taking
a lognormal approximation around (1.23) and imposing the restrictions on the γ’s gives:
1
1 + it
= β˜ exp{–γ1(σ – 1)ct–1 + (σ + γ1(σ – 1))ct – σEt ct+1 – Etpit+1
+
σ2
2
Vart ct+1 + 0.5Vartpit+1 + σCov(ct+1,pit+1)}. (1.24)
Results are virtually identical to the cases considered above however, the first to specifications
match the data more closely.
1.4 The Importance of the Sample Horizon
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) argue that model-generated and ex-post observed rates
are generally uncorrelated and move into opposite directions in response to a change in the
monetary policy instrument. Assuming that the way the household forms expectations does not
change over time (i.e. estimate one VAR over the entire sample), the size and the sign of the
correlation coefficient should not change between subsamples.8 As this section shows, this is
not the case. The moderate correlation for nominal rates and the low correlation for real rates
estimated over the full sample horizon could be due to averaging. For this reason, the following
step splits the sample into two subsamples. The first comprises an episode called the Great
Inflationwhereas the second subsample looks at the last 30 years. It includes the so-called Great
Moderation, the recent financial crisis and beyond. Differences over the sample horizon could
8 Looking at smaller subsamples means that the series, estimated using the full-sample VAR is split at several
points and compared with observed rates within this period.
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Figure 1.3. Model-Implied Rates vs. Ex-Post Observed Rates (annualized)
Notes: The gure’s rst column shows the development of ex-post observed real interest rates (dashed) compared
to rates predicted from the VAR and the DSGE model (solid) for the Fuhrer (2000) and Abel(1990,1999) preference
specication. The second column calculates the spread, i.e. the dierence between model rate and the data and sets
and highlights period when the US has been in a recession as classied by the NBER.
be either due to a change in the way agents form expectations or because the macroeconomic
environment has changed tremendously. This chapter focuses on the later and thus assumes that
the estimated coefficients of the VAR are time-constant. The following subsections motivate and
discuss the choice of these subsamples.
1.4.1 Great Ination
Meltzer (2005) describes the high inflation period from the mid-1960’s to the mid-1980’s with
inflation rates varying between two and 15 percent as the []...“the climactic monetary event of
the last part of the 20th century.” Siegel (1994) even calls it “[]...the greatest failure of American
macroeconomic policy in the postwar period”. During this period, the Bretton-Woods system
which had been established during World War II collapsed, two oil-price shocks caused severe
damage and the economy suffered from four recessions. In addition, macroeconomic theory
and the way policy makers thought about monetary policy started to change as a consequence
of outcomes of this episode. Finally, this period provides the biggest spread between model and
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data, as the right half of Figure 1.2 shows. Furthermore, the spread seems to be positive on
average, whereas it appears to be negative on average for the later part of the sample.
The following Table 1.4 displays sample moments and correlation from 1969 to 1982. Model
Table 1.4. Ex-post Observed and Model-Implied Nominal Interest Rates, 1969-1982
Time period: 1969-01-01 to 1982-10-01
Rates computed from models
Data CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
Mean 0.016 0.0097 0.0015 0.0013
St. deviation 0.032 0.031 0.037 0.028
Min -0.035 -0.052 -0.13 -0.062
Max 0.11 0.06 0.065 0.045
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.0061 -0.05 0.0072
Nominal Rates
Mean 0.087 0.078 0.07 0.069
St. deviation 0.039 0.024 0.034 0.021
Min 0.035 0.0076 -0.035 0.0019
Max 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.11
corr(Data,Model) 1 -0.41 -0.24 -0.41
and data are far from being positively correlated as the correlation coefficients are close to zero
for real and negative, in the range of -0.30 to -0.13 for nominal rates. Upon other explanations
as e.g. the high inflation period, the Federal Reserve’s behavior in response to shocks could
be an explanation for the switch of the sign of the correlation coefficient. If agents had been
surprised a lot by the Fed’s policy but their expectations had been based on a version of the
models revisited above, the huge spread between model and data appears to be quite natural.
The next section will cast a closer look upon that hypothesis using narrative policy evidence
provided by Romer and Romer (2004).
1.4.2 Great Moderation and Beyond
The second subsample includes the years from 1983 to 2017. It comprises the years of the Great
Moderation, a term coined by Stock and Watson (2002) and former Federal Reserve chairman
Ben Bernanke.9 This period has seen a reduction in the volatility of Real GDP and inflation
relative to the 1970’s as Table 1.1 showed. Moreover, both nominal interest and real rates and
inflation exhibited some trend decline. Monetary policy fought high inflation rates by respond-
ing aggressively to inflationary shocks (as argued in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Boivin
9 Bernanke referred to this in a speech at the meeting of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC on
February 20, 2004.
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and Giannoni (2006) or Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) among others). The years of the finan-
cial crisis or Great Recession are included into the subsample on purpose, as both interest rates
and consumption follow a similar trend decrease since the 1980’s and are thus rather positively
correlated. Between 2008 to 2015, when the effective Federal Funds rate hit the ZLB, i.e. is
lower than 0.25%, the shadow rate calculated from the model by Wu and Xia (2016) has been
used instead of the Federal Funds rate. Furthermore, Figure 1.2 supports the argument to dis-
tinguish these two episodes as mean and variance of the spread are smaller on average over
the last 30 years. In contrast to the first subsample, the second one shows a strong positive
Table 1.5. Ex-post Observed and Model-Implied Nominal Interest Rates, 1983-2017
Time period: 1983-01-01 to 2017-01-01
Rates computed from models
Data CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
Mean 0.0092 0.0035 -0.00056 -0.0041
St. deviation 0.031 0.019 0.022 0.017
Min -0.053 -0.07 -0.077 -0.071
Max 0.08 0.048 0.058 0.038
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.38 0.2 0.38
Nominal Rates
Mean 0.036 0.03 0.026 0.022
St. deviation 0.034 0.025 0.025 0.023
Min -0.029 -0.072 -0.05 -0.073
Max 0.11 0.091 0.1 0.081
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.62 0.49 0.63
correlation that ranges from 0.5 to 0.6 for nominal and a moderate one between 0.2 and 0.35
for real rates. Table 1.5 displays the respective results.
1.4.3 What’s driving the correlation
I conclude this section with an alternative way to think about the surprisingly distinct results for
correlation coefficients between model and data at different points in time. For a given sample
or subsample period, the calculated correlations coefficients report the ratio of the model’s and
the data’s covariance over the product of the sample variances. In any case, this involves some
sort of averaging over the entire (sub)sample. Using a correlation coefficient, augmented with
a weighted, two-sided rolling window, reveals that the correlation centered around a specific
date or point is far from being always negative in earlier and always positive in later years.10
Figure 1.4 depicts this sequence of correlations within an eight quarter window, and illustrates
10 Appendix A.3 provides the formula used to obtain smoothed correlation coefficients.
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Figure 1.4. Smooth Correlation and Smooth Mean of Interest Rate and Model Rate
Notes: The gure shows the smoothed correlation and smoothedmean of observed interest- andmodel-implied rates
using a eight-year rolling window. Appendix A.3 provides the exact formulas.
that the rolling-window correlation is much more volatile than expected. Furthermore, big re-
versals of the series of correlation coefficients seems to take place around NBER recession dates
which underlines the hypothesis that the business cycle plays an important role in explaining
the divergence of model and data. In addition, the sample average over the rolling-window cor-
relation coefficients does not coincide with the coefficients calculated in Tables 1.2, 1.4 or 1.5.
To understand, where the volatility, inherent in Figure 1.4 comes from, I cast a closer look on
the smoothed, weighted means, used to calculate the rolling correlation. A similar pattern as
in Figure 1.2 emerges. The model is not too bad in capturing the long-term trend movements,
but it fails at predicting business cycle movements.
Using a standard HP-filtering approach to separate trend and cyclical component of both
model-implied and observed rates, reveals that the cyclical components of the model and the
data are negatively correlated. From the Consumption Euler equation we know that cyclical
components should be highly positively correlated. In contrast to that, the size of the correlation
coefficient for the trend components is close to the one calculated in the replication of Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2007)’s results. Moreover, the cyclical component of the spread between
model and data is negatively correlated with the cyclical component of both real and nominal
interest rates. This confirms the result of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) that monetary
expansions over the business cycle are associated with a wider discrepancy between model and
data. The following table visualizes this result using the HP-Filter and the Baxter-King-Filter.
Results for the later are robust to findings using the HP-Filter. The filtered data comprises the
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Table 1.6. Cyclical and Trend Correlation of Data with Model Rates
Time period: 1963 to 2013
HP-Filter CRRA Fuhrer et. al. (2000) Abel (1999)
Trend
real 0.319 0.0841 0.304
nominal 0.643 0.489 0.652
Cycle
real -0.276 -0.299 -0.281
nominal -0.257 -0.11 -0.228
corr(SpreadC , Interest RateC )
real -0.777 -0.661 -0.802
nominal -0.757 -0.605 -0.771
Time period: 1963 to 2013
Baxter-King-Filter CRRA Fuhrer et. al. (2000) Abel (1999)
Trend
real 0.504 0.443 0.501
nominal 0.785 0.795 0.793
Cycle
real -0.23 -0.189 -0.238
nominal -0.216 -0.101 -0.186
corr(SpreadC , Interest RateC )
real -0.759 -0.8 -0.788
nominal -0.752 -0.727 -0.77
Notes: The Table displays the correlation coecient between model and data
rate when the interest rate is seperated into a trend and a cyclical component.
This is done on the full sample, the data loss on both sides is due to the Baxter-
King lter.
full sample, however, use of the Baxter-King filter leads to a loss of 8 quarters at both sides of
the sample. To ensure comparability of results between both filters I truncate the HP-filtered
data, respectively.
1.5 Explaining the Spread between Model and Data
Section 1.3 confirmed the result of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) and Ahmad (2005)
who link the stance of monetary policy to the wedge between model and data. Also, section 1.4
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showed that the selection of the sample horizon seems to matter in so far as the model-implied
rates track the data much closer from the 1980’s on. There are several possibilities to bring this
observation to the data. In a first step, the following subsections show that the wedge between
model and data indeed moves into opposite directions following a monetary policy intervention.
In the second step, this chapter provides a way to resolve this issue.
1.5.1 Canzoneri et al. approach
Table 1.7. Response of Interest Rate Spreads to Monetary Policy (Quarterly Data)
Time period: 1969-01-01 to 1982-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
FFR -0.843 -0.92 -0.915
(0.2151) (0.3272) (0.3247)
R2ad 0.6077 0.3399 0.3393
Nominal Rates
FFR -1.45 -1.6 -1.45
(0.1665) (0.2408) (0.1635)
R2ad 0.8486 0.6903 0.8616
Time period: 1983-01-01 to 2008-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
FFR -0.225 -0.572 -0.447
(0.1243) (0.1486) (0.1305)
R2ad 0.4247 0.3527 0.2501
Nominal Rates
FFR -0.253 -0.511 -0.267
(0.06008) (0.1235) (0.06112)
R2ad 0.7183 0.3392 0.7307
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. In each regression, the spread (de-
ned as the interest rate computed from each models Euler equation less the federal
funds rate) is regressed on four lags of the spread and an indicators of monetary pol-
icy. Only the coecients and corresponding standard errors for the monetary policy
variables are reported.
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) regress the spread between model and data on measures
of monetary policy and investigate the impact of a movement in the Federal Funds rate on the
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Consumption Euler Rate. In contrast to that, Ahmad (2005) conducts a structural VAR analysis
in the tradition of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). The difference between both
approaches is that Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) considers any movement in the pol-
icy instrument of the central bank, i.e. expected and unexpected whereas Ahmad (2005) only
analyzes surprise ones.
Following Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), I regress the spread (defined as the model-
generated interest rate minus the data) on four own lags and the contemporaneous Federal
Funds rate.
spreadt = β0 +
4∑
i=1
βispreadt–i + F FRt + νt (1.25)
The included lags capture the autoregressive nature of the series (as can be seen in Figure 1.2)
and the Federal Funds rate represents the instrument of monetary policy. If monetary policy
drives the difference between data and model, an increase in the monetary policy instrument
should lead to a significant and negative coefficient. Furthermore, the original paper uses a
second measure (the ratio of non-borrowed reserves plus extended credit to total reserves)
which I will not employ here. A reason for that is the explosion of non-borrowed reserves from
2008 on which would bias any result towards that period. The following Table 1.7 reports
regression results. Monetary contractions, i.e. a higher federal funds rate cause the spread to
narrow. All estimated coefficients are highly significant. This is surprising as Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2007) report insignificant results for rates calculated from Fuhrer (2000)’s model.
Again, there is a substantial difference between the two periods from 1969 to 1982 and 1983 to
2017. In addition, there is no qualitative difference in the reaction of nominal and real model-
implied interest rates. However, the coefficient for nominal rates approaches the coefficient for
real rates in the latter half of the sample, whereas there is a enormous difference between both
in the first half. As a robustness check, I calculate the spread between data and model using the
3-month T-Bill rate as money market rate. The Federal Funds rate remains the instrument of
monetary policy. This ensures that the sign of the monetary policy indicator in Table 1.7 is not
negative by construction. Results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very close to the
original setting. Appendix A.2.2 provides the respective results. Overall, these results confirm
and extend the finding of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007). A possible shortcoming of this
approach is the role of unconventional monetary policy from 2008 onwards which is present
in the top of Table 1.7. The zero-lower bound for nominal interest rates induced a shift from
the conventional policy instrument as the implied federal funds rate to more unconventional
instruments. Using the a Federal Funds shadow rate as proposed in Wu and Xia (2016) is one
way to account for these effects. Nevertheless, themain statement of this section, that the impact
of a change in the federal funds rate on the spread is tremendously higher from 1969 to 1982
does not change when the regarded second sample already ends in 2008.
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1.5.2 Narrative Identication
In what follows I will cast a closer look upon the early sample, i.e. the late 1960’s until the early
1980’s. The above results suggest that changes in the policy rate often surprised agents which
drives the spread between model and data apart. If this was the case, the above regression is
misspecified as ex-post observed data on the Federal Funds rate is correlated with these policy
surprises. Hence, results are biased. The standard way to heal this bias is to find a suitable instru-
ment for the Federal Funds Rate. Assume that the Federal Reserves follows some sort of Taylor
(1991) rule with an endogenous reaction to the state of the economy and a surprise component.
Using the residual of the regression of changes in the implied Federal Funds Rate on Greenbook
forecasts, i.e. the Romer and Romer (2004) measure of monetary policy shocks, it is possible to
control for these surprise moments. In order to test this hypothesis I will use narratively identi-
fied monetary policy shocks11 until 2008 to instrument the Federal Funds rate at the first-stage
of an IV regression. Analogously to Romer and Romer (2004), I include the cumulated sum
of the narrative shock series provided that the federal funds rate is usually measured in levels.
Table 1.8 shows the results. In comparison to Table 1.7 results change tremendously. Monetary
policy action does no longer have a highly significant influence on the spread between model
and data in case of CRRA preferences. In comparison to the results in Table 1.7, the reaction to
the FFR becomes larger (less negative) as well. Puzzling however is that Fuhrer (2000)’s and
Abel (1999)’s specification still react significantly - and even stronger - to the stance of monetary
policy.
Nevertheless, this puzzle vanishes with regards to the second subsample (due to Greenbook
forecast lag only until 2008). All coefficients lose their economic and statistical significance
which is precisely the result this exercise was looking for. Controlling for the unpredictable
component of monetary policy implies that movements in the FFR no longer widen the spread
between model and data. This result is in line with the literature on announcement effects of
monetary policy, e.g. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
1.6 Conclusion
When DSGE models with are very standard approach to towards the consumption-savings prob-
lem are put to the data, a fundamental problem concerning the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy arises. Theoretical predictions that the real interest rate was a sufficient statis-
tic for consumption growth are not reconcilable with the data. Especially, interest rates implied
out of a Consumption Euler equation - are weakly or even negatively correlated with their em-
11 This measure of monetary policy shocks has been introduced by Romer and Romer (2004) and has been updated
by Coibion et al. (2012) and can be downloaded from Yuri Gorodnichenko’s homepage. For the time period 1969
(due to availability of the shock series) until 1982 I will employ the original series. For the period 1983 until 2008
(due to the publication lag of the Greenbook forecasts) I will make use of the extended series. Figure A.1 in the
appendix shows that the extended and revised series comes very close to the Romer and Romer (2004) series during
the original time period.
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Table 1.8. Response of Interest Rate Spreads to Monetary Policy (Narrative Approach)
Time period: 1969-01-01 to 1982-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
FFR -0.384 -1.03 -0.886
(0.3667) (0.3656) (0.3914)
R2ad 0.5532 0.5696 0.6135
Nominal Rates
FFR -0.473 -1.87 -0.833
(0.543) (0.6097) (0.4371)
R2ad 0.5899 0.49 0.7453
Time period: 1983-01-01 to 2008-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer (2000) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
FFR 0.0257 0.118 0.0579
(0.1341) (0.2389) (0.1557)
R2ad 0.375 0.09589 0.268
Nominal Rates
FFR 0.0486 -0.129 0.045
(0.1148) (0.2066) (0.1079)
R2ad 0.5436 0.2123 0.6106
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In each regression, the Federal Funds Rate is
regressed in a rst stage on the narratively identied Romer and Romer rates plus
four lags of the spread. The second stage regresses the t of the rst stage plus 4 lags
of the spread on the spread (dened as the interest rate computed from eachmodels
Euler equation less the Federal Funds rate). Only the coecients and corresponding
standard errors for the monetary policy variables are reported.
pirical counterparts. A lot of recent work in the tradition of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)
showed that this poses a severe problem for the modeling of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. In this class of models the nominal interest rate is set by the central bank via
a Taylor rule. Changes in the policy instrument affect expectations over the price level and the
growth rate of consumption. The model predicts that the correlation between a money market
rate as e.g. the Federal Funds rate and a rate implied from changes in the expectations over
consumption growth has to be unity. If empirical evidence is not able to confirm this prediction,
this suggests that we should further augment the modeling of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. In order to solve this problem, previous work focused on alternative household
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preferences as e.g. habit formation or non-separability between consumption and leisure. Both
approaches have been able to improve the fit of the model, however none plausibly solved this
surprising result.
The present chapter of my thesis contributes to the existing literature on the empirical va-
lidity of Consumption Euler equation-implied behavior with respect to three points:
First, the existing lack of a clear-cut explanation for the puzzling finding that the correlation
between model-implied and observed rates has the wrong sign is not only due to using a bad
model. A closer look to different periods of a long data sample (1960-2017) as this chapter
did, reveals that the sample horizon plays a crucial role for the determination of the sign of
the correlation coefficient between model and data. This correlation has been zero or even
negative during a subsample from 1969 until 1982 when the Volcker disinflation heralded a
shift towards a new monetary policy regime. The strong positive correlation between model
and data observed during the last 30 years confirms this notion. The last ten years amplify this
result as consumption growth and nominal / real interest rates moved into the same direction
during the recession.
Second, the model does surprisingly well in capturing the long-term trends observed in the
data: consumption growth and real rates have been declining for 35 years, a behavior model-
implied interest rates can account for excellently. Digging deeper into that observation reveals
that following a separation of model-implied and observed rates into a trend and a cyclical com-
ponent, the trend components of model and data are strongly correlated over the full sample.
In contrast to that, the cyclical behavior seems to drive a lot of the observed negative corre-
lation from 1969 to 1982 and works as a downward bias of the correlation coefficient during
from 1983 until today. Alternative approaches towards the calculation of the correlation using
a rolling-window support this result. Furthermore, the graphical results revealed that variation
or discrepancy between model and data is strongly pronounced around recession dates.
This brings the chapter to the final and third contribution, which picks up a point made in
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007): The spread between model-implied and observed interest
rate reacts systematically to the stance of monetary policy. This fact can be replicated plus
the observation that this reaction has been much stronger pronounced for the 1969 to 1982
subsample. However, if one controls for surprise movements in the Federal Funds rate using the
(extended) Romer and Romer (2004) shock series, this significant reaction disappears in both
economic and statistical terms. Concluding, the chapter suggests that it is worth investigating
more into what affects the business cycle components of variables inside the Consumption Euler
equation. Risk-premium or preference shocks and a departure from the representative agent
framework seem to be plausible candidates.
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A.1 Data Appendix
VAR Data:
All data has been downloaded from https://research.stlouisfed.org/, the FRED
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis. The following overview provides the exact
classification of the data series employed and how all variables used in the estimation process
are constructed. This will help to ensure replicability and transparency of the empirical work
done. The maximum data length is 1959 to 2017. One year was lost due to constructing an
inflation rate out of consumer prices. Data series used in the VAR are:
• Real Personal Consumption Expenditures ND+Services
A796RX0Q048SBEA + A797RX0Q048SBEA
• Nominal Personal Consumption Expenditures ND+Services
A796RC0Q052SBEA + A797RC0Q052SBEA
• Real Disposable Income, DPIC96
• Civilian Population, CNP16OV
• Federal Funds Rate 7Day Average (quarterly data as monthly average), DFF
• Inflation Rate, calculated as log( PtPt–1 ) out of nominal and real consumption expenditures.
• Real GDP, GDPC96
• Production Price Index, PPIIDC
• Monetary Aggregate M1, M1SL
which have been used to construct the following variables described in the text:
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ct = log
A796RX0Q048SBEA + A797RX0Q048SBEA
CNP16OV

ydispt = log
 DPIC96
CNP16OV

Rt =
4
√√
1 +
DFF
100

– 1
Pt =
A796RC0Q052SBEA + A797RC0Q052SBEA
A796RX0Q048SBEA + A797RX0Q048SBEA

yt = log
GDPC96 – A796RX0Q048SBEA + A797RX0Q048SBEA
CNP16OV

ppit = log (PPIIDC)
mt = log (M1SL)
Other Data:
The 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate can be downloaded from the FRED
database using the following series identifier: TB3MS The Federal Funds shadow rate has
been provided by Wu and Xia (2016) and can be downloaded for monthly updates on: https:
//sites.google.com/site/jingcynthiawu/home/wu-xia-shadow-rates As producer prices might
have been an issue in the VAR specification, I run a robustness-check using data including the
Thomson Reuters/CoreCommodity CRB Index (TR/CC CRB) obtained from Thomson/Reuters
Datastream, as the Journal of Commerce JOC-ECRI Industrial Price Index used in Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2007) has not been publically available for me.
A.2 Robustness Checks
A.2.1 Replicating the Canzoneri et al. (2007) Setup
The following Table A.1 compares results estimated for the period 1966Q1 until 2004Q4 as
Table 1 in the original Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) paper on page 1867. To bring the
specification as close as possible to the original one, I use a commodity price index instead of a
standard producer price index and furthermore, no monetary aggregate M1. Two observations
are striking. Comparing my results to the respective original model formulation shows that
they are quite distinct. Whereas the deviation is still tolerable in the CRRA case, results differ
tremendously for the cases with habits. Moreover, my results fit the data much better although
the same calibration of parameters (e.g. discount factor, risk aversion etc.) has been chosen.
Moreover, the correlation betweenmodel and data is only close to the original paper for nominal
rates in the CRRA case. For real rates the sign of the correlation coefficient is identical and
negative.
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Table A.1. Replication of Canzoneri et al. (2007)
Time period: 1966-01-01 to 2004-10-01
Rates computed from models
Data Orig. CRRA CRRA Orig. Fuhrer (2000) Fuhrer (2000) Orig. Abel (1999) Abel (1999)
Real Rates
Mean 0.0209 0.0708 0.015 0.0566 -0.0711 0.0834 -0.00475
St. deviation 0.0253 0.0255 0.0199 0.313 0.0377 0.266 0.0176
Min -0.0349 0.0164 -0.0511 -0.757 -0.277 -0.704 -0.072
Max 0.107 0.106 0.0542 0.952 0.0323 0.703 0.0332
corr(Data,Model) 1 -0.37 -0.121 -0.07 -0.191 -0.36 -0.132
Nominal Rates
Mean 0.0649 0.116 0.06 0.101 -0.0289 0.128 0.0396
St. deviation 0.0327 0.0198 0.0333 0.315 0.0395 0.259 0.0217
Min 0.01 0.0746 0.0144 0.0144 -0.191 -0.632 -0.00357
Max 0.178 0.163 0.128 1.05 0.099 0.731 0.101
corr(Data,Model) 1 0.2 0.224 -0.1 0.0799 -0.61 0.264
Reasons for this difference may lie in the use of another commodity price index - Thom-
son Reuters CRB index instead of Journal of Commerce JOC index - and a questionable trend
break assumption. The trend break assumption is questionable in so far as the long-term trend
reversal does not start in the early 1970’s but rather after the monetary regime change in the
early 1980’s. Because deviations from specific break dates produced highly volatile and distinct
results concerning summary statistics and correlation coefficients I decided to stick with a for-
mulation without an explicitly modeled time trend. The model’s ability to capture the long-term
behavior of consumption and interest rates well confirms this decision. Finally, a complete set of
summary statistics of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)’s sample has neither been available
in an appendix nor in their paper. Hence, data issues might explain the differences. Nonetheless,
the main message their paper conveys for this period also holds in my results. The correlation
between model and data is extremely low or even negative in parts of the sample which remains
in stark contrast to all theoretical predictions. This shows that the core message is robust even
over distinct model formulations or data variations and needs other explanations - some that
my work tries to add.
A.2.2 Spread Regressions using T-Bill Rate
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Time period: 1969-01-01 to 1982-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer et. al. (2000) Abel, 1999
Real Rates
T-Bill -0.508 -0.575 -0.551
(0.1855) (0.2881) (0.2643)
R2ad 0.5505 0.2283 0.25
Nominal Rates
T-Bill -0.985 -1.21 -0.961
(0.2191) (0.3254) (0.2417)
R2ad 0.7672 0.5768 0.7781
Time period: 1983-01-01 to 2008-10-01
Monetary Policy Indicator CRRA Fuhrer et. al. (2000) Abel, 1999
Real Rates
T-Bill -0.173 -0.49 -0.362
(0.1189) (0.1368) (0.1234)
R2ad 0.3614 0.3097 0.1967
Nominal Rates
T-Bill -0.208 -0.428 -0.219
(0.05977) (0.1106) (0.05935)
R2ad 0.6901 0.2722 0.6998
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In each regression, the spread (dened as the in-
terest rate computed from each models Euler equation less the 3M-TBill rate) is regressed
on four lags of the spread and an indicators of monetary policy. Only the coecients and
corresponding standard errors for the monetary policy variables are reported.
A.3 Rolling Correlations
Figure 1.4 plots a rolling window correlation between model and observed rates. Let Yt and Mt
describe the respective data or model-implied interest rate. The chosen bandwidth is 8 quarters
in each direction such that the rolling correlation window looks as follows:
Covt(Yt ,Mt ,w) =
8∑
i=–8
wi(Yt+i – Et(Y |Yt–8 . . .Yt+8,w))(Mt+i – Et(M|Mt–8 . . .Mt+8,w))
8∑
i=–8
wi
(A.1)
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where
wi =
(
1
(i)2 ∀i 6= 0
1 if i = 0,
(A.2)
and the weighted mean for any Zt = {Yt ,Mt} is calculated as:
Et(Zt) =
8∑
i=–8
wt+iZt+i
8∑
i=–8
wt+i
(A.3)
i.e. the weights increase with the distance i from Yt or Mt . The rolling window correlation
coefficient is thus given by the following formula:
ρt(Y ,M ,w) =
Covt(Yt ,Mt ,w)p
Covt(Yt ,Yt ,w)Covt(Mt ,Mt ,w)
(A.4)
36 | A Data, Model-Implied Policy Rates and Consumption Euler Equations
A.4 Narrative Monetary Policy Shocks
The following Figure A.1 shows the original Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock
series which has been extended by Coibion et al. (2012).
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Figure A.1. Baseline (1996) and Extended (2008) Narrative Monetary Policy Shock Series
2Monetary Policy in a Heterogeneous Agent
Model With Aging
2.1 Introduction
Declining fertility rates and an increasing life-expectancy have lead to greying societies in many
countries of the developed world. While the U.S. old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the share of
retirees relative to the population at working age, has been 15% during the 1960s, recent pro-
jections suggest that this coefficient will increase to 50% in 2065.1 In other words, people aged
65 or older will account for half of the population. At least since Modigliani and Brumberg
(1954) we know that the consumption-savings decision of a household depends on his current
stage within the life-cycle. Hence, aging could, among many other things, have an impact on
the economy’s aggregate savings and thus the real return of capital. Following the argument
in Bean (2004), the real interest rate falls along the transition towards the new steady state
of the relatively older society. Thus, the dynamic reaction of macroeconomic variables may dif-
fer. Moreover, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, in particular how interest rate
changes affect aggregate consumption, might change tremendously over the course of these
developments.
In the presence of nominal rigidities, the liquidity effect of monetary policy works via three
channels: Intertemporal substitution, wealth effects and the individual (in)ability to borrow
against expected lifetime income. In an aging society, the relative importance of these channels
will change. Monetary policy generates wealth effects as households differ with respect to their
idiosyncratic productivity. Moreover, the propensity to substitute consumption today against
consumption tomorrow is a function of their age. Consequently, the transmission of monetary
policy innovations to the economy will be a function of the demographic structure. Young house-
1 Estimates are provided by the UN World population projection database. The case of 60 persons older than 65
per 100 persons between 15 and 64 is the worst case scenario of low fertility and low immigration.
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holds typically hold less assets than old ones. Hence, intertemporal substitution of consumption
over the life-cycle is their preferred response to movements of the policy rate. On the contrary,
wealth effects in response to interest rate changes matter more for older households. In an
economy, that is on a transition path between young and old, the importance of wealth effects
relative to substitution effects will increase. This implies that the direct impact of a policy rate
move will decline and indirect effects through labor and profit income will increase. Monetary
policy that considers overall welfare, should take possible effects on inter-age group inequality
into account, as well.
This chapter builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with hetero-
geneous agents and stochastic aging. First-order perturbations around the stationary steady-
steady are used to quantify the line of argumentation formulated above. From a methodological
point of view this allows to model a parsimonious life-cycle structure without having to track ev-
ery single generation as in the literature on overlapping generation (OLG) models. This enables
us to study the general equilibrium effects of monetary policy both between age groups and
between different steady states, i.e. comparing very young and very old economies. The model
is able to replicate the decline of the real return to capital as a function of the old-age depen-
dency ratio. Moreover, our results show that there is a significant difference in the consumption
response of young and old agents to a monetary policy shock. The size of this effect depends
on the fiscal stance towards debt and fluctuations in aggregate output. In addition, the way
how the government stabilizes the economy, i.e. using either monetary policy, fiscal policy or a
combination of both has a significant effect on results. Finally, including an age-structure into
the HANK framework further reduces the effect of forward guidance shocks, here measured as
the difference between a persistent and a transitory monetary policy innovation.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses related literature. Sections 2.3 and
2.4 present the theoretical model and its numerical implementation. Section 2.5 explains how
parameters are chosen to match the data. Section 2.6 describes results and section 2.7 con-
cludes.
2.2 Literature
The present chapter builds on three important strands of macroeconomic literature: First, New
Keynesian DSGE models in the tradition of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003)
or Galí (2008); second, incomplete markets models in which heterogeneous agents face idiosyn-
cratic income risk in the tradition of Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari
(1994) or Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998); and - finally, literature on aging as overlapping gen-
eration (OLG) or stochastic life-cycle models in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) or
Gertler (1999).
DSGE models in which nominal rigidities and the non-neutrality of monetary policy meet
heterogeneous agents, have emerged in recent years. Using a so called Heterogeneous Agent
New Keynesian (HANK) model, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) show that one of the cen-
tral theoretical predictions of classical New Keynesian models - monetary policy works mainly
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through direct effects of intertemporal substitution on consumption - no longer holds. The au-
thors show instead that general equilibrium effects of monetary policy on disposable income
matter much more for consumption, once uninsurable income risk and the presence of liquid
and illiquid assets in the household portfolio have been taken into account. In particular, the
amount of liquid, low-interest earning assets in household portfolios determines how the house-
hold reacts to a monetary stimulus.2 Instead of consuming more, households tend to rebalance
their portfolio away from liquid towards illiquid assets with a higher return. On the contrary,
Bayer et al. (2015), show that in response to higher uncertainty about future idiosyncratic in-
come, households rebalance their portfolio towards the more liquid asset. A further feature
of Hank models is, that monetary policy is not independent from fiscal policy, as Ricardian
equivalence fails to hold. Interest rate cuts that affect liquid assets in form of e.g. short-term
government debt have an effect on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government and
thus, household income. In addition, Lütticke (2017) shows that heterogeneity in the compo-
sition of household portfolios increases the responsiveness of consumption to monetary policy
relative to the classical New Keynesian model.
There is a rich literature on the the “glacial” nature of demographic change and its long-
run implications for monetary policy. Miles (2002) points out that within an OLG setup, aging
could increase or decrease the effectiveness of monetary policy.3 Imam (2015) estimates nega-
tive long-run effects of aging on the effectiveness of monetary policy in five of the G7 countries.
In particular, for a one percentage point increase in the old-age dependency ratio, the cumula-
tive impact of an expansionary stimulus to inflation and unemployment falls by 0.1 and 0.35
percentage points, respectively. However, Kara and von Thadden (2010) argue that the nega-
tive effect of the decrease in the population size and the increase in life-expectancy on the real
interest rate does not exceed 50 basis points over a 20-year horizon. Moreover, this order of
magnitude would not require a monetary policy reaction as the effect is too small to be visi-
ble within the horizon regarded for traditional monetary stabilization. Carvalho, Ferrero, and
Nechio (2016) identify the increase of life-expectancy as the main driver of the decline of the
real interest rate. In their calibrated model it accounts for one third of the overall decline since
1990. Moreover, they discuss challenges for monetary policy in light of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates.
With post-crisis unconventional monetary policy the literature on monetary policy shifted
towards aspects of distribution and the effect of inequality on monetary policy transmission (cf.
Coibion et al. (2017); Doepke, Selezneva, and Schneider (2015); Sterk and Tenreyro (2015)).
2 This result in line with the growing empirical evidence that the consumption response to a cut in the central
bank’s policy rate is heterogeneous across households (Broda and Parker (2014); Misra and Surico (2014)); Cloyne
and Surico (2017)). Moreover, as Auclert (2017) shows, redistribution itself can be a channel trough which monetary
policy affects the economy.
3 The transmission of monetary policy could become more effective in an economy with a higher share of richer
and older households that rely on savings instead of labor income (wealth channel). However, as borrowing con-
straints become less binding, the role of credit for consumption smoothing might decline (intertemporal substitution
channel).
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Only a small part of the literature however, focuses on inter-age-group heterogeneity and mon-
etary policy:
Fujiwara and Teranishi (2008) use a New-Keynesian life-cycle model with workers and re-
tirees to show that impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in fact depend on the age
structure of society. They argue that, if consumption responses to interest rate innovations di-
verge, there exists a severe policy trade-off for the central bank between lower interest rate
(young households) and higher interest rate (retirees) levels. Kantur (2013) confirms this re-
sult using an analytically tractable two-period overlapping generation New Keynesian model.
Cwik, Lakdawala, and Peterman (2015) examine the effects of monetary policy in a life-cycle
model with heterogeneous agents and show that monetary policy has quantitatively different
effects on households both between and within age cohorts. In a recent contribution using the
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX),Wong (2016) analyses the contribution of population
aging to the transmission of monetary policy. Her main empirical results are: First, expansionary
shocks to the monetary policy instrument are large and have a persistent effect on consumption.
Second, the consumption response of young households is significantly larger than that of old
ones and drives the response of aggregate consumption. Third, homeowners who adjust their
loans in response to a monetary policy shock display a stronger consumption response than
those of retirees or owners that do not adjust their loans. Finally, younger households tend to
adjust their loans more often which explains their higher consumption elasticity. Furthermore,
using a theoretical model, Wong (2016) shows that the fixed-rate mortgage structure is essen-
tial to generate the heterogeneous consumption response between young and old found in the
data.
2.3 The Model
The model adds the dimension of aging to a model of the heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian
(HANK) class. It is related closely to previous work in Bayer et al. (2015) and Lütticke (2017)
however, with a focus on demographic aspects of monetary policy.
The economy consists of heterogeneous households, a firm sector, a treasury and a central
bank. Markets are incomplete and households use physical capital or government bonds to self-
insure against idiosyncratic income risk. There are two types of households - workers and en-
trepreneurs. When households are workers, they supply labor and physical capital and own all fi-
nal goods producing firms. Otherwise, as entrepreneurs they receive an equal share of economy-
wide profits. The firm sector features perfect competition among intermediate goods producers,
however, final goods producers operate under monopolistic competition and set prices subject
to a friction as in Rotemberg (1982). Monopolistic competition arises due to the product vari-
ety of differentiated intermediate goods. The fiscal and monetary authorities close the model
by setting the nominal interest rate on bonds, levying taxes and issuing bonds to match desired
expenditures and ensure the stability of government debt and inflation. The model is hit by
aggregate disturbances to total factor productivity (TFP) and the Taylor rule. In what follows I
will discuss the model parts in more detail.
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2.3.1 Stochastic Aging
The economy consists of a continuum of households of measure one, where i describes the
idiosyncratic productivity- and j the corresponding age-cohort-state. Each household is born at
age 20 and ages from that time onwards. Households maximize their current and future felicity
over an infinite horizon. As each household belongs to a certain age cohort j at any point in
time t, aging can be described by a J -state Markov chain with transition probability matrix PJ .
For a given annual life-expectancy X , there exists a transition probability from one age cohort
into the next given by:4
PJ ( j + 1| j) := ξ j+1| j =
J – 1
X
, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. (2.1)
The probability to remain in an age-group j is given by 1 – ξ j+1| j . Aging works only in one
direction - once the household has transitioned into the next cohort, he remains there for a
while or ages even further. In the limit, he dies, and is reborn with probability 1 in the next
period.5
To visualize this, assume aging comprises only four different states, an amount high enough
to capture the life-cycle motive of young, middle-aged, old and dying households, sufficiently.
The transition probability matrix for aging described by J = 4 states, looks as follows:
PJ =

1 – ξ j+1| j ξ j+1| j 0 0
0 1 – ξ j+2| j+1 ξ j+2| j+1 0
0 0 1 – ξ j+3| j+2 ξ j+3| j+2
1 0 0 0
 . (2.2)
The size of each age-cohort determines the position of the economy. The transition probability
matrix for aging allows to calculate the stationary age distribution and thus, old age-dependency
ratios. There are several ways to change the age structure of the economy in order to compare
different steady state outcomes. One possibility is to decrease fertility and let population growth
decline, the other is an increase in life-expectancy. Average life-expectancy (over both sexes) in
the U.S. has increased from 70.4 years (1960-1965) to 78.9 years (2010-2015) and UN (2018)
projects it to increase to 86.5 years in the year 2065. Put otherwise, each new old cohort has
aged a bit slower than the previous one. To translate this into the model framework, some age
cohorts age faster or slower, depending on the desired outcome. Life-expectancy X is the sum
4 The implicit assumption behind this formulation is that the size of each age-cohort is identical in the baseline
scenario.
5 In this state the household eats up all his remaining wealth. This allows to abstract from tracing bequests from
one generation to the other. This renders the model numerically much simpler. Nevertheless, bequests are important
to explain the concentration of wealth in the top five- and one- percentile of the income distribution. A simple
life-cycle framework fails to account for that (compare e.g. De Nardi (2015), De Nardi and Yang (2014).
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of the time spent in each age cohort. If time spent is now allowed to vary, this implies that the
transition probabilities are calculated as:
ξ j+1| j =
1
X j
,using that X =
J∑
j=1
X j . (2.3)
This allows to study the effect of greying as discussed in Miles (2002), Kantur (2013) or Imam
(2015).
2.3.2 Idiosyncratic Productivity
Agents not only differ with respect to their age cohort but with respect to two more dimen-
sions. For a given stochastic transition probability, households become either workers (si j t = 1)
or entrepreneurs (si j t = 0).6 This approach follows Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull
(1998) and generates the entrepreneur state as high income state. Furthermore, conditional on
being in age cohort j, workers are ex-ante identical, but are ex-post heterogeneous with respect
to their idiosyncratic labor productivity realization, hi j t . We assume that productivity evolves
according to a log-AR(1)-process using Tauchen (1986)’s algorithm such that:
log(hi j t) = ρh log(hi j t–1) + "ht , "ht ∼ N(0,σ2h). (2.4)
To make work experience matter, the productivity process is scaled over the j age cohort, ap-
proximating a quadratic scaling. This implies that regardless of the idiosyncratic productivity
realization, the middle-age household cohort will always be more productive than his younger
and older counterparts. Individual labor productivity is given by
hi j t =
h˜i j t∫
hi j td ji
. (2.5)
To ensure that average worker productivity is constant, we scale h˜i j t by its cross-sectional aver-
age over idiosyncratic productivity and age-cohort. Entrepreneurs have zero labor productivity
but receive a constant share of the economy-wide profits from imperfect competition as income.
Profit incomes are subject to the same rate of taxation as labor income. This allows to neglect
considerations about the optimal fiscal mix between labor taxes and taxes on pure profits.
6 Note that although the selection between type worker and type entrepreneur is stochastic, the economy-wide
share of entrepreneurs is constant over time and small.
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2.3.3 Preferences and Labor Supply
Households have time-separable preferences and discount future utility with the time-discount
factor β . The discount factor does not change when agents get older. This is on purpose, as
ad-hoc aggregate differences in subjective discounting could overlay idiosyncratic differences
in capital accumulation that stem from the diverse age-productivity endowment. Households
derive utility from consuming ci j t and, when working, disutility from supplying labor ni j t .
The consumption-labor-trade-off is captured by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988)
(GHH) preferences such that households maximize the discounted sum of felicity:
E0 max
{ci j t ,ni j t}
∞∑
t=0
β tu

ci j t – G(ni j t ,hi j t)

. (2.6)
All worker-type households supply labor and pay taxes on their wage income.7 Using GHH
preferences makes the household problem numerically much more tractable. Households do
not alter their labor supply decision in response to aggregate income uncertainty, as e.g. a TFP
shock. Effectively, i.e. taking idiosyncratic labor productivity into account, all households supply
the same amount of labor in terms of hours.8 Assumptions on the functional forms of the felicity
function, on the aggregate price level and the consumption bundle of differentiated goods are
standard in the literature. Utility u(·) is obtained under constant relative risk-aversion, where
σ > 0 is the degree of risk aversion such that:
u(xi j t) =
x1–σi j t
1 – σ
=

ci j t – G(ni j t ,hi j t)
1–σ
1 – σ
, (2.7)
where xi j t is the household’s demand for consumption ci j t minus the disutility from labor
supply, described in G(·). There exists are variety k of differentiated goods, bundled into a
composite consumption good using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
ci j t =
∫ 
c
η–1
η
i jktdk
 η
1–η
. (2.8)
Variety justifies price differences such that each of this differentiated goods is offered at price
pkt . Aggregate price level Pt and the demand for each single variety are thus given by:
Pt =
∫
p1–ηtk dk
 1
1–η
and ci jkt =

pkt
Pt
–η
ci j t . (2.9)
7 Modeling an additional "retiree problem" implied that retirees no longer work but received tax-financed lump-
sum transfers. Its implementation would be straightforward and is a possible future extension. The scaling of id-
iosyncratic productivity realizations over the life-cycle already fulfills a similar purpose.
8 This translates into the functional form of G(·)which is a function of hi j t , as well. Hence, there exists a functional
form such that the household’s effective labor supply does only depend on the nominal wage and no longer on
idiosyncratic productivity.
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For hours ni j t worked at wage rate wt and effective labor tax rate τ, the first-order condition
of G(ni j t ,hi j t) with respect to ni j t leads to the following expression:
∂ G(ni j t ,hi j t)
∂ ni j t
= (1 – τ)wthi j t . (2.10)
Under a constant Frisch-elasticity of labor supply and the income distribution as calibration
target we can choose a functional form
G(ni j t ,hi j t) = hi j t
n1+γi j t
1 + γ
, (2.11)
where γ> 0 is the inverse Frisch-elasticity. Idiosyncratic productivity hi j t drops then from the
FOC with respect to ni j t . This result eliminates Hartmann-Abel effects of uncertainty on labor
supply discussed above and implies that we can drop the household-specific indices i, j and
substitute Nt for ni j t , as ni j t = Nt(wt).9 This allows to simplify the expression for xi j t and
G(·), which now read:
xi j t = ci j t –
(1 – τ)wthi j tNt
1 + γ
(2.12)
G(hi j t ,Nt) =
N1+γt
1 + γ
. (2.13)
Asset markets are incomplete. The household derives his portfolio decision subject to the fol-
lowing budget constraint:
ci j t + bt+1 + qtki j t+1 = (qt + rt)ki j t + (1 – τ
w)wthi j tNt + bt
Rbt
pit
, (2.14)
ki j t+1 > 0, bt+1 > 0,
where households can either save into capital ki j t or into government bonds bt . Capital ki j t
rents out at at price qt and pays rt as dividend, which has to equal the marginal product of
capital net of depreciation. Government bonds bt are a linear combination of total assets and
the capital stock and pay nominal return Rbt .
10 The return on bonds has to be adjusted by
realized inflation, pit =
Pt–Pt–1
Pt–1
.
9 This assumption does not alter the portfolio-choice problem of the household. However, higher realized uncer-
tainty translates into an increase of the dispersion of hi j t . Without this assumption individual labor supply ni j t
increased in hi j t and thus, total labor supply increased in the dispersion of hi j t . This complicates aggregation.
10 The assumption to abstract from including bonds into the household’s decision problem is strong and neglects
important life-cycle considerations, as e.g. portfolio rebalancing in response to income uncertainty (cf.. Bayer et al.
(2015)). Nonetheless, bonds as aggregate asset suffice to fulfill the purpose of having a second asset in the model.
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Substituting xi j t = ci j t –
(1–τ)wthi j tNt
1+γ into (2.14) results in the following expression:
xi j t + bt+1 + qtki j t+1 = (qt + rt)ki j t + (1 – τ
w)

γ
1 + γ
wthi j tNt

+ bt
Rbt
pit
, (2.15)
ki j t+1 > 0, bt+1 > 0,
The dynamic planning problem of the household’s optimization problem is characterized by the
following Bellman equation:
V (k,h, J ,Θ;K ,Rb, s) = max
∆k′
u

x(k, k′,h, J) + βEV (k′,h′, J ′,Θ′;K ′,Rb′ , s′)

. (2.16)
The distribution function Θ is the joint distribution of (k,h, J). Aggregate bond holdings and
inflation, described in the paragraph on the government sector further below, depend on Θt
which thus becomes a state variable of the planning problem.
The First-order necessary conditions for the full maximization problem can be summarized
as follows:
ci j t : u
′(xi j t) – λt = 0 (2.17)
Nt : u
′(xi j t)hi j tNγ · (–1) + λt(1 – τ)wthi j t = 0 (2.18)
bt+1 : – λt + βEt
Rbt+1
pit+1
λt+1 = 0 (2.19)
ki j t+1 : – λtqt + βEt(qt+1 + rt+1)λt+1 = 0, (2.20)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. The last two equations describe
the sequence of consumption Euler equations and the no-arbitrage condition between the net
marginal return on capital r and the nominal interest rate Rb, corrected for inflation. Adjusting
capital is subject to a friction given by:
∆ki j t+1 =
1
qt

Ii j t –
θ
2
∆ki j t+1
ki j t
2
ki j t

, (2.21)
where Ii j t is investment. An equilibrium condition for the price of capital qt can be derived
by maximizing (2.16) subject to (2.14) and (2.21) with respect to ∆ki j t+1. This includes the
assumption that qt =
λt
µt
, where µt is the Lagrange multiplier on (2.21) such that:
–λtqt + µtqt + µtqtθ
∆ki j t+1
ki j t

= 0, (2.22)
which can be rearranged to:
qt = 1 + θ
∆ki j t+1
ki j t

. (2.23)
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2.3.4 Firm Sector
The model breaks up production into two parts. Intermediate goods and final goods producers.
Whereas the first work under perfect competition, the later differentiate the intermediate good
and exercises a degree of market power via its price setting mechanism.
Firm Problem: Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods producing firm operates under perfect competition and employs labor
and capital as factor inputs. The production function has constant returns to scale:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
(1–α)
t , (2.24)
where Nt is total labor supply and Kt the amount of total assets invested into the capital stock.
Total factor productivity (At) is an AR(1)-process that moves according to an exogenous inno-
vation such that:
log(At+1) = ρA log(At) + "
A
t+1 "
A
t ∼ N(0,σ2A). (2.25)
Define MCt as the price at which the intermediate good is sold to final good producers. The
profit-maximization problem then reads as follows:
MCtYt = MCtAtK
α
t N
(1–α)
t – (δ + rt)Kt – wtNt . (2.26)
Intermediate goods firms make zero profits and factor inputs earn their (net) marginal product.
The real wage rate and the real interest rate are given by:
rt = αAtMCt

Nt
Kt
1–α
– δ (2.27)
wt = (1 – α)AtMCt

Kt
Nt
α
, (2.28)
where MCt are real marginal cost and δ the depreciation rate of capital.
Firm Problem: Final Good Producers
Final good producers differentiate the intermediate good and set prices under monopolistic
competition. Following Rotemberg (1982), the monopolistic firm faces quadratic cost of adjust-
ing nominal prices. Risk-neutral managers, which are a group of households with mass zero,
set prices. They have the same time-constant discount factor as households. They are compen-
sated by a share of profits and do not participate in the asset market. The profit-maximization
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problem over real profits Πt subject to the demand of good k is:
Πt = maxa E0
∞∑
t=0
β tYt

pkt
Pt
– MCt

pkt
Pt
–η
–
η
2κ

log

pkt
pkt–1
2
, (2.29)
taking demand of good k
ykt =

pkt
Pt
–η
Yt , (2.30)
as given. The first-order necessary condition w.r.t. allows to derive a variant of the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve:
log(pit) = βEt

log(pit+1)
Yt+1
Yt

+ κ

MCt –
η – 1
η

. (2.31)
The nominal rigidity inherent in the price setting problem leads to an inefficiency of output.
This holds regardless of the type of nominal rigidity employed. Under the Calvo (1983) price
setting mechanism, price dispersion creates a wedge between aggregate employment and ag-
gregate output. Under Rotemberg (1982) adjustment cost however, the nominal rigidity creates
a wedge between aggregate production and aggregate consumption as a part of production goes
into the price adjustment cost, making output less efficient. Nevertheless, up to a second-order
approximation those approaches yield an identical Phillips curve.
2.3.5 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Two policy rules close the model. First, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate on bonds.
Thus, the bank implicitly targets an inflation rate that equates the net real return on capital
and the real return on bonds. The treasury supplies bonds such that total expenditures equal
the sum of total tax revenue and bonds rolled over in the previous period.
Monetary policy follows a modified Taylor (1993)-type feedback rule with interest rate
smoothing:
Rbt+1
R¯b
=

Rbt
R¯b
ρRB pit
p¯i
(1–ρR)θpi
vRt+1, (2.32)
where R¯b is the steady state interest rate and " a monetary policy shock. The coefficient, 0<
ρR < 1 is usually estimated to be close to one.11 We assume that, like TFP, the monetary policy
innovation is described by an AR(1) process given by:
log(vRt+1) = ρR log(v
R
t ) + "
R
t+1, "
R
t ∼ N(0,σ2R). (2.33)
11 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) estimate the degree of interest rate smoothing to be around 0.8.
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The specification of this rule suggests that the Taylor rate is adjusted gradually in response to
a shock. Furthermore, θpi ≥ 0 determines the monetary policy stance towards inflation and is
usually larger than one (Taylor principle). The higher θpi, the stronger the reaction of the central
bank to a deviation of inflation from its steady state, which is modeled to be zero.
FollowingWoodford (1995), the fiscal policy rule takes fiscal theory of the price-level (FTPL)
considerations into account and looks as follows:
Bt+1
B¯
=

BtR
b
t /pit
B¯R¯b/p¯i
ρB pit
p¯i
–γpi Tt
T¯
–γτ
, (2.34)
where tax revenues Tt are equal to τ(wtNt +Πt). The parameter ρB captures the fiscal policy
stance towards debt. A coefficient smaller than one actively stabilizes debt, whereas for ρB = 1,
the treasury rolls over all outstanding debt including interest rate payments. Moreover, a degree
of cyclicality is inherent in the fiscal policy rule. Setting γpi = γτ = 0 implied that debt does not
automatically respond price movements and the business cycle. However, for γpi > 0> γτ the
treasury takes a countercyclical, for γpi < 0< γτ a procyclical stance on debt.
Price-Level Determinacy
The life-cycle motive, distortionary taxes and idiosyncratic income shocks present in the model’s
setup make the economy non-Ricardian. Thus, monetary policy alone does not uniquely deter-
mine the price-level. Price-level determinacy depends on fiscal policy as well given that house-
holds also save into government debt to smooth consumption. Hence, for any given interest rate
path there exists a uniquely pinned down path of inflation, such that the government budget
constraint holds in every period. The fiscal-monetary interaction allows to discuss the effects of
monetary vs. fiscal stabilization polices in response to shocks as depicted in Appendix A.4.
2.3.6 Market Clearing and Recursive Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the goods, bond, labor and capital market have to clear. The following two
paragraphs state the market clearing conditions and define a recursive equilibrium.
Market Clearing
The labor market clears at the competitive wage rate as defined in (2.28). The household de-
mand for bonds is an exogenously determined fraction of total assets and thus a function of
the capital stock. The implicit assumption is that all households hold the same bond-to-capital
ratio. In equilibrium, this is share determined by the supply of government bonds as stated in
equation (2.34).
Bdt+1 := TAt+1 – qtKt+1 = B
s
t+1(∆Yt+1,Bt ,pit), (2.35)
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where TAt+1 stands for total assets. The market for capital clears under the following condi-
tions:
qt = 1 + φ

∆ki j t+1
ki j t

(2.36)
Et

qt+1 + rt+1
qt

= Et

Rbt+1
pit+1

, (2.37)
where (2.36) implies that under competitive markets the price of capital has to equal its re-
placement cost.12 Equation (2.37) is the no-arbitrage condition derived from the FOCs of the
household. The return on capital has to equal the real return on bonds. Under Walras’ law, the
goods market clears as long as the market clearing conditions hold in all other markets.
Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium is a set of policy functions {x∗, k∗}, a value function V , pricing func-
tions {w, r,q,pi,Rb}, aggregate capital and labor supply functions {K ,N}, distributions Θt over
individual capital holdings, productivity, aging and perceived laws of motion ΓA,ΓR, such that:
1. Given V, {ΓA,ΓR}, prices and distributions, the policy functions {x∗, k∗} solve the house-
hold’s decision problem, and given the policy functions {x∗, k∗}, prices and distributions,
the value function V is a solution to the Bellman equation.
2. All markets clear and interest rates on bonds are set according to the Taylor rule of the
central bank, as stated in (2.32).
3. The perceived laws of motion ΓA,ΓR coincide with the actual laws of motion, i.e. Θ′i =
Γi(Θ, s
′
i), i ∈ {A,R}.
2.4 Numerical Implementation
The household’s Bellman equation and the corresponding recursive equilibrium is not com-
putable, because it involves the infinite-dimensional object Θt .13 Discretization and represen-
tation of Θt by its histogram makes the distribution a finite-dimensional object and thus com-
putable.
12 Adjustment cost on capital only have to be paid when capital is actively destructed and replaced or the capital
stock increases. There are no adjustment costs for replacing the existing capital destroyed by depreciation.
13 The state vector contains the entire cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic states. If there is a continuum of
agents, as assumed in this model, the state vector becomes an infinite-dimensional object.
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2.4.1 Household Problem
A discrete Markov chain describes both the (stochastic-)aging and the idiosyncratic productivity
process. The number of age states is set to four and the number of productivity states to five.
Four age states are sufficient to capture the life-cycle dynamics, dividing the model into young,
middle-aged, old and dying households. Five productivity states allow a quasi-quadratic scaling
over the age-distribution which again supports life-cycle dynamics found in the data. The ap-
proximation of the AR-(1) process of productivity as described in (2.4) relies on the standard
method proposed in Tauchen (1986).
We solve the household problem using 80 grid points on the asset, eight grid points on the
productivity and four grid points on the age grid. The stationary equilibrium in the absence
of aggregate shocks is found by iterating over first-order conditions of the household problem.
The employed endogenous grid-point method (EGM) has been originally developed by Carroll
(2006) and extended by Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010).14
2.4.2 Aggregate Fluctuations
After calculating the stationary equilibrium, it remains to compute aggregate dynamics. The
dynamic system can be represented as a set of non-linear difference equations, such that:
Et F(St ,St+1,Ct ,Ct+1) = 0, (2.38)
where {S,C} are the sets of state- and control-variables. Basically any dynamic, non-linear sys-
tem of this form can be solved using the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) perturbation approach
as suggested by Reiter (2009). However, full grid-size is nFgrid = nage × nh × nTA = 2560. Per-
turbation around the full consumption policy, the value function and the distribution, plus ag-
gregate states and controls contains over 7600 points, what makes solutions without state- and
control-space reduction at least time consuming if not also numerically unstable. Full second-
order approximations will be infeasible for sure.
We employ the method as proposed in Bayer et al. (2015) that extends the Reiter (2002,
2009) method. To reduce the number of idiosyncratic states, we use the fact that the three-
dimensional distribution Θ can be approximated with a distribution that has a fixed copula and
(possibly) time-varying marginal distributions.15 This approach builds on a notion in Krusell
and Smith (1998) who showed that not all moments of the cross-sectional distribution have
the same impact on the distribution of e.g. wages and interest rates that households need to
forecast.
We fix the Copula to the stationary distribution of the model and obtain its representation by
fitting a cubic spline to the marginal distributions of productivity and assets over all age states.
14 Changing the number of grid points on the grid for total assets had only minor and negligible impact on results.
15 Following Skar’s theorem, every multivariate cumulative distribution function of a random vector can be ex-
pressed in terms of its marginal distributions and a Copula.
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This technique reduces the number of endogenous states tremendously. As shocks to idiosyn-
cratic productivity or the age distribution are neglected in this baseline version, we assume their
marginal distributions to be time-constant as well. Hence, instead of perturbating the full distri-
bution with nFS–grid = 2560 points, we only have to perturbate around the marginal distribution
of assets with nRS–grid = nTA = 80 points. In comparison to Reiter (2009), the full distribution
function maintains its shape.
Reduction of the control space relies on (inverse) discrete cosine transformations (DCT) of
stationary equilibrium value function and consumption policies. Simply put, the idea behind
DCT transformation is to identify pieces of information in e.g. the consumption policy that
can be effectively “discarded” without seriously compromising its informative content (akin to
image compression as e.g. jpeg). This approach reduces the size of the control-space substan-
tially.16
2.5 Calibration
We calibrate the economic and demographic structure of the model to the US economy. Aggre-
gate data used for calibration spans the post-Volcker disinflation time until 2008. One model
period equals a quarter of a year, given that many macroeconomic variable that are relevant for
stabilization policy run at this frequency. The following tables summarize the choice of param-
eters and their corresponding target in the data.
Table 2.1. Calibrated Household Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
Households
β 0.993 Discount factor K/Y = 285%
γ 0.75 Inv. Frisch elasticity Chetty et al. (2011)
σ 4 Coe. Relative Risk Aversion Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018)
Idiosyncratic Income
ρH 0.979 Persistence of Income Process Standard Value
σH 0.08 STD of Income Process Standard Value
16 However, as the number of coefficients retained from the compression step is implicitly chosen by the researcher,
robustness of the results should be checked.
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2.5.1 Household Preferences
An overview over the parameters relevant for the household problem is provided in Table 2.1.
Households’ felicity over the composite good x is of constant-relative risk aversion (CRRA) form.
Their degree of risk aversion is set toσ = 4, as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). The inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is γ= 0.75, and builds on the analysis in Chetty et al. (2011) that finds
values that typically range between 0.5 and 1. For a discount factor of β = 0.993 that matches
the annual real interest of the regarded time period, the annual capital output ratio produced
by the model is too low. As Table 2.2 shows, the sum of both liquid assets, capital and bonds,
relative to output only amounts to 1.98 instead of 2.86 as in the data. The quarterly standard
deviation of shocks to idiosyncratic labor productivity is set to 0.08 and the degree of quarterly
persistence to 0.979 which follows Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). The probability to
leave the high-income entrepreneur state follows Guvenen, Kaplan, and Song (2014) and is
set to 6.25%. This corresponds to their annual probability of 25% to drop out of the top 1%
income group. The share of household’s in the high-income state is set to 0.5% of all households.
However, as Table 2.2 shows, the model does not perform well in matching US wealth inequality
as the implied-Gini coefficient of the model is only 0.58 instead of 0.78.17
Table 2.2. Model-Implied Moments and Data
Targets Model Data Source Parameter
Asset-to-Output Ratio (K+B)/Y 1.98 2.86 NIPA Discount factor
Mean government expenditures (G/Y) 0.19 0.2 NIPA Discount Factor
Mean government revenue (T/Y) 0.21 0.2 NIPA Tax Rate
Gini total wealth 0.59 0.78 SCF Fraction Entrepreneurs
2.5.2 Aging
The number of households in each age group is not necessarily equal. To capture differences
between young and old societies, the mass of older relative to younger households has to vary.
When younger persons age faster or older persons age slower the average lifetime increases.
Hence, the transition probability ξ j = PJ ( j + 1| j) from one to another age-group will vary in
size.
17 The too-low wealth inequality is driven by the assumption that only old, dying households enter the high income
state and then consume all assets. Hence, there is no high-income inequality in earlier stages that accumulates over
the life-cycle. This has been done for numerical reasons such that the dynamic response of consumption to amonetary
policy shock remains plausible.
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Table 2.3. Parameters for Economies with Dierent Age Composition
Parameter Value Description Source
Young Economy
Xy 70.4 Life expectancy, years UN Data: 1965-1970
ξ1,2, ξ2,3 1.25% Age prob. states (1,2) to (2,3) own calculations
ξ3,4 4.25% Age prob. state 3 to 4 own calculations
ϕy 15% Old-age dep. ratio UN Data: 15.7% (1965)
Middle-aged Economy
Xm 78.9 Life expectancy, years UN Data: 2010-2015
ξ1,2, ξ2,3 1.25% Age prob. states (1,2) to (2,3) own calculations
ξ3,4 2.5% Age prob. state 3 to 4 own calculations
ϕm 25% Old-age dep. ratio UN Data: 22.1% (2015)
Old-aged Economy
Xo 86.5 Life expectancy, years UN Data: 2065-2070
ξ1,2, ξ2,3 1.25% Age prob. states (1,2) to (2,3) own calculations
ξ3,4 0.96% Age prob. state 3 to 4 own calculations
ϕo 51% Old-age dep. ratio UN Data: 49.3% (2065)
The number of age states is set to J = 4 to keep the model specification parsimonious. The
transition probability matrix will thus correspond to (2.2). Agents are born at age 20 and start
to work immediately. In the young society, average life expectancy is around 70 years, while in
the grey society people get 86 years old on average. I assume that the increase in life expectancy
only matters for the old. Using equation (2.3), the probabilities {ξ1,2,ξ2,3} as in equation (2.2)
are thus set to 1.25%, which corresponds to 20 years of young and middle-aged life, respectively.
On the contrary, agents spend between 10 and 26 years in their last phase of life. Thus, ξ3,4
should be set to values between 4.25% and 0.96%.18This corresponds to an old age-dependency
ratio between 0.15 and 0.7 which is in line with projected US population statistics. The mass
of dying households, i.e. agents that are in their final life phase varies between 0.5% and 0.1%
of total population.
18 Age transition probabilities correspond to the quarterly frequency of the model, as in equation (2.1).
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2.5.3 Firm Sector
Table 2.4. Calibrated Firm Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
Intermediate Goods
δ 0.0135 Depreciation Rate NIPA: Fixed Assets and
Consumer Durables
α 0.7018 Labor Share Standard Value
ρA 0.9 Persistence of TFP Shock Standard Value
σA 0.026 STD of TFP Shock STD(Y) = 1
θ 11.4 Capital Adj. Cost Investment-Volatiliy
Ratio = 4.5
Vendors
κ 0.085 Degree of Nominal Rigidity Avg. price duration 4 quarters
µ 0.95 Mark-up on Marginal Cost Standard Value
The labor share adjusted for profit income is set to 1 –α= 0.702, and hence, the capital share
equals α= 0.298, which are standard, long-run averages for the U.S. economy. The rate of de-
preciation is set to δ = 0.0135, which corresponds to an annual consumption of fixed capital of
5.4%, which has been the long-run average over the regarded time period in the data. Resellers
sell intermediate goods as final goods at a markup of 5% percent, which implies marginal cost
of µ= η–1η = 0.95 in steady state. The degree of price stickiness, κ= 0.085 is set to target an
average stickiness of four quarters. Both parameters, markup and price stickiness assume val-
ues which are standard in the literature on New Keynesian Models (compare e.g.Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Galí (2008)). We choose capital adjustment cost of φ = 11.4.
This comes close to an investment volatility of 4.5 in response to TFP shocks, as found in U.S.
data. The TFP shock is highly persistent. The degree of persistence is set to ρA = 0.9 and its
standard deviation σA = 0.026.
2.5.4 Government Sector
Treasury
The treasury issues debt according to a rule that is similar as in Woodford (1995) or Bi, Leeper,
and Campbell (2013). The tax rate and government expenditures are jointly calibrated to match
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the 20% expenditure share of output what implies an effective tax rate of 30%. US government
debt is highly persistent and the autocorrelation parameter ρB assumes a value of 0.86 which
can be estimated from US data.
Central Bank
The nominal interest rate on bonds Rbt is set according to a Taylor rule. We linearize the model
around the zero-inflation steady state, such that in absence of shocks, the nominal interest rate
equals the real return on capital, set to 2.6% (annually). The degree of persistence or interest-
rate smoothing captured in ρRB is set to 0.9. The parameter θpi, which describes the reaction
of the nominal interest rate towards deviations of inflation from its steady state value is set to
1.5> 1 and satisfies the Taylor principle in the baseline scenario. The scenarios of full monetary
vs. full fiscal stabilization of inflation and its influence on parameter choice are discussed below.
The persistence of the monetary policy shock captured in ρR is set to 0.839. The volatility of the
monetary policy shock is set according to results in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
Table 2.5. Calibrated Government Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
Treasury
τ 0.3 Tax Rate G/Y = 20%
γpi 1.5 Reaction to In. Standard Value
γτ 0.75 Reaction to Revenue Standard Value
ρB 0.86 Autocorrelation of Gov’t Debt
Central Bank
θpi 1.5 Ination Stance of CB Standard Value
ρRB 0.9 Policy Persistence Parameter Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999)
ρR 0.839 Persistence of MP Shock Standard Value
σR 0.18 STD of MP Shock Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)
2.6 Quantitative Results
This section discusses the impacts of aging from two perspectives: The first one assumes a long-
run perspective and illustrates the effect of greying on monetary policy as e.g. discussed in
Miles (2002) or Imam (2015). Thereafter, the perspective changes towards one of short-run
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stabilization policy. The model allows to discuss how age heterogeneity and the demographic
composition matter for the transmission of monetary policy. This is done in two steps. First,
we look at the dynamic response of the model to a monetary policy shock, as stated in (2.32).
Second, we compare this outcome to a version of the model without aging. To isolate the effect
of age heterogeneity, all other parameters will be kept constant. Finally, we will vary the age
composition resulting in a very young, an intermediate and an old age society in steady state.
2.6.1 Long-run Eect of Greying: Impact on the Real Return to Capital
Following the argument made in Bean (2004), Miles (2002) or Miles (1999), the natural rate
of interest is a decreasing function of the demographic structure of the economy. Hence, the
effectiveness of monetary policy decreases as Imam (2015) argues. Here, aging and the real
return to capital are connected via the policy function of capital. Thus, it is not possible to
state a functional form that allows to derive the real interest rate for a variation of the old-
age dependency ratio. However, using equations (2.2) and (2.3) and the population statistics
targets as discussed in Table 2.3, we come up with transition probabilities that imply a young, a
medium-aged and an old-aged economy. In our case, the steady state of the economy is solved
over a grid of old-age dependency ratios ranging from 0.15 to 0.5. Figure 2.1 displays the steady
state real interest rate as a function of the age structure and the evolution of the old-age. Starting
in the 1960’s, where the old-age dependency ratio has been 0.15, the real return to capital will
decreases by 0.5 percentage points in the year 2065, where the share of old has risen to 0.5.
Results are in line with Miles (1999) who found similar results, however using European data.
2.6.2 Eects of Monetary Policy: Aging vs. No-aging
In section 2.2 we discussed how taking life-cycle considerations into account could change the
transmission channel of a monetary policy innovation.19 For this reason we compare our model
with an incomplete market economy that neglects aging, i.e. has no built-in OLG-structure but
is otherwise identically calibrated. The latter variant without aging corresponds to a special
case of the model in Bayer et al. (2015) where all assets are liquid. All parameters are set to
coincide with the calibration in 2.5. Figure 2.2 displays the dynamic response of the system to a
monetary policy shock that, all else equal, increased the nominal interest rate by 18 basis points
in the first quarter.
Three observations immediately attract attention. First, the model with OLG-structure seems
to be more persistent as the shock takes a relatively longer time to fade out. A similar point
has been made in Wong (2016), though. Second, for some variables the response on impact
is substantially stronger than in the model without aging. Third, except for the response of
aggregate consumption, the shock amplification follows similar patterns.
Moreover, Figure 2.2 shows that the size of intertemporal substitution in response to a shift in
the policy rate depends on your current age state. On impact, aggregate consumption, defined as
19 A variant that compares the case of a TFP shock is displayed in Figure A.5 in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.1. Real Return to Capital and Demographic Change
Notes: The gures displays the evolution of the real return to capital over dierent old-age dependencies in the left
panel. The variation over the old-age share roughly corresponds with UN population statistics data on the (projected)
demographic development between 1960 and 2065 as the right panel shows. Deviations from the data should stem
from (one-time-)eects like higher fertility, migration or the retirement of the baby-boomer generation.
the sum over the consumption policies in every age-state, drops by more than half a percentage
point. However, it drops only half as much as aggregate consumption in the world without aging.
Given that the drop of old-age consumption is only slightly negative, the consumption response
of young households will be much more negative in order to match aggregate consumption.
This finding is in line with results in Wong (2016).
Furthermore, the response of dividend, profit and wage income is less prominent than in
the model without age-structure. One reason could be the difficulty of the model to generate
comparable, plausible income inequality.
2.6.3 Eects of Monetary Policy: Changing the Age Distribution
In a next step, we vary the age composition of the economy. While in the baseline scenario,
every age group was populated by an equal amount of households, adjusting survival probabil-
ities allows to change that into a young, medium-old and old economy. The respective old-age-
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Figure 2.2. Aggregate Response to a MP Shock in a Model with and w/o OLG-structure
Notes: Impulse Responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock, vR = 0.18 pp (annualized). Solid line:
The Model with OLG-structure (aging). Dashed line: Identically calibrated model but w/o OLG-structure (no-aging).
dependency ratios correspond to the ones discussed in Table 2.3.20 The aggregate effects of
changing the age distribution are small for most variables. It mainly affects the on-impact level
of the response but not its shape. Hence, for reasons of space, not all IRFs are reported again.
However, changing the age composition has a pronounced effect on consumption aggregates.
The difference between the response of aggregate consumption in the young relative to the old
20 The baseline scenario where every age group is populated by an equal amount of households corresponds to an
old-age dependency ratio of 50% and thus, coincides with the old-economy setup. This would change however, if
the model was solved with a higher number of age states, as we define old only as the (J-1)th and Jth age state.
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Figure 2.3. Consumption Response to a MP Shock Over Dierent Economies
Notes: Impulse Responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock, vR = 0.18 pp (annualized). Solid line:
Young economy corresponding to and old-age dependency ratio of 0.15. Dashed line: Medium-old economy corre-
sponding to and old-age dependency ratio of 0.4. Dashed-dotted line: Old economy corresponding to and old-age
dependency ratio of 0.6.
economy is 0.1 percentage points on impact. This pattern is even more pronounced in the case
of consumption of young households. When there are many of them, the responds to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock is 0.6 percentage points larger on impact compared to a world
with only a few young households. The consumption response of old households holds some
important insights for monetary policy, as the response of old households to a contractionary
monetary policy shock could turn positive. Here, wealth effects of monetary policy seem to ex-
ceed the effects of intertemporal substitution as for the later is probably not much time left. A
bit puzzling are sign and magnitude of the response of old households when living in an old
economy. Here, the response on impact displays the usual, negative response but is rather small.
A possible explanation lies in the model setup. Old households do not retiree in the sense that
they receive pension transfers instead of labor income but they work until they die. This implies
that old households do not rely on a declining number of young households at working age
to finance their pensions. As the economy gets older, the aggregates of composite good xi j t as
defined in equation (2.12) become almost identical between young and old households. In the
case of a young or a medium-old economy instead, composite consumption of the old is only
half of the amount of composite consumption of the young. Furthermore, the Gini coefficients
of consumption and capital drop from 0.41 to 0.38 and 0.63 to 0.58 respectively, as the econ-
omy gets greyer. As wealth accumulated over the life-cycle to distributed on more shoulders,
the individual motive to consume more in reaction to an increase of interest rates might decline
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and even turn around again. A further possible explanation can be numerical reasons given the
parsimonious number of age states chosen and the specification of the entrepreneur state as
last state of the joint distribution.
2.6.4 Eects of Monetary Policy: Forward Guidance
During the last decade, central banks relied more and more on unconventional monetary policy
tools as e.g. forward guidance. Forward guidance is a communication device of central banks
that conveys information on future changes of the policy rate. Its impact on the transmission
of monetary policy can be twofold as Campbell et al. (2012) argue. First, households could
interpret the announcement of such a strategy as more monetary stimulus and expect a lower
future path of the policy rate which stimulated economic activity (Odyssean interpretation).
Second, households could read this strategy as bad news about the future economic outlook
assuming that the central bank had superior information about the state of the economy (Delphic
interpretation). Hence, the effect of forward guidance depends very much on how markets read
central bank communication (Campbell et al. (2012)).
So far, quantifying the effects of forward guidance on the macroeconomy has been difficult.
Medium-scale DSGE models tend to overestimate the effects of unconventional monetary policy
on key macroeconomic variables dramatically. McKay and Reis (2016) analyze a situation in
which the monetary authority announces to lower the real interest rate by 0.5 percentage points
for a single quarter at some point in the future. Within their three-equation New Keynesian
model such a transitory shock generates an 18 times larger impact on inflation than a persistent
shock to the current real rate. In some specifications a forward guidance shock even generates
explosive paths for inflation and output (Carlstrom and Paustian (2012)). This phenomenon
has been called forward guidance puzzle by e.g. Giannoni, Patterson, and Del Negro (2015). As
resolutions for this puzzle, McKay and Reis (2016) and Giannoni, Patterson, and Del Negro
(2015) propose to add either an incomplete markets economy and borrowing constraints or a
life-cycle structure. This dramatically reduced the effect identified in standard RANK models.
Their finding builds on the fact that in a incomplete market economy the possibility to hit the
borrowing limit within the next years is positive and thus, households become wary to increase
their current consumption through dissaving. This reduces the power of forward guidance as
intertemporal substitution plays a smaller role for consumption. This is a general result of the
effects of monetary policy on consumption in HANK economies (compare Kaplan, Moll, and
Violante (2018)). In an economy which includes a life-cycle structure, new born generations
cannot increase their current consumption already today as they need time to accumulate assets,
first.
In the model discussed in Section 2.3, the interest rate does not follow an exogenous path
set by the central bank as in McKay and Reis (2016). Instead, monetary policy sets the interest
rate according to a feedback rule that responds to fluctuations in inflation and deviations of tax
revenues from their steady state. Thus, one way to think about forward guidance in the present
framework would be the difference between the effect of a transitory and a highly persistent
monetary policy shock on aggregate variables. This follows the argumentation in Nakamura
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Figure 2.4. The Eect of Forward Guidance: Persistent vs. Transitory Shocks
Notes: The top panel depicts the Impulse Responses to a one standard deviationmonetary policy shock, vR = 0.18 pp
(annualized) for the baseline specication that does not change the age distribution. The shock process is either tran-
sitory (ρR = 0) or persistent as in the baseline speci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to a persistent and a transitory shock between a model with OLG-structure and a model w/o OLG-structure.
62 | 2 Monetary Policy in a Heterogeneous Agent Model With Aging
and Steinsson (2014). Their shock estimates have little effect on short-term interest rates but
a much larger impact on rates eight to twelve quarters ahead. They argue that the shock high
persistence can be mainly interpreted as forward guidance shocks about future monetary policy.
More precisely, the difference in the effect on aggregate variables between a persistent and a
transitory monetary policy shock could be interpreted as the forward guidance component of
the shock.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the results. Forward guidance, here interpreted as the difference be-
tween a persistent and a transitory disturbance has an effect. As the top panel shows, the trans-
mission of a shock has a four to five times larger effect on impact and decays much slower.
Nevertheless, this is, although of course difficult to compare, in no range of the tremendously
big effects found in the representative agent model of e.g. McKay and Reis (2016). What drives
the difference with the complete markets economy becomes visible in the response of consump-
tion in the top panel. The dynamic responses to both the transitory and the persistent shock peak
after eight quarters and fall again afterwards. This occurs as a monetary tightening redistributes
wealth away from wage-earning to profit-earning households. Moreover, borrowers lose relative
to lenders and thus, inequality increases. Redistribution of wealth away from households with
high marginal propensities to consume towards households with low marginal propensities to
consume increases output (through aggregate demand) until it converges back to steady state.
Such effects are generally muted in a representative agent model.
The lower panel isolates the effect of adding a life-cycle structure on the effect of forward
guidance. As expected from the results in Giannoni, Patterson, and Del Negro (2015), adding
stochastic aging reduces the effect of forward guidance even further. The positive difference in
case of output, consumption and inflation indicates that the effect of both a transitory and a
persistent shock as been more pronounced in the economy without aging. The reason for that
lies in the finiteness of life in our model setup. When households enter the last age state they
know that they will be reborn with probability one. However, even if they knew they would be
hit by a shock in the next period, they could not respond to it ex ante as they have to consume
all wealth in their final period and restart “naked”. Hence, they do not suffer from the future
interest rate increase but are reborn with a lower level of consumption.
2.7 Conclusion and Outlook
The chapter has contributed to the incomplete markets literature with nominal rigidities in the
following respect: Aging and the demographic composition of the economy matter for monetary
policy. Not only in the distant future as demographic change is “glacial”, but also for means of
short-run shock stabilization by a central bank or fiscal policy.
The present chapter built a stochastic aging OLG-structure around a model, similar to those
discussed in Bayer et al. (2015) and Lütticke (2017). Demographic change is one explanation
for the constant decline in real interest rates observed in the data. The model is able to replicate
results found in the literature on the long-run macroeconomic impacts of demographic change
as inMiles (2002) or Imam (2015). By calculating the transition path of the real return to capital
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using UN population projections from 1965 to 2065, the model shows that, ceteris paribus (all
else being equal) the real return to capital falls by approximately half a percentage point.
Moreover, the OLG-structure introduced a further degree of heterogeneity to a HANKmodel:
In addition to idiosyncratic labor productivity, households behave differently conditional on
their current position in the life-cycle. This effect is mainly visible in different consumption re-
sponses towards monetary policy shocks. By comparing our model to a similar model without
aging structure, we can show that the impact on aggregate consumption is muted given that
the consumption motives of young and old households not necessarily coincide. As would be
expected, intertemporal substitution plays a much stronger role for young households relative
to old ones. This has also been documented in recent literature as e.g. in Wong (2016). Further-
more, the effect of a monetary policy shock aggregate consumption gets smaller the greyer the
economy becomes.
Our model contributed to the discussion on the effects of forward guidance. Following ar-
guments made in Giannoni, Patterson, and Del Negro (2015) and McKay and Reis (2016) we
document that the inclusion of a stochastic aging framework reduces the difference between per-
sistent and purely transitory monetary policy shocks, relative to an economy which only has an
incomplete markets setting. Moreover, although not directly comparable, the magnitude of the
forward guidance effect is much smaller than in literature that uses the standard three-equation
New Keynesian or a medium-scale DSGE model.
To our best knowledge, this chapter has been the first to integrate a stochastic aging frame-
work into HANK models in the tradition of Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) or Bayer et al.
(2015). However, not only leave results room for further research - the easily-computable solu-
tion method as proposed in Bayer et al. (2015) calls for the integration of richer model features.
Especially, the following three points would be worth to look at: First, the present model lacks a
full second asset, i.e. there is no distinction between a liquid and an illiquid asset. This mutes the
entire portfolio-choice problem. Bonds, here introduced to integrate debt-financed government
deficits and inflation into the model, have the same equilibrium return as capital. This drawback
has been due to the idea to keep the model specification parsimonious at first and focus on the
age structure instead. Bayer et al. (2015) and Lütticke (2017) discuss how a departure from
that, by having a liquid and an illiquid asset, influences the transmission of shocks.
Second, model (a more complex) pension system and split the household maximization
problem into a worker- and a retiree problem, where the later receive tax-financed transfers.
This guarantees that at a certain point of the life-cycle, the household has to rely more on
savings than tax-financed transfers. This would especially be the case if we thought about a
public pension system that guarantees only a minimum amount to everybody (lump-sum trans-
fers). Households that anticipated this would then save much stronger into physical capital and
dissave when they become old. Furthermore, this allowed to study more traditional questions
related to demographic change as e.g. the sustainability of public finances. Finally, a full, second-
order welfare analysis would allow deeper, optimal insights into the redistributionary effects of
monetary and fiscal policy.
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A.1 Unconditional Business Cycle Statistics
Table A.6. Unconditional Business Cycle Statistics
GDP C I
Data
STD 1.03 0.783 4.5
AC(1) 0.882 0.835 0.805
Corr GDP 1 0.879 0.887
Model (MP)
STD 1 1.09 0.562
AC(1) 0.45 0.445 0.451
Corr GDP 1 0.787 0.526
Model (TFP)
STD 1 0.668 4.27
AC(1) 0.998 0.998 0.801
Corr GDP 1 0.984 0.772
Notes: Real GDP, Consumption (C), In-
vestment (I) in logs. All data are HP-
ltered with λ = 1600. Model refers to
simulation following a rst-order ap-
proximation in response to a mone-
tary policy and TFP shock. Standard
deviations are multiplied with 100.
A.2 Model Response to TFP Shocks
The following section reports the model response to shocks to total factor productivity (TFP)
and compares it with the setup without an OLG-structure for robustness. Figure A.5 displays
the results. As in the case of a monetary policy shock, introducing an OLG-structure to the
model changes the initial shock impact, tremendously. Deviations might stem foremost from
differences in the age-productivity/productivity distribution that arise by construction. However,
in most cases, the transition path follows similar patterns, regardless of the age structure.
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Figure A.5. Aggregate Response to a TFP Shock in a Model with and w/o OLG-structure
Notes: Impulse Responses to a one standard deviation TFP shock, vR = 0.09pp (annualized). Solid line: The Model
with OLG-structure (aging). Dashed line: Identically calibrated model but w/o OLG-structure (no-aging).
A.3 Numerical Performance
The following sections discuss performance, speed and accuracy of the method proposed in
Bayer et al. (2015) and used in this chapter by comparing it to versions w/o state-space reduc-
tion via the copula.
A.3.1 Quality of the Approximation
To show that the state-space reduction via the Copula does not change the first-order pertur-
bation around the non-stochastic steady state, we solve both models using the same parameter
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values and compare the simulation for the aggregate stock of capital. Both Figure A.6 and Table
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Figure A.6. Quality of Approximation
Notes: Both panels show simulations of the model discussed in Section 2.3 with TFP shocks solved with (1) the Reiter
method with state-space reduction via Copula function. (2) the Reiter method with full histogram.
A.7 show that the response of capital to a shock to total factor productivity is virtually identical
in both simulations. Furthermore, the advantage of the state-space reduction as proposed in
Bayer et al. (2015) and further explained in Bayer and Lütticke (2018) becomes visible with
respect to the time-needed to perturbate around the non-stochastic steady state.
68 | A Monetary Policy in a Heterogeneous Agent Model With Aging
Table A.7. Simulation Errors and Run-Time relative to Full-Reiter Method
Model Full-Reiter Copula-Reiter
Mean Value (%): 0.000 0.005
Run-Time (seconds) 634.450 11.203
Notes: Dierences in percent between simula-
tions of aggregate capital for the model discussed
in Section 2.3 solved with state-space reduction
via Copula function (1) and the Reiter method
on the full joint histogram (2). The rst column
shows the mean percent deviation from the full
histogram and the second column compares run
time in seconds on a MacBook Pro (2016) with an
2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. Code in Matlab.
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A.4 Eects of Monetary Policy: Stabilization Policy
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Figure A.7. Aggregate Response to MP Shock with Stabilization Policy
Notes: Impulse Responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock, vR = 0.18 pp (annualized). The param-
eters of the above scenarios discussed are as follows:
(a) γpi = 1.5, γT = 0, θpi = 0, ρR = 0.83
(b) γpi = 0, γT = 0.75, θpi = 1.5, ρR = 0.83
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3Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: A
20 Years Empirical Perspective
3.1 Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its successor, the Fiscal Compact have been praised as
the cornerstones of successful European economic integration. Nevertheless, the last 20 years
have seen endless discussions, failures to reform and to commit credibly, and finally the Euro-
pean debt crisis from 2010 onwards. While popular debate in Germany favors the hypothesis
of profligate southern Europeans bailed out using German tax payers money - others blame
the 2003 violation without consequences of Germany and France as the original Fall of Man.
The present chapter argues into another direction. For some countries the SGP has never been
complied with seriously once they had been admitted to joining the EMU in 1999. Huge rescue-,
bail-out and recovery packages in the aftermath of the Great Recession further contributed to
the distress of public finances in Europe. The recent handling of Portugal’s and Spain’s excessive
deficits in 2015 by the EU and national governments provide additional arguments in support
of this hypothesis.
By constructing a broad data set of 31 countries, i.e. 28 EU countries plus Iceland, Norway
and Switzerland, this chapter estimates quarterly structural deficit series out of government
budget balances on the basis of an Unobserved Components Model (UCM) and the Kalman Fil-
ter. Using a one-step estimation approach, employing a variant of a model first proposed by
Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004), the estimation of the unobserved components does not rely
on several datasets and independent regressions as e.g. the current method chosen by the Eu-
ropean Commission.1 The advantage is that a one-step approach allows to calculate standard
errors and thus a confidence interval for e.g. the structural deficit. In addition, a statement
1 For details on the econometric approach chosen by the European Commission compare Havik et al. (2014);
Mourre et al. (2013); Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014).
72 | 3 Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: A 20 Years Empirical Perspective
about the fiscal policy stance, i.e. whether fiscal policy tends to accommodate or enhance busi-
ness cycle fluctuations can be put on solid, statistical ground. Given that different approaches
towards the calculation of the latter lead to huge variations in predicted results (cf. German
Council of Economic Experts (2016), box 6 pp. 92-94), a direct approach helps to mitigate es-
timation uncertainty. I will provide an overview on other frequently used methodologies and
relate them to my findings.
From an institutional perspective, the chapter allows an empirical assessment of European
fiscal policy in the light of the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and their
successor treaties. Moreover, a partition into several country blocks that share some common
characteristics (Euro Area, 2004 EU entry countries, EU Med or Northern Europe) shows that
until now there has not been a convergence towards a permanent and more sound fiscal pol-
icy. With respect to the requirements agreed upon in the various treaties mentioned above, the
chapter documents that for most EU countries the Maastricht criteria, and especially the 3%
deficit ceiling might have worked as a benchmark to policy makers but were no longer taken
seriously after the run-up phase to the European Monetary Union (EMU). Using safety-margins,
i.e. values the structural deficit can assume to stay within the 3% boundary, reveals that discre-
tionary and not business cycle-related spending has been the driver of deficits in many European
countries.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 gives a brief literature overview on the Euro-
pean fiscal governance framework of the last 20 years. Section 3.3 discusses the data and gives
a brief exposition on the institutional details of the treaties on fiscal policy in Europe. Section
3.4 introduces the UCM in the spirit of Harvey (1990) and Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004)
and deviations from it related to the research question. Section 3.5 briefly describes related
methods to calculate the structural budget balance. Section 3.6 discusses estimation results
and compares them with the results from applying related methods. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature
Theoretical and empirical literature on the SGP and the surveillance of budgetary positions in
a monetary union is numerous and a huge amount has by now been outdated by institutional
changes and reform debates following the European Debt crisis. This section provides a
brief overview over 20 years of academic literature, whereas the next section reviews the
institutional details of the numerous (changes to) treaties on European fiscal policies.
3.2.1 Early Years Of The SGP
In addition to a politically independent central bank, the rules laid down in the SGP were
thought to prevent coordination failures between the single monetary policy authority and
multiple, national fiscal policies. Prior to the start of the EMU, Buti, Franco, and Ongena (1998)
had already warned that problems with the implementation of the pact may arise in early years
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in the event of a slow-down in economic activity. Early literature on the Fiscal Theory of the
Price-Level (FTPL, compare Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995)) provides the
theoretical foundation for this: Monetary policy is active, i.e. the European Central Bank (ECB)
ensures price stability, defined as an inflation rate of below, but close to two percent. The fiscal
policy side is passive, i.e. European governments credibly commit not to run excessive deficits
(max. three percent of GDP, but balanced in the long-run) and not to accumulate too high stocks
of debt (60 percent of GDP). These constraints to fiscal policy have been criticized as inflexible
by taking governments the capability to adequately respond to economic shocks during a crisis.
Calmfors and Corsetti (2003) discuss how to reform the SGP while walking the tightrope
between short-run flexibility and long-run sustainability. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) and
Brunila, Buti, and in ’t Veld (2002) among others discuss how to recover space for the working
of automatic stabilizers, despite having the fiscal policy rule of the SGP in place. Galí and
Perotti (2003) find that implementing the SGP did not harm the flexibility of EMU countries
but rather supporting the countercyclical nature of automatic stabilizers. Focusing more
on the political process behind, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) argue that the election-oriented,
short-term perspective policy makers usually take leads to a temptation to raise additional debt.
3.2.2 Violations And First Reform
The SGP has not been enforceable against big countries as France and Germany (first in 2003)
and fines have not been applied in the case of Portugal (2002) and Greece (2005). In 2005,
the European Council then reformed or rather relaxed the requirements of the treaty.2 Annett
(2006) analyses how the reformed SGP can be made more enforceable with respect to polit-
ically induced deficit biases and documents why some countries fared better under the fiscal
framework than others. Buti (2006) discusses the implementation of the 2005 reform. They
conclude that the reform went into the right direction concerning “asymmetric incentives and
lack of a long-term view” however, question whether the key weakness - its lack of enforceabil-
ity - has been eliminated. Filipek and Schreiber (2010) review the pact in the light of the 2005
reform and the Greek debt crisis and propose to adapt a European debt brake and medium-term
objectives (MTOs) that also consider an consideration of external imbalances.
3.2.3 Recent Reforms
Lane (2012) argues that implementation problems of the new Fiscal Compact based on the eval-
uation of structural deficits require a quasi real-time monitoring of government expenditures.
Furthermore, the German Council of Economic Experts (2016), box 6 pp. 92-94 discusses that
real-time measurement of the output gap, which is a key variable to calculate the structural
deficit is challenging and different approaches lead to huge variations in the value the out-
put gap assumes. Andrle et al. (2015) outline ways to simplify the European fiscal governance
2 For a broader overview on this discussion and the 2005 reform see De Grauwe (2007) and Senior Nello (2009),
p.250 and Annett (2006)
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framework after the recent reforms (Six Pact, Fiscal Compact, Two Pact). They propose to use
the public debt-to-GDP ratio as single anchor in a common fiscal rule for all countries. Fur-
thermore, they emphasize the necessity of greater automaticity in enforcing violations of the
constraints to fiscal policy. Since then, several supranational institutions (IMF, European Com-
mission or the European Fiscal Board) bring up the need to reform the existing framework using
e.g. expenditure rules. Their main aim is to increase transparency and to reduce complexity and
exceptions and escape clauses (compare German Council of Economic Experts (2017)).
3.3 Fiscal Policy Treaties and Data Description
The following two subsections give a brief overview of the development of fiscal policy treaties
in the EMU. A possible conclusion that could be drawn from this discussion is that reforms of the
various treaties have not enhanced but rather complicated the adequate surveillance of govern-
ment budgets. Furthermore, loop-holes and other exceptions that justify a violation of the deficit
and debt criteria have become bigger with every reform undertaken. The section concludes with
a description of key summary statistics over the regarded countries in the sample.
3.3.1 A History of Fiscal Policy Treaties in Europe
Maastricht Treaty
Signed and established in 1992 by the member states of the European Community, the Maas-
tricht Treaty created the European Union and led to the creation of the Euro as common currency.
Among other things, the Maastricht Treaty imposes constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy.
Limitations on the size of debt and budget deficits become part of the first pillar within the pillar
structure of the European Union. The imposed criteria state that countries “shall avoid excessive
government spending”, i.e. the ratio of government net lending to nominal GDPmust not exceed
three percent. In case of “exceptional” circumstances, as which structural reforms with positive
medium-run effects as well as severe economic downturns are considered, the deficit may range
in between three and three and a half percent. Furthermore, a restriction on the amount of debt
relative to GDP set to 60 percent, is introduced. In case a country fails to meet this criterion,
it has to prove efforts of a significant reduction over the last years and aspired convergence to
the reference value within “satisfactory” time. In addition, long-run interest rates on sovereign
bonds have to converge, such that “nominal long-term interest rate[s are not] more than two
percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation member states”. Whereas these cri-
teria are still binding for all EU members, restrictions on annual inflation and the exchange rate
(devaluation of currency etc.) have been more important in the run-up to EMU. Nevertheless,
every prospective member of the Euro Zone has to fulfill these restrictions before being allowed
to enter and introducing the Euro as its currency. The next subsections discuss refinements and
reforms of the legal limitations on the conduct of fiscal policy.
3.3 Fiscal Policy Treaties and Data Description | 75
Stability and Growth Pact
To guarantee and preserve the sustainability of public finances, the SGP is an agreement among
the member states of the European Union which had initially been ratified in 1998. All EU mem-
bers are obliged to be in compliance with the SGP not only at the end of the preceding fiscal
year but also in the medium-run. Its initial purpose has been to ensure that the Maastricht crite-
ria are not only met before entering the currency union, but are maintained subsequently. The
pact especially implies fiscal monitoring by the European Commission and the Council of Min-
isters, including recommendations through its preventive, and in utmost cases excessive deficit
procedures (EDP), through its dissuasive arm. The preventive arm complements the Maastricht
criteria by demanding convergence to a common medium-term objective (MTO). They entered
into force in 1998. The original version of the SGP recommends this common budgetary posi-
tion, to be either balanced or in surplus. In contrast, the dissuasive arm is in charge of enforcing
the limitations agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty. It defines corrective policy measures, e.g.
increases in the VAT rate, a non-compliant country has to undertake within a certain time frame.
Breaches of the restrictions on deficits and debt intensify surveillance and can lead to economic
sanctions as last resort. The SGP’s corrective rules entered into force in 1999. The 2005 SGP re-
vision deals with criticism from politicians and academics, complaining about the low flexibility
and weak enforceability of the original treaty version. Annett (2006) even identifies enforce-
ability as the “Achilles’ heel” of the treaty, compared to other core characteristics of good fiscal
governance. Major complaints have been that the pact jeopardized growth if governments do
not possess full spending flexibility during economic downturns. In addition, Greece and Por-
tugal have used “creative accounting” - techniques to meet the three percent deficit ceiling at
any cost. Finally, the European Commission has been unable to implement sanctions against
France and Germany, which at that time had repeatedly violated the deficit constraint. The
2005 reform does not alter the three percent deficit and 60 percent debt ceiling, however, the
settlement whether a country runs an excessive deficit or not does now depend on additional
factors. Deficit procedures now regard the structural or cyclically adjusted deficit, the dura-
tion of low growth periods plus the possibility that the violation stems from reforms increasing
medium-run competitiveness. Important changes in the preventive arm include the deviation
from a common MTO. Instead, MTOs for each member country are calculated depending on
the respective debt-to-GDP ratio and potential GDP growth. MTOs include country-wise safety
margins, i.e. the maximum structural deficit which is still in line with the Maastricht figure
of three percent. Moreover, the maximum structural deficit to be set as MTO objective is one
percent of potential GDP in case the country is not highly indebted and has a strongly growing
economy. Nevertheless, in case a country is prone to demographic long run risks, the upper MTO
limit should be set to be zero or in surplus. Furthermore, fiscal consolidation has become part
of the preventive arm. Under “favorable” economic conditions, i.e. if the output gap is positive,
countries that do not meet the above criteria agree to improve their structural deficit by half a
percent of potential GDP per annum. If reforms undertaken during the consolidation process
are aimed to improve overall competitiveness, a short-run deviation from the MTO is possible
and not prosecuted. As 3.5 shows, different methodologies to calculate the output gap lead to
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huge variations in the structural deficit figures. The focus on the structural component thus en-
ables space for a political interpretation and a less stricter enforcement of the self-given rules. In
2011, a collection of governance rules concerning the monitoring of economic policies, known
as the “Six Pack” became mandatory in 2011. In 2013, further economic coordination between
members states has been laid down in the “Two Pack”.
Fiscal Compact
The Fiscal Compact is part (Title III) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in
the Economic and Monetary Union, signed on 2 March 2012.3 The purpose has been to foster
discipline of public spending and strengthen the SGP following the insights of the European debt
crisis. Its main elements build on the reformed SGP and include a balanced budget rule which
needs to become part of national law plus an automatic correction mechanism. Furthermore,
the excessive deficit procedure has been strengthened towards higher automatization of the
decision, whether a country runs an excessive deficit or not. Finally, high debt countries need to
ex-ante report strategies for the issuance of new debt and reduce their debt per year by 1/20th
of each percentage point above the 60 percent debt ceiling.
The balanced budget rule is respected if annual, structural expenditures do not exceed the
country-specific MTO, as formulated above. As this has been based on the SGP however, it con-
tains more flexible upper limits for structural deficits depending on the country-specific debt-
to-GDP ratio. Countries whose level of debt does not exceed the 60% threshold are allowed to
run a structural deficit of at most 1% of nominal GDP in contrast to the otherwise allowed 0.5%.
According to the SGP, the Fiscal Compact demands a “rapid convergence” to the MTO under
consideration of country-specific risks. The fiscal policy rule needs to be mandatory, preferably
at constitutional level, as does e.g. the German “debt brake”. Moreover, an automatic correction
mechanism whose guidelines were delineated by the European Commission but is individually
implemented by each country shall work against the fiscal reality of significant deviations from
the respective MTO.
3.3.2 Overview How EU Regulation Aects Countries in Sample
The data sample contains 31 countries. 28 of them are members of the European Union, which
implies that the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact applies to them. Rules
imposed by successive agreements, such as the Fiscal Compact apply only to 20 countries in
the sample, as countries outside the Eurozone as Sweden, Poland or Hungary are not bound
by any economic or fiscal policy coordination mechanisms. So far only the United Kingdom has
not ratified the treaty however, the upcoming Brexit makes a ratification more than illusional.
Denmark and Romania are outside the Eurozone and may accede to the treaty only after negoti-
ations with representatives of the Eurozone. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are not affected
by any of the above treaties. However, both countries are closely associated with the EU and
3 A comprehensive, more detailed overview on the Fiscal Compact has been provided in ECB (2012).
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the Eurozone and have access among other things to the European Single Market. Moreover,
Switzerland is interesting as they agreed upon maintaining sustainable public finances using a
debt brake.
For a more comprehensive analysis, it is useful to sort countries into political, historical or
regional subgroups. This might even allow to generalize the vast amount of information the
results will convey.4 I base my classifications on the “EU supranational bodies”, discussed in
an Wikipedia article on the “Regions of Europe” - which is no official classification and not
to confuse with official European regions which are represented in the Assembly of European
Regions. A lot of European governments coordinate their EU politics and especially their voting
behavior on the European Council with neighbors they have strong historical or geographical
ties with in inter-governmental or -parliamentary bodies: Examples for that are the:
• Nordic Council (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Norway among others)
• Baltic Assembly (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania)
• Benelux States (The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg)
• Craiova Group (Romania and Bulgaria among others)
• Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria)
• EU MED Group (Spain, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal),
among others. Based on that, I will select a country that is the most representative of the supra-
national body it belongs to (here marked in bold). Southern Europe is a special case: France and
Italy belong to the (economically) most-important countries and Greece has been hit the hard-
est by the European Debt Crisis and the Great Recession, such that I will identify these countries
on their own. Finally, as Germany is no member of a smaller, very homogeneous supranational
body of countries, Germany is added to the list of countries for which I will discuss results in
detail.
3.3.3 Data Description
All quarterly data stems from the Eurostat National Accounts Database. The dataset contains
the log of seasonally-adjusted real GDP, seasonally-adjusted general government net lending
in percent of seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP and general government gross debt in percent
of nominal GDP. In cases when data was not available for the entire time span, e.g. only at
annual frequency during some periods, Section 3.4 describes a method how to still obtain the
structural components of the model. For some countries, the annual budget balances had to be
obtained directly from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database as they were not covered
by the Eurostat National Accounts Database. Hence, the data is either of quarterly or annual
4 If not in the main text, full results on individual countries will be provided in the respective appendix.
78 | 3 Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: A 20 Years Empirical Perspective
frequency and covers a time span from usually 1995 to 2015 for most countries, for some even
longer.5 Variables used for estimation are quarterly, seasonally-adjusted real GDP and the quar-
terly government budget balance in percent of nominal GDP. Consolidated, general government
gross debt in percent of GDP is used as additional exogenous regressor.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 provide an overview over the development of GDP growth, deficits
and debt for all countries. I divide the sample into four subperiods and calculate the respective
subsample averages. The summary statistics show that during the years 1995 - 2000, all coun-
tries (except for Norway, Luxembourg and Ireland) have run substantial deficits. Substantial
refers to the fact that the across-country average deficit is close to three percent, in particular
after excluding the three countries named above. The budgetary position improved on average
from 2000 to 2005. However, the group of countries which joined the European Union in 2004
give a mixed picture. Some of them consolidate or even run surpluses, whereas others as e.g.
Hungary or Poland have a deteriorated budget balance. With the exception of Bulgaria, Lux-
embourg and the Scandinavian countries, all countries are hugely affected by the recession in
2008-2010 and the post- bank-bailout costs following the financial crisis. For the most recent pe-
riod from 2010 to 2015, more than half of the countries in the sample face even higher deficits
on average than before. Despite austerity programs and expenditure cuts, many countries in
the other half still run substantial deficits highly above three percent of GDP. It seems that in
the short run, deficits below the three percent boundary are hard to achieve for many countries
following the European debt crisis. This effect is supported by the fact, that the sanctioning
mechanism did never fully work and has been weakened or politically adjusted over and over
gain.
The European economies have been growing strongly from 1996 to 2000. Exceptions were
Germany, France or Italy - economies with a lot of problems concerning structural growth during
that time. Data on GDP growth of the Eastern European transition economies exhibits catch-up
growth and the Scandinavian economies have successfully recovered from the Scandinavian
banking crisis in the early 1990’s. Growth increases even more during the early 2000’s but be-
comes slow and moderate on average for the years 2005-2010, as many countries have been hit
strongly by the Great Recession in 2008-2009. Post 2010 GDP growth does not give a clear pic-
ture. Some countries quickly recovered, whereas especially the southern European Economies
shrank on average.
With the exception of Italy and Greece, the level of debt in percent of GDP has been centered
around 60% for major European economies in the late 1990’s. For other European countries
debt has been even much lower. During the early 2000’s almost all countries converged below
the now binding threshold of 60% debt to GDP ratio. Prominent exceptions among others are
again Germany and France who have also been the first countries to receive an official warning
by the European Commission in 2003 for breaking the Stability and Growth Pact. A sanctioning
process which has been voted down by the council of Europeanministers of finance later. Deficits
increased almost everywhere from 2005 until 2010 as the financial crisis and the subsequent
debt crisis included debt-financed bank-bailouts and recovery programs. This trend continued
5 For some Eastern European countries data is only available from 2000 onwards.
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Figure 3.1. Quarterly GDP Growth (grey-solid) and Budget Balances (black-dashed) in % of GDP Until 2015
Notes: The gure shows quarterly, seasonally-adjusted real GDP growth rates and budget balance ratios in percent of nominal GDP. In case data has only
been available every 4 quarters, corresponding value is reported as circle. All data is measured in Euro and has been provided by the European System
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) and in some cases the IMF World Economic Outlook Database
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Table 3.1. Fiscal Developments in Europe, 1995 - 2015
Countries Balance in Percent of GDP Growth Rate of GDP Debt in Percent of GDP
1995 - 2000 2000 - 2005 2005 - 2010 2010 - 2015 1996 - 2000 2000 - 2005 2005 - 2010 2010 - 2015 1995 - 2000 2000 - 2005 2005 - 2010 2010 - 2015
Austria -5.8 -2.3 -3.1 -2 3.2 1.7 1.3 1 70.4 69.7 72.8 83.2
Belgium -2.4 -0.41 -1.8 -3.5 2.7 2.1 1.3 1.2 124 105 95.4 106
Bulgaria 0.27 0.49 -2.3 -1.7 5.3 4.4 0.9 2.9 76.3 50.4 17 19
Croatia -4.9 -3.6 -5.6 -3.3 4.5 1.7 -1.1 1.6 NaN 38.6 42.3 75.4
Cyprus -3.2 -3.6 -0.93 -5.3 3.4 3.9 2.9 -1.3 53.7 61.4 56 87.7
Czech Republic -3.5 -4.8 -3 -2.1 1.2 3.8 2.4 1.3 15.6 25.7 29.9 42.1
Denmark -0.53 0.98 3.1 -1.6 2.8 1.6 0.2 0.81 56.4 48.5 34.2 44.9
Estonia -0.34 1.3 0.33 0.28 5 7 1 3.3 5.67 5.14 4.84 8.95
Finland -0.31 4.1 2.7 -2.4 4.8 3.1 0.78 0.55 44.7 40.8 37 54.8
France -3.4 -2.6 -3.7 -4.7 2.6 2.1 0.73 1.1 59.1 62.2 70.4 91.2
Germany -4 -3.5 -1.6 -0.74 1.6 0.99 0.62 1.9 59.6 61.6 67.7 77.3
Greece -7 -6.5 -8.9 -9.1 3.5 4.5 0.95 -4.3 NaN 104 113 166
Hungary -6.7 -5.9 -6.2 -3.1 2.6 4.2 0.53 1.5 65.4 56.8 70.7 79.1
Iceland 0.076 2.4 -6.2 -1.7 4.7 4.2 0.81 2.8 NaN NaN NaN NaN
Ireland 2.3 1.1 -13 -5 8.6 5.2 0.05 3.5 42.6 31.3 41.1 107
Italy -3.4 -2.9 -3.4 -3.2 1.5 1.5 -0.44 -0.33 109 105 106 126
Latvia -2.5 -0.65 -5.1 -1.3 5.1 9.5 -2.7 2.8 12.6 13.4 19.1 41
Lithuania -3.4 -2.3 -2.7 -3.8 4.7 6.6 2.4 3.2 24.2 21.7 19.8 38.7
Luxembourg 1.2 1.8 0.53 1.5 2.9 2 3.1 4.8 NaN 6.73 11.5 22.1
Malta -6.2 -3.1 -2.9 -1.5 1.6 2 3.2 6.2 NaN 67 65 69.1
Netherlands 0.46 -1.5 -1.9 -2.9 4.5 1.3 1.3 0.76 57 50.3 50.3 65.2
Norway 5.1 9.8 16 11 3.7 2.3 1.4 1.5 23.4 35.7 44.3 31.3
Poland NaN -5.2 -4 -4.3 NaN 4.3 4.5 3 NaN NaN 44.3 46.6
Portugal -3.5 -5 -6.4 -5.9 4.1 0.86 0.61 -0.95 51.2 57 73.9 123
Romania -4 -1.7 -5.3 -2.6 -1.3 5.5 2.9 2.3 22.3 21.8 16.2 36.3
Slovakia -8.1 -3.9 -4.8 -3.1 2 5.8 3.6 2.2 49.6 43.4 32.4 51.4
Slovenia -1.7 -2.9 -2 -6.4 4.1 3.5 2.3 0.63 24.8 26.9 27.8 62.4
Spain -4.1 -0.51 -1.9 -7.9 3.7 3.6 1.8 -0.14 62.7 50.1 42.9 86.1
Sweden -2 0.48 1.7 -0.66 3.2 3 1 2.6 64.1 49.7 40 40.2
Switzerland -2 -1.7 0.57 0.27 1.8 1.7 2.2 1.7 NaN NaN NaN NaN
UK -2.2 -1.4 -4.9 -6.9 3 2.9 0.68 2 38 36 49.9 84.3
Notes: The above table shows average summary statistics over ve-year intervals. For some countries the rst interval is not exactly ve years (e.g. the sample only starts
in 1996 or 2002) - however, to keep notation simple the corresponding value is then just the average of the remaining years. If the years until the year 2000 are missing
completely, the corresponding rst column is set to NaN.
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on average for the most recent period. Similar to the summary statistics of the budget balances,
the early criteria on a debt limit seem to be no longer binding and not achievable anymore in
the medium term.
To conclude, it appears that fiscal discipline and the sustainability of public finance had
already ended after the post-Euro or post-European Union convergence phase. The ratification
of treaties such as the Maastricht Treaty or the Stability and Growth Pact should have exactly
prevented that. Also, from a 2016 perspective - automatic sanctions as imposed following the
ratification of the Fiscal Compact do not make sense if they are not credibly imposed. How large
has the scope of discretionary fiscal policy really been? How large was the structural deficit in
reality? The descriptive statistics suggest that there has already been a constant decline in fiscal
discipline prior to the recent crisis which we should be able to detect in the data, as well.
The next section puts the data to use in an empirical model. Unobserved Component Models
(UCM) enable to decompose observed variables such as GDP or government figures into their
unobservable parts. Taking a time series perspective, where all seasonal influences have been
eliminated, it is possible to discuss and evaluate the influence of cyclical and structural com-
ponents, separately. Following Taylor (2000) or Galí and Perotti (2003), the decomposition of
the observed deficit can be regarded as a fiscal rule, analogously to the ones used to conduct
monetary policy. Fiscal rules help to monitor fiscal discipline as agreed upon in the Stability and
Growth Pact. The precise rule is discussed in section 3.4.
3.4 An Unobserved Components Model
The econometric model used for the estimation of cyclically-adjusted government budget bal-
ances belongs to the class of Unobserved Component Models (UCM) in tradition of e.g. Harvey
(1990) or Harvey (1991). The basic idea is a signal-extraction problem. The econometrician
is interested in unobservable components (the states) of an observable time series. Economic
theory is used to pin down the underlying structure and Kalman Filtering- and Fixed Interval
Smoothing-techniques are employed to extract unobservable states out of the data. The follow-
ing section delineates the empirical model and the chosen estimation approach.
3.4.1 The Model
The UCM decomposes time series into a trend, a cyclical and an idiosyncratic component. The
statistical treatment of these unobserved components depends on knowledge or assumptions
about the states’ underlying law of motion. Individual components, as the structural or cyclical
component are not directly observable but we do have an idea about how they evolve over
time. In combination with observables, this constitutes a state-space system. Observable data
will be quarterly real GDP and the budget balance ratio defined as quarterly government net
lending over quarterly nominal GDP. Gross debt in percent of nominal GDP is an additional
regressor - but not part of the underlying law of motion of the unobservable states and added
as an exogenous regressor.
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The European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) contains quarterly
data for both GDP and the government deficit for at least from 2000 onwards for most coun-
tries. This allows straightforward estimation and interpretation of quarterly, cyclically-adjusted
deficit series. However, prior to the year 2000 there is a shortage in the availability of quarterly
government spending data for a variety of countries. Using a model first proposed by Camba-
Mendez and Lamo (2004)6, the signal-extraction problem is augmented with an update step
from annual to quarterly frequency. I will show below that quarterly states can be extracted
even when new information is only available every fourth quarter, i.e. at annual frequency. This
allows a longer-term evaluation of the fiscal policy stance in the European Union.
Real GDP is modeled as the sum of a stochastic trend µyt,q, a cyclical component ψt,q and
a measurement error ζ1t,q. The budget balance ratio follows a stochastic trend µdt,q, a cyclical
component Φd(L)ψt,q proportional to the business cycle, and a presumably negative level effect
of the European Debt crisis between 2008Q4 and 2012Q4 ηdt,q. In addition, the budget balance
ratio is affected by gross debt over nominal GDP plus a component ζ2t,q accounting for measure-
ment errors. The model assumes that trend processes are independent, as economic theory tells
us that potential or long-run output is usually determined by supply-side factors that concern
the structure of the economy and are not altered by government spending or monetary policy.
On the contrary, the structural component of the budget balance is at the discretion of policy
makers and depends mainly on legislative and other political factors. The nature of the propor-
tionality between the business cycle and the cyclical budget balance lies in automatic stabilizers.
Common examples are tax revenues and unemployment benefits which fluctuate proportional
to the business cycle. During a recession, tax revenues decrease which supports disposable in-
come and dampens the pass through to aggregate demand. In times of boom, higher revenues
are collected which diminishes the effect on aggregate demand. The more progressive the tax
code, the stronger the stabilizing nature of taxation. In addition, higher unemployment bene-
fits during recessions absorb shocks to aggregate demand, whereas the converse holds during
booms. Stated otherwise, these variables work as automatic stabilizers on the business cycle. A
very recent contribution to this otherwise extensively researched field has been made by McKay
and Reis (2016).
In order to account for measurement errors, ζt i,q is an iid, normally-distributed process with
standard deviation σζi , ∀i ∈ {1,2}. A measurement error of zero implied that the interpolated
series is exactly the sum of its unobserved components.
The observation equation of the state-space system can be described as a two-dimensional
vector-autoregression where:
yt,q = µ
y
t,q + αψt,q + ζ1t,q
dt,q = µ
d
t,q + (α1 + α2L)ψt,q + λ f η
f
t,q + λdη
d
t,q + ζ2t,q, (3.1)
6 Whereas the original paper documented quarterly, structural deficit series of Germany and Italy from 1970 to
2000, the present chapter supplies the decomposition of the government budget balance for a set of 30 countries
for the years 1995 to 2015 or even earlier.
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where t,q indicate the specific year and quarter. Output yt,q is described by the log of quarterly
real GDP, whereas dt,q is nominal government net lending over nominal GDP. The joint, cyclical
component is modeled as a second-order autoregressive process:
ψt,q = ρ1ψt,q–1 + ρ2ψt,q–2 + ζ3t,q, ζ3t,q ∼ N(0,1). (3.2)
The polynomial lag operator Φd(L)= (α1 +α2L) onψt,q accounts for the proportionality with
the business cycle. The stochastic trend components evolve according to the following two equa-
tions, where i = {y , d}:
µit,q = β
i
t,q + µ
i
t,q–1 + "
i
t,q, "
i
t,q
iid∼ N(0,σ2"i)
β it,q = β
i
t,q–1 + ν
i
t,q. ν
y
t,q
iid∼ N(0,σ2νy) (3.3)
The trend component of both GDP and budget balance ratio are assumed to follow independent
randomwalks. In addition, Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004) model the slope of this trend, βt,q
as a second randomwalk. If however, the variance affecting this slope-randomwalk is near zero,
the entire trend component converges against a random walk with drift. Moreover, I include
exogenous variables η ft,q and η
d
t,q to model changes in the level of the budget balance ratio
after 2008Q4 until the end of 2012 (indicator variable) and the reaction of the budget balance
to the debt-to-GDP balance.
3.4.2 State-Space System
In what follows I describe the state-space system for the fully observable model. In an additional
step I explain how it is possible to interpolate the missing 3 quarters in case annual budget
balance data has been used to extend the sample to a longer time horizon. To keep things
comparable, the notation still closely follows Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004). A more detailed
and comprehensive overview of all the steps and equations can be found in Appendix B.2.
Fully-observable Model
The two-dimensional vector-autoregressive process in equation (3.1) is summarized by the fol-
lowing equation, representing the measurement equation of the state-space system:
x t,q = Ast,q + Bzt,q + "t,q, (3.4)
where A is a selection matrix on the state-vector st,q, B is a vector capturing the additional level
effect on the budget balance ratio between 2008Q4-2012Q4 and the effect of the gross debt
over GDP ratio and "t,q allows to control for measurement errors. The vector x t,q stacks the two
observables, (yt,q, dt,q)′. The state-vector st,q collects the unobservable components discussed
above. The underlying transition equation is given by:
st,q = Cst,q–1 + et,q. (3.5)
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If quarterly data is available for both real GDP and the budget balance ratio at all times no
partial-updating steps are needed. The state vector is augmented such that the new state vector
contains both the unknown states st,q and the known observables, x t,q represented in qt,q =
(x t,q, st,q)
′. This results in the following state-space system at quarterly frequency:
x t,q = Z
′qt,q (3.6)
qt,q = Nqt,q–1 + Mzt,q + Rvt,q. (3.7)
In eight out of 31 cases all data is fully available at quarterly frequency and the structural com-
ponents of the model can be recovered directly without any further interpolation steps. In case
annual budget balance data is used to help obtaining the desired sample length, an interpolation
based on the full sample requires the aggregation to an annual frequency. A subsequent partial
updating step then recovers the structural components also at quarterly frequency. Exploiting
the recursive structure of equation 3.7, the annualized representation at quarterly frequency
looks as follows:
x t,4 = Z
′qt,4 (3.8)
qt,4 = Nt
4qt–1,4 + M
4
t (zt1 . . . zt4) + ξ
4
t,4 (3.9)
L4t = Var(ξ
4
t,4). (3.10)
The annualized representation is used to estimate the unknown parameters of the model con-
ditional on the full sample length. The model’s equations are now time-dependend due to the
construction of an auxiliary budget balance-ratio series for the missing quarters. Whenever quar-
terly data is available, the later will be used during the updating procedure. The state-space
system allows to construct the joint log-likelihood function of the model via the prediction error
decomposition. Prediction errors and the prediction error variance stem from a Kalman Filter-
ing algorithm robust to outliers which evaluates the log-likelihood function at every point in
time, t. Maximum Likelihood estimates are obtained through numerical minimization of the
negative of the joint log-likelihood function. In addition, the standard errors of the estimated
parameters are obtained from the inverse Hessian matrix. Finally, performing Ljung-Box Tests
on the correlation of standardized residuals ensures that the model is well-specified.
Interpolation Step
In case quarterly data on government deficits are only partially available, annual deficit series
are used to interpolate the unobservable states to a quarterly frequency. Camba-Mendez and
Lamo (2004) overcome this problem by introducing auxiliary variables represented in a vector
xat,q which is fully observable even at quarterly frequency.
xat, j =
j∑
i=1
Wt,i x t,i ,
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where
Wt,i =

1 0
0 wt,i

and wt, j =
Y nt, j
4∑
i=1
Y nt,i
.
The vector xat,q transforms quarterly real GDP at quarterly level into quarterly real GDP at
annual level, i.e. it contains the cumulated sum of quarterly GDP figures for the regarded year.
Additionally, annual budget balance ratios are weighted and cumulated afterwards. The weight
is constructed from quarterly nominal GDP, Y nt, j over annual nominal GDP in the respective
year.7 This implies that xat,4 contains just the end-of-period value for GDP and the corresponding
annual budget balance ratio.
The state-space system for the model using annual data basically looks like the system pre-
sented in 3.7 and 3.9. However, as wt,q is time-varying, all system matrices except the selection
matrix Z are time-varying as well. Furthermore, the annualized systemwhich is used to estimate
the unknown model parameters only uses every fourth observation, given that at this frequency
all data is fully-observable. See the appendix for a detailed derivation of all equations and esti-
mation steps.
Once the parameters are estimated, Kalman filtering with partial updating finds the unob-
served parts of the state vector qt,q at quarterly frequency. Partial updating implies updating
for real GDP every quarter and updating for the budget balance ratio only every fourth quarter.
Since this chapter reconstructs the unobservable states until at least the first quarter of 1995, the
filtered outcome is passed to a Kalman Smoothing algorithm. All estimation and specification
test results will be discussed thoroughly in the succeeding section.
3.5 Further Approaches towards Structural Budget Balances
Before comparing the approach delineated above with other possible approaches employed to
estimate cyclically-adjusted budget balances, this section provides a brief overview on the Eu-
ropean Commission’s methodology and estimation based on HP-filtering and Hamilton (2017)-
Filtering.
3.5.1 The European Commission’s Approach
The European Commission follows its own approach to monitor the fiscal policy rules delineated
in the EU treaties above. Their approach views the budget balance as the sum of a component
proportional to the business cycle and a discretionary part corrected for one-time measures and
7 For standard flow variables, the annual value is just the sum of its quarterly components. This does not hold for
ratios, i.e. the weighting has to account for differences between quarterly nominal GDP values.
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the influence of automatic stabilizers:
BBt =
Rt – Gt
Yt
= CABt + "OGt , (3.11)
where BBt denotes the budget balance or net government spending, Rt – Gt stands for revenue
minus expenditures, Yt for GDP, CABt for the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, and OGt for
the output gap. The parameter " denotes the joint reaction parameter of revenue and expendi-
tures towards the cycle. The division into these parts is not uniquely pinned down by theory and
discussions about the quantitative magnitude and the qualitative reliability of these figures are
always related to the estimation of the output gap and the sensitivity parameter. The German
Council of Economic Experts (2016) pointed out that different methodologies lead to severe de-
viations between the values the structural deficit assumes and makes qualitative judgment less
reliable. Two major revisions in the EU’s methodological approach recently took place. Havik
et al. (2014) describes a revised approach to estimate potential GDP and the output gap, also
employing Kalman Filtering techniques. In addition, Mourre et al. (2013) show and compare
two approaches and the impact on results, if, instead of estimating a budget sensitivity, " is
estimated as semi-elasticity.
Output Gap Calculation
Calculating, forecasting and evaluating the output gap, i.e. the difference between actual, ob-
served output and output when the economy was running at full potential belongs to the central
questions of (empirical) macroeconomics during the past 60 years. Giorno et al. (1995) com-
pare the use of a production function-based methodology with the HP-filter to find a smooth
GDP trend and calculate structural budget balances. While later parts of this section discuss the
HP-filter, I will briefly describe the production function approach and its recent elaborations
(Havik et al. (2014)) which are now part of the ECOFIN approved methodology to calculate
potential output.
Using a simple two-factor type Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
y = c + α ln(N) + (1 – α) ln(K) + e, (3.12)
as regression equation, the Solow-residual e or the log of total factor productivity can be cal-
culated. The residual series is then smoothed using the HP-filter to provide a measure of trend
factor productivity. Actual (log-)capital input k, the smoothed residuals ep and a measure for
potential employment np are then re-inserted into the equation to obtain potential output as:
yp = c + αnp + (1 – α)k + ep, (3.13)
where potential employment has been calculated as the log of T LF(1 – NAWRU) – EG, i.e. trend
labor force times one minus the estimated non-accelerating wage-rate of unemployment minus
employment in the government sector. The new propositions in Havik et al. (2014) concern the
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estimation of the NAWRU and the estimation of trend total factor productivity ep using more
appropriate statistical tools.
Instead of HP-filtering, a Bayesian bivariate Kalman-filtering approach following Koopman
and Durbin (2003) has been chosen. Here, the trend-cycle decomposition is based on a struc-
tural recursive model which in case of the NAWRU is augmented with information that stems
from a Phillips Curve trade-off. The overall benefit of this revised approach is to give economic
theory more space in contrast to a purely statistical approach that might generate arbitrary
outcomes.
Reaction Parameter ε
The estimation of " is based on a two-step methodology, following van den Noord (2000) and
has been updated by Girourard and André (2005). In a nutshell they comprise: Revenue elas-
ticities of corporate, personal income and indirect taxes and social security contributions with
respect to the output gap. On the expenditure side the elasticity of unemployment benefits to
the output gap is regarded. The output gap elasticity of those budget items can be obtained
by multiplication of a weighting parameter (elasticity of e.g. individual revenue item to base
revenue) times the elasticity of the base to the output gap. This allows to keep track of country-
specific tax codes or the significance of unemployment benefits.
The revised reaction parameter " accounts for a second order approximation error which
does not matter as long as both output gap and budget balance are small. Until 2012, " had
been defined as time-constant budget-sensitivity, i.e. measuring the ratio of incremental changes
in the budget to incremental changes in output. However, as Mourre et al. (2013) show on pp.
11-13, using the definition of the budget sensitivity does not exactly lead to the desired result,
i.e. the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. Instead they propose to use a time-constant budget
semi-elasticity, i.e. measuring the ratio of incremental changes in the budget-balance ratio to
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the percentage change in GDP.8 Mourre et al. (2013) point out that during the recent financial
crisis this approximation error made up to half a percentage point of GDP. Furthermore, using
(3.11) and the results and definitions of footnote (8) allows to break down the semi-elasticity
parameter " into its components.
" =
dB
dY
–
B
Y
=

(dR/R)
(dY /Y )
– 1

R
Y
–

(dG/G)
(dY /Y )
– 1

G
Y
= (ηR – 1)
R
Y
– (ηG – 1)
G
Y
.
(3.14)
Mourre et al. (2013) propose to use this approach instead of the sensitivity-approach because
cyclical adjustment is much stronger on the expenditure side relative to the revenue side. Here,
a main driver of adjustment are unemployment expenses and transfers. This feature is not
adequately captured by using revenue and expenditure sensitivities instead. Given that revenues
are sensitive to the business cycle, a change in output is more or less off-set by a change in
8 The approximation error which is usually of second-order magnitude can be derived using the following ap-
proximation of the cyclically-adjusted balance plus the output gap and the corresponding definition of the reaction
parameter ".
CAB =
B – dB
Y p
=
B
Y
– ("R – "G) · OG = BY – "
Y – Y p
Y p
,
The budget-sensitivity is defined as :
dB
dY
=
dR – dG
dY
=
(dR/R)
(dY /Y )
· R
Y
–
(dG/G)
(dY /Y )
· G
Y
,
and substitution for " in the definition of CAB leads to the following cyclically-adjusted balance:
CABe =

B
Y
–
dB
Y p

,
whereas the budget-elasticity has been defined as
dB
dY
–
B
Y
=
dB/Y
dY /Y
=
(dB/dY ) · Y – (dY /Y ) · B
Y
=
dB
dY
–
B
Y
,
and leads to the following CABe which corresponds to the definition above.:
CABe =

B
Y p
–
dB
Y p

.
The substitution for " in both cases shows that the budget sensitivity only adjusts the budget balance but not cur-
rent output, which is of course affected by the current cyclical movement, whereas the the semi-elasticity correctly
describes the reaction of the budget-balance to GDP -ratio to cyclical change in GDP. As Mourre et al. (2013) show,
the difference between the correct CAB and the one based on the budget sensitivity amounts to:
CABe – CABs =

B
Y p
–
dB
Y p

–

B
Y
–
dB
Y p

= · · · = OG · B
Y
,
which only matters in case both factors are large as e.g. during the recent financial crisis.
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revenues. The revenue elasticity ηR close to 1 and thus, the revenue semi-elasticity "R is close
to 0. In contrast to that, a huge part of total expenditures is of non-cyclical nature, which implies
that the expenditure elasticity ηG is close to zero. Hence, the expenditure-to-GDP-ratio strongly
responds to changes in the business cycle if the expenditure-to-GDP-ratio is approximated by
0.5, roughly the EU average. Nevertheless, Mourre et al. (2013) conclude that in absence of the
recent crisis years, the revision had a minor impact on quantitative results.
3.5.2 Alternatives
Another popular and easy to implement alternative towards this trend-cycle-separation problem
is the HP-filter, after Hodrick and Prescott (1981, 1997). Let a time series Yt be described as Yt =
TtCt"t such that in logs, the cyclical component ct of the series is approximately (abstracting
from noise) equal to the log of the original series yt minus the trend component τt . The basic
idea behind that is to simultaneously minimize the squared deviation of the log time series from
its trend plus to penalize excessive curvature in the trend component, using λ. The optimization
problem which needs to be solved looks as follows:
min
τ
 T∑
t=1
(yt – τt)
2 + λ
T–1∑
t=2
[(τt+1 – τt) – (τt – τt–1)]
2

. (3.15)
Using the ratio of government net lending over nominal GDP, this series can be split into a
trend or structural and a cyclical part. This very simple approach can be good approximation
provided the fact that the cycle of the budget balance and GDP are proportional and trend
excess expenditures are related to long-term growth prospects of the economy.
However, the HP-Filter comes with enormous drawbacks such that the European Commis-
sion no longer uses it (see Havik et al. (2014) p.6 for further details) to calculate potential
output. The filter is biased at the start- and endpoints of the sample because estimates are
needed to calculate initial differences. It is not causal as it is forward- and backward-looking
at the same time. This may lead to problems when HP-filtered data is used to estimate
recursively-ordered structural models. Moreover, especially the endpoint problems imply that
the filter should not be used for real-time policy recommendations as results might be biased.
Furthermore, the choice of λ which is related to the length of the cycle is somehow arbitrary.
Longer deviations from trend cannot be detected by construction and would be counted as
a trend reversal. This has become obvious during or right after the recent financial crisis.
Whereas Cogley and Nason (1995) illustrate how some of these shortcomings differently affect
the detrending of trend- and difference stationary time series, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) provide
further insights on issues concerning the choice of λ. Stock and Watson (1999) define a 1-sided,
or purely-backward looking Kalman-Filter equivalent version of the filter that mitigates some
of the criticism delineated above.
Finally, Hamilton (2017) proposes to use a simple but (in his opinion) statistically more
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superior regression-based method of fourth differences instead, which works surprisingly well.
For quarterly data, the OLS regression equation looks as follows:
yt+h = c + yt–p+4 + yt–p+3 + yt–p+2 + yt–p+1 + "t , (3.16)
where I follow Hamilton (2017) and set h to 8 and p to 4. In absence of other influences (e.g.
seasonality), the residuals eˆ = (yt+h – yˆt+h) are the cyclical component of the series. In the
following section I will compare my results with results based on the methods described in this
section.
3.6 Empirical Results
In what follows I am going to discuss estimation results and their implication for the stance of
fiscal policy in the respective country. Furthermore, I analyze the estimated structural budget
balances with respect to medium-term objectives and safety-margins over different time periods.
Finally, the results are compared with outcomes of the alternative approaches discussed further
above.
3.6.1 Estimation Results
Figure 3.2 depicts the interpolated, quarterly budget balance series and the respective cyclically-
adjusted balance for each country. The black, solid line is the actual budget balance observed
and for some early years extended with annual values in form of bubbles. The grey-dotted line is
the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. Depending on individual data availability, the time hori-
zon covered is shorter for some countries. The respective sample length becomes visible from
the summary statistics in Table 3.1. For a subset of countries9, chosen to make the fiscal policy
stance comparable across countries with similar characteristics, the results in Table 3.2 display a
subset of the estimated coefficients of the model. The full vector of estimated coefficients looks
as follows:
θ = [α α1 α2 ρ1 ρ2 σ" y σηy σ"d σηd σξ1 σξ2 λ f λd] (3.17)
The estimation coefficients can be broadly separated into three groups: Business cycle related,
potential GDP or structural government balance and exogenous influences. I follow Fatás and
Mihov (2010) who think of fiscal policy as a combination of automatic stabilizers and endoge-
nous and exogenous discretionary fiscal policy. My classification looks as follows:
• Business Cycle related: The reaction of fiscal policy to cyclical fluctuations as a result of
the tax code and social security benefits that link the budget to the business cycle. Here
α1,α2 represent the cyclical reaction of the budget balance ratio. The cycle generating
coefficients are ρ1 and ρ2. The coefficient α links GDP to the cycle.
9 The choice of the subset and the selection criteria have been discussed in section 3.3, based on the “Regions of
Europe” article on Wikipedia.
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Table 3.2. Estimation Results for Subset of Countries
Coecients related Cycle-generating Reaction to
to the Business Cycle AR(2)-Coecients Crisis Lagged Debt
GDP Budget Balance
Countries α α1 α2 ρ1 ρ2 λf λd
Nordic Council 0.0457 0.00727 0.0149 -0.6 -0.564 -0.00154 -0.000742
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Baltic Assembly 0.0504 0.0146 0.0112 -0.396 -1.14 -0.00112 -0.0012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
France 0.0316 0.0267 0.000201 -0.467 -0.617 -0.000986 -0.000981
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0000)
Germany 0.0518 0.0232 0.0141 -0.21 -0.931 -0.000794 -0.000865
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Greece 0.105 0.00369 0.0146 0.0447 -0.816 0.00133 0.000601
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0173) (0.0001)
Italy 0.0514 0.00764 0.00519 -0.432 -0.925 -0.000806 -0.0016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Benelux 0.0544 0.0157 -0.000261 -0.386 -0.574 -0.000933 -0.00145
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0786) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Visegrad Group 0.0672 0.0193 0.00551 -0.864 -0.991 -0.00202 -0.00018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Craiova Group 0.0983 0.0109 0.00044 -0.689 0.355 -0.00115 -0.000974
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0777) (0.1812)
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. The table shows 7 out of 13 estimated coecients. The
remaining 6 are the standard deviations of the trend processes and the measurement errors. Rep-
resentative countries chosen for the respective supranational body are in order of appearance:
Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania.
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Figure 3.2. Structural Decits (dashed) and Budget Balance (solid) in Europe until 2015 (Quarterly Data)
Notes: The gure shows quarterly, government budget balances in percent of seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP and its corresponding trend component,
i.e. the structural budget balance. In case some parts of the respective country budget balance are only available at annual frequency, circles depict
the annual budget balance value which by construction is equivalent with the value the budget balance would assume in the fourth quarter provided
all data was available.
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• Potential or trend components: An adjustment of fiscal policy in response to changing (long-
run) economic conditions. Standard deviations of the budget balance’s trend process is
estimated using (σ"d , σηd). The trend component of GDP or potential GDP is estimated
using the following standard deviations: (σ" y , σηy)
• Exogenous influences: Policies unrelated to (direct) economic conditions such as political
considerations, one-time events as crisis or the level of debt that affect the budget only via
the amount of interests that need to be paid. The exogenous influence of the financial cri-
sis and gross debt, (λ f ,λd) on the level of the budget balance ratio. Standard deviations
of the measurement error (σξ1 σξ2).
A table with full estimation results on all countries is provided in the Appendix in Table B.1.
The cycle-generating coefficients ρ1, ρ2 are consistently negative and highly significant for
all countries. This is in line with the commonly accepted view of a stationary cycle, fluctuating
around zero.10 Positive coefficients for α and α1 on the common underlying cycle suggest a
countercyclical fiscal policy stance. In this representative table of results this is the case for all
countries / supranational body representatives. The t-statistics are very significant in all cases.
In combination with moderate deficits, a countercyclical fiscal policy stance smoothes business
cycle fluctuations by supporting the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers (see Melitz (2000)).
The coefficient α2, relating the budget balance ratio to the lag of the business cycle is usually
positive and smaller than α1 however, for some countries it is also negative.
Following e.g. Fatás and Mihov (2010) or Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008), the
change in the fiscal stance can be highlighted through the correlation between the growth
rate of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance ratio and the output gap. A positive correlation
expresses a countercyclical and a negative a pro-cyclical policy stance. Figure 3.3 shows this
for the subset of countries and the years 2005-2015. This approach generally confirms the
countercyclical stance of fiscal policy in Europe. However, for that time period, the results for
Estonia (Baltic Assembly) and Romania (Craiova Group) are puzzling, given that the estimated
coefficients on the cycle (α1, α2) are both positive and thus suggest a countercyclical stance.11
An explanation might be the state of development of both countries. Kumar and Ter-Minassian
(2007) argue that the main causes for pro-cyclical fiscal policy stem from weak institutions,
corruption, financial constraints and low confidence of foreign investors. Apart from that, the
findings are in line with results of Fatás and Mihov (2010) who find that fiscal policy in Europe
has become more countercyclical after 1999.
The cyclically-adjusted balance is displayed in Figure 3.2 - here for all countries. In most
cases it is smooth, a feature of the general linear exponential smoothing model (ARIMA(0,1,2))
- assumption, underlying the trend components. Furthermore, especially in the case when only
quarterly data was used, accounting for outliers further smooths results a bit.
10 Employing an augmented Dickey-Fuller test revealed that the null hypothesis of no unit root in the cycle cannot
be rejected for 27 out of 31 countries, testing at a 5% level of significance.
11 Boiciuc (2015) finds that fiscal policy in Romania has been pro-cyclical from the year 2000 onwards for all years
but 2013.
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Figure 3.3. Fiscal Policy Stance and the Output Gap (2005-2015)
Notes: The gure shows the annual change of the quarterly, cyclically-adjusted budget balance and the Output Gap
for the years 2005 to 2015. The correlation coecient is an indicator for the stance of scal policy. Positive indicates a
countercyclical and negative a pro-cyclical stance. Representative countries chosen for the respective supranational
body are in order of appearance: Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania.
Two exogenous influences on the government budget balance are described via the coeffi-
cients λ f which captures the influence of the European Debt Crisis (2008Q4-2012Q4) and λd
which measures the impact of high states of (lagged) debt over GDP. The influence of a higher
debt-to GDP ratio on the budget is negative and highly significant in 25 out of 29 countries
where quarterly data on gross debt has been available in Euros. However, in Table 3.2 the re-
action of Romania’s (Craiova Group) budget balance to lagged debt has the same sign but is
insignificant. In the case of Romania this makes sense, given that in Bulgaria, the second Craiova
Group country, the reaction to lagged debt even displays a positive reaction. Furthermore, as
non-Euro country, Romania is not affected by the ECB’s policy. A negative sign of the reaction
to debt implies that higher debt yesterday leads to a less positive balance or a higher deficits
today and governments do not stabilize debt by cutting expenditures today. Hence, fiscal policy
could be active in the definition of Leeper (1991)’s Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. A passive
monetary policy which is needed to ensure a stable equilibrium is also in line with the behav-
ior of the ECB in recent years. Furthermore, the magnitude of the reaction to debt does not
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differ tremendously and is rather small. This might stem from “debt brakes” anchored in the
respective constitutions, especially with respect to the Fiscal Compact.
On the contrary, the additional influence the financial crisis had on the countries’ spending
behavior is not so clear-cut. For 19 out of 31 countries I find an additional, significant impact of
the crisis on the level of the budget balance ratio. Nevertheless, this additional effect has to be
taken with a grain of salt. The economic significance of both coefficients - the reaction to debt
and the financial crisis - is not too big which could be explained by the fact that sudden higher
spending due to e.g. bank bail-out programs or economic recovery programs might be already
captured by an increase in the structural deficit, although from a conceptual point of view this
was not correct.
The next subsection compares the my findings with results that can be derived using alter-
native approaches as discussed in section 3.5.
3.6.2 The Fiscal Policy Stance In Comparison With Other Methods
As previous sections already pointed out, there is more than one unique road towards the “Rome”
of monitoring public finances, the calculation of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. Section
3.5 discussed two main approaches: 1. Cyclically-adjusted budget balances based on potential
GDP derived from Kalman Filtering supply-side variables of the economy and estimating the
tax code and social security benefit semi-elasticities to the output gap and 2. purely statistical
approaches as the HP-Filter or Hamilton’s eight quarter detrending.
First, I propose to combine the estimated output gap (based on Kalman Filtering of Real
GDP using the UCM discussed in section 3.4) with the 2005 and 2014 version of the budget
sensitivities / semi-elasticities as calculated in Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014). This is an
approximation, given that potential GDP in Mourre et al. (2013); Mourre, Astarita, and Princen
(2014) is based on various supply-side variables. Second, I suggest to detrend quarterly real GDP
using both the HP- and the Hamilton Filter and calculate the cyclically-adjusted budget balance
as the difference between the observed or smoothed balance (in case of data limitations) and
the product of the output gap and the budget elasticities. I will display my results graphically
and in a table, summarizing the fiscal stance over different methodologies. Figure 3.4 displays
the graphical approach towards this comparison. For the majority of countries / regional rep-
resentatives the cyclically-adjusted budget balances calculated using alternative methodologies
resemble each other, and are similar to the version calculated using the model in section 3.4
(black, dashed). However, in some cases and for single years, bigger derivations of course un-
derline the difficulty in finding a plausible approach towards this trend-separation problem. For
the case of the Baltic Assembly (Estonia), the huge derivation stems from a mean reversion be-
tween 2008 and 2010 as Figure 3.2 illustrates. Here, the outlier-robust version of the chapter’s
Kalman filtering approach steps in and “produces” a smoother trend component. The relatively
“bad” performance of Hamilton’s filter in some cases depends on the choice of the length of the
underlying cycle.
Table 3.3 provides more quantitative evidence on the performance of other approaches rela-
tive to the UCM: The first six columns show the correlations of the respective alternative method
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Figure 3.4. Comparing the CABs Using Dierent Methodologies, (2005-2015)
Notes: The graph depicts three versions of cyclically-adjusted budget (CAB) balances based on the 2014 budget semi-
elasticity of Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014) and the CAB balance derived from the UC model for the years 2005-
2015. Representative countries chosen for the respective supranational body are in order of appearance: Denmark,
Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania
with the approach chosen in this chapter. Correlations are very high and positive in all cases,
though it is fair enough to admit that in case of the first to columns results might be biased
towards the chapter’s result by using the cyclical component of GDP calculated using the UCM.
Especially when the ratio of α1,α2 and α comes close to the semi-elasticities calculated by
Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014), results resemble each other strongly.
The degree of pro- or countercyclicality, i.e. the fiscal stance of the respective government is
displayed in the last three columns of the table.Ωα measures the percentage point change of the
budget balance ratio for a 1 percent change in the GDP. Because the numerator ofΩα is in levels
and the denominator in logs, this ratio can also be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. This allows
to compare Ωα to the semi-elasticities presented in Mourre et al. (2013); Mourre, Astarita, and
Princen (2014). A bit puzzling is the result that for some countries the semi-elasticities almost
coincide, for other however, there is a big discrepancy. On the one hand, given the fact that
both elasticities have been obtained using totally different approaches the results might not be
perfectly comparable in all cases. On the other hand, as Table B.1 and Appendix B.1.2 show, the
fiscal stance calculated using an UCM directly provides standard errors for the semi-elasticities.
Nevertheless, the sign clearly indicates a countercyclical stance in all cases which is in line with
the literature and earlier results found above.
3.6 Empirical Results | 97
Table 3.3. Comparing Methodologies across Subset of Countries, (2005-2015)
Correlation of CAB with Fiscal Stance of
CAB of UC Model EU Approach UC Model
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Budget Sensitivity Semi-Elasticity Ωα
ELA2005 ELA2014 HP2005 HP2014 HF2005 HF2014 (2005) (2014) [(α1 + α2)/(α)]
Nordic Council 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.49 0.58 0.48
Baltic Assembly 0.61 0.62 0.94 0.94 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.61 0.51
France 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.79 0.32 0.31 0.85
Germany 0.91 0.93 0.9 0.91 0.53 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.72
Greece 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.66 0.58 0.45 0.52 0.17
Italy 0.93 0.9 0.79 0.75 0.87 0.86 0.39 0.43 0.25
Benelux 0.93 0.93 0.67 0.66 0.53 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.28
Visegrad Group 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.88 0.3 0.44 0.37
Craiova Group 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.51 0.5 0.53 0.57 0.12
Notes: The table reports correlation coecients of six cyclically-adjusted budget balances calculated using dif-
ferent approaches towards obtaining potential GDP and the reaction of the budget to the cycle. Furthermore,
indicators of the scal policy stance are reported using the budget sensitivity / semi-elasticity of Mourre et al.
(2013); Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014) and coecients estimated from the UCM. For details see section
3.6.2. Representative countries chosen for the respective supranational body are in order of appearance: Sweden,
Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania.
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3.6.3 Safety Margins
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Figure 3.5. Structural Decits (solid) and Medium-Term Objective (dashed) in Europe until 2015
(Quarterly Data)
Notes: The gure shows quarterly, structural budget balances in percent of seasonally-adjusted nominal GDP (solid)
and a medium-term-objective (MTO) of scal policy (dashed) which changes around a ve-year window. The MTO is
dened as the maximum value discretionary decits can assume such that the 3% Maastricht decit threshold is
never exceeded over the cycle. Representative countries chosen for the respective supranational body are in order
of appearance: Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania
The last subsection of this chapter analyses a fiscal policy evaluation tool which is also part
of the EU treaties. Starting from the reformed version of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005,
so-called “safety-margins” and “medium-term objectives” (MTO) play an important role in the
evaluation whether a country runs an excessive deficit or not. According to the treaties countries
may have a maximum structural deficit of 1% (revised 2005 version of the SGP) and a maximum
structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP according to the Fiscal Compact which constitutes the MTO
in order to guarantee sustainable debt.12 Furthermore, all countries that have not yet reached
their MTO should consolidate discretionary spending by a minimum of 0.5% each year until
the MTO is reached.
Table 3.4 regards so-called safety margins, i.e. the maximum value discretionary spending
can assume such that the 3% Maastricht deficit threshold is never exceeded over the cycle. It
12 Structural Deficits higher than 0.5% but below 1% are possible if the respective country’s debt is below 40% of
GDP.
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is calculated as the three percent threshold deficit minus the minimum cyclical component of
the budget balance ratio, i.e. it is a worst-recession margin. Calculation over the entire sample
does not really make sense as the financial crisis is a huge outlier and provides a too negative
picture of the state of the economy. The idea is to calculate the safety margins for a five-year
window, such that it is possible to evaluate structural spending within this episode. This allows
for variation due to huge outliers as e.g. the recent crisis. The regarded periods correspond to
the periods regarded in the summary statistics. Furthermore, Table 3.4 depicts average figures
for the structural balance in the respective time period. Figure 3.5 plots the the safety margins
within a five-year window and the corresponding structural deficit.
For a majority of countries, structural expenses are not within or above the safety margins
that guarantee a compliance to the Maastricht criteria. Furthermore, especially for the periods
2005-2008 and 2008 until 2015, when the revised SGP and later the Fiscal Compact where
signed and ratified, almost all countries (except Germany and the Sweden) are far away from
their MTO. This can be regarded as a consequence of the recent crisis which has been the worst
recession since the Great Depression. However, the figure shows more than that. Structural
deficits declined over the last years and many countries are on a convergence path towards
the respective safety margin. This is a result of the austerity programs that included harsh
consolidation and structural reform obligations following the bailout by the rescue funds ESFS
or ESM. Nonetheless, the country-specific safety margin are lower than the maximum structural
deficit in the MTO agreed upon in the SGP for most countries, i.e. more consolidation is needed.
This is especially important as public finances of most European countries are challenged by a
high stock of debt and an aging population. Moreover, the figure shows that many countries
became fatigue to reform their budgets at least after joining the EMU, as we see structural
deficits increase already around the year 2000.
What is the conclusion of these results? These results highlight that fiscal discipline, which
should have been imposed by the Maastricht Treaty or Stability and Growth Pact (and the nu-
merous successor treaties) did not exist. Average figures, overall (as in the summary statistics)
and structural failed to be in compliance with the Maastricht criteria over almost the entire sam-
ple. It has not been the Franco-German complicity with assistance of the Italian presidency that
undermined the Stability and Growth Pact and provided bad incentives. Compared to annual
or even quarterly figures, using averages here allows to assess the performance of the structural
deficit over years of boom and recession. Structural spending, especially in good times has been
too high and has left little room for fiscal policy when the tide turned. This confirms the result
of Buti, Franco, and Ongena (1998), mentioned in the introduction. The frequent violation of
the Stability and Growth Pact and the political “necessity” to weaken its criteria and its enforce-
ability in 2005 are the sad consequence of this story and pose a big threat to the sustainability
of public finances in Europe.
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Table 3.4. Safety Margins and the Structural Decit for a Subset of Countries
Countries Average Average
Safety Margin Struct. Balance
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2008 2008-2015 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2008 2008-2015
Nordic Council 0.144 -2.37 -1.71 -2.72 -0.59 1.95 1.49 -0.855
Baltic Assembly -2.43 -2.43 -1.01 -2.6 0.238 0.539 0.982 1.01
France -1.69 -1.69 -2.25 -1.61 -4.83 -2.32 -2.75 -4.39
Germany -1.3 -1.3 0.237 -1.06 -3.86 -2.53 -1.9 -0.268
Greece -2.63 -2.63 -1.98 -1.85 -7.05 -6.83 -9.8 -10
Italy -2.88 -2.88 -2.35 -2.84 -3.53 -3.19 -3.37 -2.64
Benelux -2.43 -2.43 -2.43 -2.43 -0.539 -1.11 -2.54 -2.54
Visegrad Group - -1.71 -2.32 -2.32 - -3.99 -4.5 -4.5
Craiova Group -2.84 -2.84 -2.62 -2.62 -3.14 -4.01 -3.39 -3.39
Notes: Safety Margins are dened as the three percent threshold decit minus the minimum cyclical component
of the budget balance ratio. Representative countries chosen for the respective supranational body are in order of
appearance: Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland and Romania.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided new quantitative evidence on almost 20 years of European government
spending under the Stability and Growth Pact and its successor treaties. Using an unobserved
components model (UCM) and the Kalman Filter, the present chapter estimated structural
deficit series for 31 European countries between 1995 and 2015. Comparing these values
against the 3%Maastricht benchmark reveals that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has not
really been taken seriously by many European governments. Political decisions to vote down
a pending excessive deficit procedure as in the case of France and Germany in 2003 or Spain
and Portugal last year, do not improve the popularity of these treaties in the population. Fur-
thermore, the chapter assessed the stance of European fiscal policy. In accordance with earlier
research, this chapter documents that European fiscal policy is in general strongly counter-
cyclical. Moreover, the degree of countercyclicality varies between the countries. This is less
pronounced with respect to the reaction of fiscal policy to gross debt. European fiscal policy
is very active in the definition of the FTPL. Surprisingly, this does not differ too much among
European countries. The economic significance of that effect is small however, given that a lot
of European countries have anchored so-called debt brakes in their constitutions in line with
the Fiscal Compact. Using safety-margins, i.e. values the structural deficit can assume to stay
within the 3% boundary, reveals that discretionary and not business cycle-driven spending has
been the driver of deficits in many European countries. Finally, the chapter provides quarterly
series of the structural and the primary structural deficit which can be used for policy analysis
or can be set into perspective with other methods to obtain these figures.
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Table B.1. Full Estimation Results
Countries α α1 α2 Ωα ρ1 ρ2 λf λd
Austria 0.14 0.041 -0.0109 0.216 0.489 -0.0261 -0.000911 -0.00188
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0001)
Belgium 0.139 0.0311 0.0118 0.3089 -0.723 0.0958 -0.000393 -0.000532
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0060) (0.0000)
Bulgaria 0.122 0.0217 0.0295 0.4219 0.416 -1.01 0.000594 0.00192
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Croatia 0.0307 0.0201 -0.0143 0.1876 -0.464 -0.645 -0.003 -0.00332
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cyprus 0.163 0.0171 -0.00661 0.0641 -0.0803 -1 -0.0041 -0.000381
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Czech Republic 0.0342 0.000452 -0.0111 -0.3099 -0.651 -0.43 -0.0029 -0.00189
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.2793)
Denmark 0.0457 0.00727 0.0149 0.485 -0.6 -0.564 -0.00154 -0.000742
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Estonia 0.0504 0.0146 0.0112 0.5119 -0.396 -1.14 -0.00112 -0.0012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Finland 0.0619 0.0211 0.0145 0.5756 -0.279 -0.763 -0.000126 -0.000923
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0204) (0.0002)
France 0.0316 0.0267 0.000201 0.8486 -0.467 -0.617 -0.000986 -0.000981
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0000)
Germany 0.0518 0.0232 0.0141 0.7197 -0.21 -0.931 -0.000794 -0.000865
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Greece 0.105 0.00369 0.0146 0.1738 0.0447 -0.816 0.00133 0.000601
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0173) (0.0001)
Hungary 0.0562 0.0172 -0.00956 0.1355 -0.401 0.0241 -0.00239 -0.00476
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Iceland 0.0767 0.00992 -0.00236 0.0986 -0.294 -0.94 -0.000616 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) -
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Countries α α1 α2 Ωα ρ1 ρ2 λf λd
Ireland 0.0339 0.021 0.0085 0.8702 -0.502 -0.709 -0.000772 -0.00105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Italy 0.0514 0.00764 0.00519 0.2497 -0.432 -0.925 -0.000806 -0.0016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Latvia 0.0438 0.0152 -0.0133 0.04392 -0.444 -0.745 -0.00292 -0.00388
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.1161) (0.0001)
Lithuania 0.0878 0.0157 0.0019 0.2005 -0.567 -0.921 -0.000983 -0.00161
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Luxembourg 0.0379 0.0231 -0.00264 0.539 -0.331 -0.983 -0.000658 -0.000866
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0001)
Malta 0.0433 0.0176 0.0126 0.699 -0.383 -0.722 -0.00105 -0.000834
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Netherlands 0.0544 0.0157 -0.000261 0.284 -0.386 -0.574 -0.000933 -0.00145
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0786) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Norway 0.122 0.0177 0.0239 0.341 0.0978 0.0385 0.0015 -0.00141
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Poland 0.0672 0.0193 0.00551 0.369 -0.864 -0.991 -0.00202 -0.00018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Portugal 0.0421 0.0191 -0.0176 0.0356 -0.507 -0.301 -0.00311 -0.00345
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Romania 0.0983 0.0109 0.00044 0.116 -0.689 0.355 -0.00115 -0.000974
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0777) (0.1812)
Slovakia 0.0284 0.0215 0.00948 1.09 -0.822 -0.729 -0.00105 -0.000629
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0109) (0.0001)
Slovenia 0.0399 0.0083 0.02 0.71 -1.03 -0.267 -0.00105 -0.00186
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0065) (0.0001)
Spain 0.115 0.00704 -0.0103 -0.0282 -0.0485 -0.541 -0.00429 -0.00265
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Sweden 0.0357 0.0292 0.00894 1.07 -0.119 -0.339 -0.000846 -0.00128
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0059) (0.0068)
Switzerland 0.0823 0.0136 0.0141 0.337 -0.387 -0.592 -0.000845 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0038) -
UK 0.0466 0.0286 0.0108 0.845 -0.389 -1 -0.000679 -0.000614
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0276) (0.0275)
Notes: Standard Erros in parentheses. The table shows 7 out of 13 estimated coeceints. The remaining
6 are the standard deviations of the trend processes and the measurement errors.
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B.1 Specication Results
B.1.1 Ljung-Box-Statistics
The model’s specification is discussed via Ljung-Box statistics. In a correctly specified model the
correlation structure is rich enough to absorb all serial correlation in standardized prediction er-
ror residuals, computed from the Kalman Filter. Stated otherwise, a model is well specified when
it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals. Following
Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004), statistics are reported for the first 4 and 6 autocorrelations in
Table B.2. In the overall evaluation, the model does fairly well and seems a good approximation
towards quarterly figures in European public finance.
B.1.2 Variance of Ratio of Parameters
Derivation of the standard error of the ratio of three estimated coefficients: α1+α2α For any
known variance-covariance matrix of θ which contains among others the coefficients α,α1,α2
it is straightforward to calculate individual standard errors following an maximum likelihood
estimation of the parameters. However, from an economic perspective I am interested in the
combination of those coefficients as given by α1+α2α . Hence, the calculation of the standard
errors needs to account for potential covariation between the estimated coefficients. This can
be done using a first- and second order Taylor-series expansion evaluated at the expected value
of the random variables.
The first step combines x = α1 +α2 to a new random variable with expected value:
E(x) = E(α1 + α2) = α1 + α2 (B.1)
VAR(x) = VAR(α1 + α2) = VAR(α1) + VAR(α2) + 2COV (α1 + α2) (B.2)
Hence, we end up with a function G = g(x ,α)= xα . Let c = (E(α), E(x)). The first-order ap-
proximation is then given by:
g(x ,α) ≈ g(c) + g′α(c)(α – E(α)) + g′x(c)(x – E(x)) + O(n–1) (B.3)
Taking expectations on both sides gives:
E(g(x ,α)) = E

g(c) + g′α(c)(α – E(α)) + g′x(c)(x – E(x)) + O(n–1)

(B.4)
≈ E[g(c)] + g′α(c)E [α – E(α)] + g′x(c)E [x – E(x)] (B.5)
= E[g(c)] + 0 + 0 (B.6)
≈ g(E(x), E(α)) = E(x)
E(α)
(B.7)
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Using this result, the second-order expansion is:
g(x ,α) = g(c) + g′α(c)(α – E(α)) + g′x(c)(x – E(x))
+
1
2
n
g′′αα(c)(α – E(α))2 + 2g′′αx(c)(α – E(α))(x – E(x)) + g′′x x(c)(x – E(x))2)
o
+ O(n–2)
(B.8)
such that by taking expectations on both sides again we obtain:
E(g(x ,α)) = g(c) +
1
2
n
g′′αα(c)VAR(α) + 2g′′αx(c)COV (α, x) + g′′x x(c)VAR(x)
o
(B.9)
Using that g is defined as g = x/α, g′′x x = 0, and g′′xα = –α–2 and g′′αα = 2x/α3. Thus,
E(x/α) ≡ E(g(x ,α)) ≈ E(x)
E(α)
–
COV (α, x)
E(α)2
+
2E(x)VAR(α)
E(α)3
(B.10)
Using the definition of the variance and that E(g(x ,α))≈ g(c), the variance of g(x ,α) is given
by:
VAR(g(α, x)) ≈ E
n
[g(α, x) – g(c)]2
o
(B.11)
Now, using the first-order Taylor expansion for g(x ,α) expanded at c gives:
VAR(g(x ,α)) ≈ E
n
g(c) + g′α(c)(α – E(α)) + g′x(c)(x – E(x)) – g(c)
2o (B.12)
= g′2α (c)VAR(α) + 2g′α(c)g′x(c)COV (α, x) + g′2x (c)VAR(x) (B.13)
Now returning to our ratio g(x ,α)= x/α we end up with
VAR(g(x ,α)) ≡ VAR
 x
α

≈ 1
E(α)2
VAR(x) + 2
E(x)
E(α)3
COV (α, x) +
E(x)2
E(α)4
VAR(α)
(B.14)
=
E(x)2
E(α)2

VAR(x)
E(x)2
– 2
COV (α, x)
E(x)E(α)
+
VAR(α)
E(α)2

(B.15)
Under the assumption that the estimated coefficient and its expected value coincide (how should
this be different when not working from a Bayesian perspective) and assuming that the covari-
ance between α, x is equal to the COV (α,α1)+ COV (α,α2) we end up with:
VAR
α1 + α2
α

=
(α1 + α2)2
α2
σ2α
α2
– 2 × COV (α, (α1,α2))
α(α1 + α2)
+
σ2α1+α2
(α1 + α2)2
 (B.16)
The standard error is the respective square root of this expression.
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Table B.2. Ljung-Box Test-Statistics
Countries GDP Balance
Q(4) Q(6) Q(4) Q(6)
Belgium 0.598 0.736 4.34 13.8
(0.897) (0.981) (0.227) (0.0169)
Bulgaria 3.42 3.68 1.79 2.14
(0.331) (0.596) (0.618) (0.829)
Czech Republic 0.336 0.55 0.336 0.55
(0.953) (0.99) (0.953) (0.99)
Denmark 5.78 9.89 1.56 2.01
(0.123) (0.0785) (0.67) (0.848)
Germany 0.238 0.379 0.238 0.379
(0.971) (0.996) (0.971) (0.996)
Estonia 8.56 12.8 3.56 7.81
(0.0357) (0.0251) (0.314) (0.167)
Ireland 2.65 2.66 1.65 1.69
(0.448) (0.752) (0.649) (0.89)
Greece 7.97 8.73 4.98 5.58
(0.0467) (0.12) (0.173) (0.349)
Spain 11.6 12.4 6.46 7.06
(0.00286) (0.0154) (0.0913) (0.216)
France 3.99 4.96 2.91 3.41
(0.262) (0.421) (0.405) (0.637)
Croatia 6.95 12 7.11 13.7
(0.0736) (0.0354) (0.0685) (0.0175)
Italy 13.4 14.6 5.24 6.19
(0.00391) (0.0121) (0.155) (0.288)
Cyprus 3.09 3.19 1.87 2.29
(0.378) (0.671) (0.6) (0.807)
Latvia 5.52 6.07 1.02 1.58
(0.137) (0.3) (0.797) (0.903)
Lithuania 1.9 2.52 3.5 4.55
(0.594) (0.773) (0.32) (0.473)
Luxembourg 4.52 4.56 10.4 10.4
(0.21) (0.471) (0.0157) (0.0641)
Hungary 3.06 5.28 2.61 3.64
(0.382) (0.383) (0.455) (0.602)
Malta 7.6 7.72 8.55 8.66
(0.055) (0.172) (0.036) (0.124)
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Countries GDP Balance
Q(4) Q(6) Q(4) Q(6)
Netherlands 4.44 12.6 0.686 0.946
(0.218) (0.027) (0.877) (0.967)
Austria 1.58 2.45 2.68 3.23
(0.664) (0.783) (0.443) (0.665)
Poland 2.22 2.56 1.76 1.92
(0.528) (0.767) (0.623) (0.86)
Portugal 5.03 5.41 0.417 2.36
(0.17) (0.368) (0.937) (0.797)
Romania 1.23 5.59 2.35 2.88
(0.745) (0.349) (0.502) (0.718)
Slovenia 7.37 9.19 2.62 3.68
(0.0611) (0.102) (0.453) (0.596)
Slovakia 12.5 13.9 3.77 4.09
(0.00578) (0.0165) (0.288) (0.536)
Finland 1.93 2.14 5.23 5.38
(0.586) (0.829) (0.156) (0.372)
Sweden 5.02 5.1 0.256 0.409
(0.17) (0.403) (0.968) (0.995)
UK 11.4 12.2 4.81 9.84
(0.00988) (0.032) (0.186) (0.0799)
Iceland 0.31 4.5 2.06 4.4
(0.958) (0.48) (0.56) (0.493)
Norway 7.03 7.77 2.24 4.86
(0.0709) (0.17) (0.525) (0.433)
Switzerland 2.27 2.42 3.69 3.77
(0.517) (0.788) (0.296) (0.583)
Notes: P-Values in parentheses. The table displays Ljung-
Box Test statistics using 4 and 6 lags. An insignicant test
statistic implies that the null hypothesis of no autocorrela-
tion in the residuals cannot be rejected and the model is
well-specied.
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B.1.3 Critical Repraisal of the Estimation Methodology
The appendix section on specification issues concludes with a critical acknowledgment of the
employed method, the available data and the question at hand. The estimation strategy this
chapter uses builds on widely accepted and state-of the art time series methods. Compared
to ad-hoc or two-step approaches as e.g. the HP-Filter or the estimation of semi-elasticities,
the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach is a direct one. Of advantage is that the
SVAR approach does not need to deal with additional uncertainty from measurement errors
and estimation errors of the fiscal elasticities. It accounts for them directly. Furthermore, the
semi-elasticities are not necessarily time-constant and the two-step approach does not take
variations into account. The direct approach chosen here does that by assuming that the cycle
itself is a stochastic process. Nevertheless, some drawbacks of the underlying model are worth
mentioning. For the countries where quarterly government data is still relatively scarce, estima-
tion at an annual frequency covering 15 years for 13 coefficients can be problematic. The short
horizon and the enormous state-space may lead to likelihood functions which have no unique
(global) maximum and are not very well-defined. Additionally, the Kalman Filter Gain might not
converge against its steady state value. The formulation of prior beliefs about the distribution
of the coefficients and estimation within a Bayesian framework should improve results, espe-
cially with respect to probability boundaries obtained fromMonte Carlo simulation. In addition,
severe structural breaks affect the budget balances. Although the present model accounts for
country-specific outlier observations via the Mahalanobis distance, it would be preferable to
model them directly. However, that increased the number of coefficients to be estimated only
further. For big trend reversals that affected almost all countries equally as e.g. the European
Debt crisis an additional indicator variable solves this issue.
B.2 Deriving the Model
B.2.1 Basic Setup
This variant is based on the model by Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004). The initial state-space
setup looks as follows: The measurement equation is given by

yt,q
dt,q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
x t,q
=

1 0 0 0 α 0
0 0 1 0 α1 α2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

µ
y
t,q
β
y
t,q
µdt,q
βdt,q
ψt,q
ψt,q–1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
st,q
+

0 0
λ f λd

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

η
f
t,q
ηdt,q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
zt,q
+

ζ1t,q
ζ2t,q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
"t,q
,
(B.17)
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with
Σ"" =

σ2
ζ1
0
0 σ2
ζ2

and the state equation is given by:

µ
y
t,q
β
y
t,q
µdt,q
βdt,q
ψt,q
ψt,q–1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
st,q
=

1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 ρ1 ρ2
0 0 0 0 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

µ
y
t,q–1
β
y
t,q–1
µdt,q–1
βdt,q–1
ψt,q–1
ψt,q–2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
st,q–1
+

"
y
t,q
ν
y
t,q
"dt,q
νdt,q
ζ3t,q
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et,q
(B.18)
with
Σee =

σ2" y 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2νy 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2
"d 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2
νd 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

Both matrices, Σee and Σεε are positive-definite and bounded. If the estimated value of σvi is
very small, the ARIMA(0,2,1) trend components reduce to random walks with drift.
B.2.1.1 Building Quarterly Series out of Annual Data
For convenience, the state-space representation derived above is stated again:
x t,q = Ast,q + Bη
d
t,q + "t,q (B.19)
st,q = Cst,q–1 + et,q (B.20)
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Remember that for some countries yt,q is observed every whereas dt,q is unobserved only every
fourth quarter. You can account for these missing observations by applying a variable trans-
formation described in what follows. For this purpose an additional variable is defined, which
cumulates quarterly observed GDP values and weights the annually observed deficit numbers:
xat, j =
j∑
i=1
Wt,i x t,i ,
where
Wt,i =

1 0
0 wt,i

and wt, j =
Y nt, j
4∑
i=1
Y nt,i
For the respective fourth quarter, we now observe (cumulated quarterly) values for GDP and
the annual budget balance. It remains to integrate this auxiliary variable in the state-space
setup described above. By using that xat, j+1 = Ψu I x
a
t, j +Wt, j+1x t, j+1 it is possible to rewrite
the state-space system in the following way:
xat,q = Ψu I x
a
t,q–1 +Wt,q

ACst,q–1 + Bη
d
t,q + Aet,q + "t,q

st,q = Cst,q–1 + et,q,
where Ψq is an indicator equal to 0 if we are in the first quarter and equal to 1 else. Stacking both
equations into one system and defining a new selection matrix for the augmented observation
equation gives:
xat,q = Z
′qt,q,
with Z′ = [I 0] and as augmented transition equation
xat,q
st,q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
qt,q
=

Ψu I Wt,qAC
0 C

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nt,q

xat,q–1
st,q–1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
qt,q–1
+

Wt,qB
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mt,q

(η ft,q,η
d
t,q)
′
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
zt,q
+

Wt,q Wt,qA
0 I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rt,q

"t,q
et,q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
vt,q
(B.21)
where the combined shock process has zero mean and covariance matrix:
Σ =

Σ"" 0
0 Σee

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The new state-space system at quarterly frequency reads as follows:
xat,q = Z
′qt,q
qt,q = Nt,qqt,q–1 + Mt,qzt,q + Rt,qvt,q
Q = Rt,qvt,qv
′
t,qR
′
t,q = Rt,qΣR
′
t,q (B.22)
B.2.2 State Space Transformation into Annual Frequency
Finally, the joint quarterly state-space system is transformed in a way such that the model pa-
rameters can be estimated at an fully observed annual frequency. By construction, the auxiliary
variable, xat,4 displays the observed (annual) deficit value and cumulated real GDP, every fourth
quarter of a year. By exploiting the recursive structure of the system, it is possible to construct
the respective annual system matrices out of the quarterly frequency representation:
qt,4 = Nt,4qt,3 + Mt,4zt,4 + Rt,4vt,4 ⇔
qt,4 = Nt,4Nt,3qt,2 + Nt,4Mt,3zt,3 + Nt,4Rt,3vt,3 + Mt,4zt,4 + Rt,4vt,4 ⇔
. . .
qt,4 = Nt,4Nt,3Nt,2Nt,1qt–1,4 + Nt,4Nt,3Nt,2Mt,1zt,1 + Nt,4Nt,3Nt,2Rt,1vt,1 + Nt,4Nt,3Mt,2zt,2+
Nt,4Nt,3Rt,2vt,2 + Nt,4Mt,3zt,3 + Nt,4Rt,3vt,3 + Mt,4zt,4 + Rt,4vt,4 ⇔
qt,4 = N
4
t qt–1,4 + Mt,4zt,4 +
3∑
i=1
 
i–1∏
j=0
Nt,4– j
!
Mt,4–izt,4–i︸ ︷︷ ︸
M4t (zt,1,...,zt,4)
+ Rt,4vt,4 +
3∑
i=1
 
i–1∏
j=0
Nt,4– j
!
Rt,4–1vt,4–i︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξt,4
with
Nkt =
 
k–1∏
j=0
Nt,4– j
!
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and
E

ξt,4ξ
′
t,4

= Rt,4ΣR
′
t,4 +
3∑
i=1
 
i–1∏
j=0
Nt,4– j
!
Rt,4–iΣR
′
t,4–i
 
i–1∏
j=0
Nt,4– j
!′
≡ Lt,4
by assuming that E
 
vt,qv
′
u–i

= 0 for i 6= 0. The complete state-space system at annual frequency
reads as follows:
xat,4 = Z
′qt,4
qt,4 = N
4
t qt–1,4 + M
4
t (zt1, ...zt4) + ξt,4
Lt,4 = Rt,4ΣR
′
t,4 +
3∑
i=1
NitRt,4–iΣR
′
t,4–iN
i′
t
B.3 Kalman Filter Recursions
B.3.1 Recursive Estimation of Model Parameters Using Annual Series
The following state-space representation displays the system of equations at an annual fre-
quency, with details on the transformation steps discussed above.
xat,4 = Z
′qt,4 (B.23)
qt,4 = N
4
t qt–1,4 + M
4
t (zt1, ...zt4) + ξt,4, (B.24)
where equation (B.23) represents the measurement and (B.24) the transition equation.
Assumptions:
• xat,4 is a (2× 1) vector. It contains the cumulated sum of the logs of quarterly real GDP
and the annual budget balance ratio, both observable at point t.
• qt,4 is an [(2+m)× 1] state vector, containing the models data input x t,4 and the vector
of unobservable state variables st,q with length m.
• ξt,4 is a zero mean process formed as a linear combination of two independent zero mean
processes, with variance Lt,4 =
¦
ξt,4ξ
′
t,4
©
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• Z′ = [I 0] is a [2× (2+m)] selection matrix, ensuring the equality sign in the measure-
ment equation.
• N4t is a [(2+m)× (2+m)] transition or system matrix
• M4t (zt1, ...zt4) is a vector, an exogenous variable combining the influence of the financial
crisis and gross debt.
The following page presents outlier-robust Kalman Filter recursions in order to numerically
evaluate the log-Likelihood function of the annual unobserved components model.1 The log-
Likelihood function is then maximized in order to estimate the model’s unknown parameters.
The filtering method, initially developed by Kalman (1960) is a method for the recursive
estimation of (unobserveable) states, given measured observations of the output variable. This
setup follows Lütkepohl (2007), Hamilton (1994) and Chang (2014).
Initialization phase:
Kalman filter recursions are initialized with the unconditional mean and variance of the
state vector at t = 1. If all eigenvalues of the transition matrix are inside the unit circle, the
process describing the state variables is covariance-stationary. In this case, q1,4|0,4 = 0 and
vec(P1,4|0,4)=

In2 –
 
N41 ⊗N41
–1 · vec(Λ1,4) provide the initial conditions for starting the
recursion.
In our case, however, unity is an eigenvalue of the system matrix which implies singularity
of
 
In –N
4
t

and a non-unique solution.2 A proper way to initialize the unstable parts of the
variance-covariance matrix of the state vector is to set large numbers (like e.g. 107) on parts
of the main diagonal. This procedure is called diffuse state initialization. A more exact version,
accounting for the accumulation of numerical inaccuracies is presented in Koopman and
Durbin (2003).
Prediction Phase:
Given starting values qˆ1,4|0,4 and P1,4|0,4, the idea is to find estimates of qˆt,4|t–1,4 and
1 In the case when all data is observable at quarterly frequency, the same recursions are applied however no partial
updating steps are necessary. In this case the state-space aggregated to annual frequency but estimated using every
quarter.
2 This due to unit root behavior of β it,q–1 and µ
i
t,q–1 for i = {y , d} in the independent trend component of our UC
model, which are part of the state vector, st,q.
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Pt,4|t–1,4 for t = 2,3, . . . T . Since zt,q is deterministic, its entire path is known. For the
prediction of qt,4 this implies by transition equation (B.24):
Eˆ

qt,4|zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, , zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

= qˆt,4|t–1,4 + M
4
t (zt1, ...zt4) + 0 (B.25)
Forecasting for the observed variables gives:
xˆat,4|t–1,4 = Eˆ

xat,4|zt,4,qt,4

= Z ′ Eˆ

qt,4|zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

= Z ′qˆt,4|t–1,4 (B.26)
such that the forecast error and its associated variance-covariance matrix become:
xat,4 – xˆ
a
t,4|t–1,4 = Z
′  qt,4 – qˆt,4|t–1,4 (B.27)
E

(xat,4 – xˆ
a
t,4|t–1,4)(x
a
t,4 – xˆ
a
t,4|t–1,4)
′ = Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z (B.28)
Evaluation phase:
Let θ be the set of hyperparameters to be estimated. It comprises the following parameters:
θ =

α α1 α2 ρ1 ρ2 σ" y σv y σ"d σvd σξ1 σξ2 λ f λd

By assuming that the initial state qˆ1,4|0,4 and the innovation in the transition equation {ξt,4}Tt=1
are multivariate Gaussian, the distribution of our data conditional on the past is normal with
mean xˆat,4|t–1,4 = Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4 and variance Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z such that:
xat,4|zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4 ∼ N
 
(Z ′qˆt,4|t–1,4), (Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z)

(B.29)
For the (log-)Likelihood function follows:
fX at,4|Zt,4,x
a
t,4...,x
a
1,4,zt,4...z1,4

xat,4|zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt–1,4 . . . z1,4; θ

= (2pi)n/2 |Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z|–1/2 × exp{–12

xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4
′  
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z
–1 
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4

}
(B.30)
Lt,4(θ) = log fX at,4|Zt,4,xat,4...,xa1,4,zt,4...z1,4

xat,4|zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt–1,4 . . . z1,4; θ

=
–
n
2

log(2pi) –
1
2
log|Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z|–1 –
1
2

xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4
′  
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z
–1 
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4

(B.31)
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which is evaluated for t = 1,2, . . . , T by the prediction error decomposition. Variable n is the
length of the vector of observed variables at point in time t. The joint (log-)Likelihood of the
model is just the sum of the conditional likelihoods.
Outlier Correction
At this point the Kalman-Filter Algorithm is extended for an outlier-correction mechanism.
This extension is based on Chang (2014). Sometimes outliers violate the assumptions made on
the conditional distribution of the data - or stated otherwise - the distribution is contaminated
by other distributions. Chang (2014) thinks of that as a modeling error and constructs a hy-
pothesis test in order to check if the actual observation is compatible with the model, i.e. the
null hypothesis of the test cannot be rejected. Using a judging criterion based on the square
of the Mahalanobis distance, the test determines whether the Chi-squared, with m degrees of
freedom distributed distance between the true and the predicted observations is larger than the
distance between the observed and the predicted observations. The test statistic is given by:
γ¯k =
s
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4
′  
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z
–1 
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4
2
(B.32)
If the test statistic exceeds a critical value (e.g. for a 1% significance) this indicates an out-
lier detection. The following algorithm shows how to correct the prediction error variance for
outliers:
• Calculate initial distance γ¯k(0) and set the initial scaling factor λk(0)= 1.
• If and as long as γ¯k > χα: Inflate Rk(t)= Z ′Λ4t Z , which is part of the prediction error
variance with the scaling factor λk and calculate a new prediction error variance given
by:
Qk(t) = Z
′ N4t Pt–1,4|t–1,4N4′t  Z + Rk(t) (B.33)
• Calculate λk(t + 1) as follows:
λk(t + 1) = λk(t) +
γ¯k(t) – χα
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4
′  
Qk(t)
–1  
Rk
  
Qk(t)–1

xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4

(B.34)
• Update γ¯k.
The scaled version of the prediction error variance leads to the fact that in the updating phase,
outliers don’t play too big a role anymore when calculating the Kalman Filter Gain.
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Updating phase:
Updating the inference about the state vector qt,4:
qˆt,4|t,4 = Eˆ

qt,4|x
a
t,4, zt,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

= qˆt,4|t–1,4 – Pt,4|t–1,4Z(Z
′Pt,4|t–1,4Z ′)–1

xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4

(B.35)
given by the fact that: Eˆ(ξt,4|xat,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4)= 0,
The associated MSE follows:
Pt,4|t,4 = E

(qt,4 – qˆt,4|t–1,4)[(qt,4 – qˆt,4|t–1,4)
′
= Pt,4|t–1,4 – Pt,4|t–1,4Z
 
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z
–1
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4 (B.36)
Forecasting phase:
Producing a forecast of qt+1,4|t,4:
qˆt+1,4|t,4 = Eˆ

qt+1,4|zt+1,4, x
a
t,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

= N4t+1 Eˆ

qt,4|x
a
t,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

+ Eˆ

M4t+1(zt+1,1, ...zt+1,4)|x
a
t,4, zt,4, . . .

+ Eˆ

ξt+1,4|x
a
t,4, x
a
t–1,4 . . . , x
a
1,4, zt,4, zt–1,4, . . . , z1,4

= N4t+1 qˆt,4|t,4 + M
4
t+1(zt+1,1, ...zt+1,4) + 0
By substitution of (B.35) follows:
qˆt+1,4|t,4 = N
4
t+1 qˆt,4|t–1,4 + N
4
t+1Pt,4|t–1,4Z
 
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4
–1 
xat,4 – Z
′qˆt,4|t–1,4

+ M4t+1(zt+1,1, ...zt+1,4)
(B.37)
The associated variance-covariance matrix can be found by substituting from (B.37) and (B.24):
Pt+1,4|t,4 = N
4
t+1

Pt,4|t–1,4 – Pt,4|t–1,4Z
 
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4Z
–1
Z ′Pt,4|t–1,4

N4t+1
′
+ 0 + Λt+1,4,
(B.38)
where Λt+1,4 = E

ξt+1,4ξ
′
t+1,4

and var(M4t+1(zt+1,1, ...zt+1,4))= 0 for all t = 0,1,2, . . . , T
[0.5em] Repeating this algorithm until T and implementing a numerical maximization (or
minimization for the negative of the (log-)Likelihood function) search routine estimates the
models hyperparameters, given the data.
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B.4 Partial Updating and Fixed Interval Smoothing
After estimating the models unknown parameters at a fully observed annual frequency3 it re-
mains to find estimates of the unknown state qt,q using full sample information. This is done
via Kalman Filter recursions where new information on real GDP and inflation is received every
quarter, whereas updates on the budget balance ratio are only available every fourth quarter.
Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004) alter the standard updating equations such that:
qˆt,q|t,q = qˆt,q|t,q–1 + Pt,q|t,q–1ZJ
′
qF
–1
t,qJq

xat,q – Z
′qˆt,q|t,q–1

(B.39)
Pt,q|t,q = Pt,q|t,q–1 – Pt,q|t,q–1ZJ
′
qF
–1
t,qJqZ
′Pt,q|t,q–1, (B.40)
where Ft,q = JqZ ′Pt,q|t,q–1ZJ ′q represents the MSE of the prediction error, transformed in such
a way that full information is only obtained when q = 4. This is done by defining Jq as matrix
equal to [1 0] if q < 4 and equal to an (2× 2) identity matrix if q = 4.
The prediction equations are similar to those at annual frequency, for sake of completeness
they are provided again:
qˆt,q|t,q–1 = Nt,qqˆt,q–1|t,q–1 + Mt,qzt,q
Pt,q|t,q = Nt,qPt,q|t,q–1N
′
t,q + Rt,qΣR
′
t,q
Using the outcome of the Kalman Filter recursions, the filtered states are smoothed in order
to recover the exact states, given all information on xa1,1, . . . , x
a
4,T . Sequences of filtered state
vector and variance plus the forecast MSE are stored. The smoothed state vector and variance
at point in time T are initialized with the last filtered values obtained from the Kalman Filter.
For all t < T the Fixed Interval Smoothing Algorithm of Ansley and Kohn (1982) is given by:
qˆt,q|T ,4 = qˆt,q|t,q + Ht,q
 
qˆt,q+1|T ,4 – Nt,q+1qˆt,q|t,q – Mt,q+1zt,q

(B.41)
Pt,q|T ,4 = Pt,q|t,q – Ht,q
 
Pt,q+1|t,q – Pt,q+1|T ,4

H′t,q, (B.42)
where Ht,q = Pt,q|t,q N′t,q+1|t,qP–1t,q+1|t,q is the Kalman Smoothing matrix.4
3 This step is only required when the sample length of the data for country j is extended using annual data.
4 In case that Pt,q|t+1,q is not invertible, Ansley and Kohn (1982) propose to use an generalized inverse, instead.
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